Non-propositional analyses of belief. by Feldman, Richard Harold
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1975
Non-propositional analyses of belief.
Richard Harold Feldman
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Feldman, Richard Harold, "Non-propositional analyses of belief." (1975). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2129.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2129

NON-PROPOSITIONAL ANALYSES OF BELIEF
A Dissertation Presented
By
Richard Harold Feldman
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial
ulfillment of the requirements for the degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
April 1975
Phi I osophy
(c) Richard Harold Feldman 19/5
All Rights Reserved
NON- PROPOS I T I ONAL ANALYSES OF BELIEF
A Dissertation
By
Richard Harold Feldman
Approved as to style and content by:
Herbert Heidel berger
,
Chairman of Committee
- Ojl/l/b Uh i ‘i /C'l
Gareth B. Matthews* Member
.0
.
fl
icb'nvcLA, ul s u-
Edmund L. Gettier, Member
>iX~^7\aa^ / J Rd<L
Barbara H. Partee, Member
_JZ
Robert C. Sleigh', Department Head
Philosophy Department
i i i
Apri 1 1975
NON-PRO POSITIONAL ANALYSES OF BELIEF
Richard H. Feldman, B.A. Cornell University
M.A., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Prof, Herbert Heidelberger
In this dissertation I will evaluate three principal
kinds of non-propositional analyses of belief. The first kind
is the sentential analysis, according to which belief sentences
may be interpreted as relating people to sentences. A view of
this sort has been defended by Rudolf Carnap in Meaning and
: jNecess ity .
The second kind of non-propositional analysis of belief
to be discussed is the inscriptions! (or utterance) analysis,
according to which belief sentences may be interpretated as
relating people to inscriptions or utterances. The views of
this sort that I will criticize have been presented by Israel
Scbeffler in The Anatomy of Inqu iry and by Donald Davidson
in "On Saying That".
The third kind of non-propositional analysis is the
non-relational analysis, according to which belief sentences are
iv
not relational at all. I will discuss
defended by W. V. 0. Quine in Word and
Objects of Thought, and Jaakko Hintikka
the versions of this view
Object
,
A. N. Prior in
in "Semantics for
Propositional Attitudes".
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Chapter I
PROPOSITIONS
In Chapters 3 and 14 of Some Main Problems of Philosophy'1
G. E. Moore discusses propositions. 2 In Chapter 3 he says that
there "certainly are in the universe such things as propositions"^
and he goes on to describe some of their more important charac-
teristics. In Chapter 14 he comes to a different conclusion,
namely, "that there simply are no such things as propositions."^
Many philosophers have been more sympathetic with Moore's
later view, that there are no propositions, than with his earlier
view, that there are. In large part the reason for the stronger
appeal of the negative view is that neither Moore's nor anyone
else's account of propositions leaves the reader certain that
there are such things.
Moore's discussion of propositions may be summarized as
follows:
(1) Propositions are not "any of those collections of words,
which are one of the things that are commonly called propositions."^
The word 'proposition' is sometimes used to mean 'sentence, 1 and
Moore is here pointing out that he is not using the word in that
way.
(2) Propositions, Moore says, are "the sort of thing which
these collections of words express" or "what these words mean."^
1
i he collections of words to which Moore refers are sentences, so
propositions are the meanings of sentences, and sentences are
said to express propositions.
Elsewhere Moore points out that not all sentences express
propositions. For example, a sentence such as 'Close the door'
does not express one. In general, it is only declarative
sentences that express propositions.^
(3) When one sees or hears a sentence, and understands it,
one "apprehends" the proposition expressed. A proposition, then,
is "the sort of thing which is apprehended" when one understands
a sentence. 8
(4) One may simply apprehend a proposition without making any
judgment about it, or one may adopt any of a number of attitudes
toward it. Moore mentions only the possibilities of believing
it and disbelieving it,^ but there are several others that may
be added to his list. One may doubt a proposition, know it,
assert it, etc. All of these positions one may take or have
with respect to a proposition are called "propositional attitudes." 8
(5) Propositions "are a sort of thing which can properly be
said to be true or false,"^ although Moore admits that other
things may also be said to be true or false, for example, beliefs
(acts of believing) and sentences.
Moore has suggested elsewhere that propositions are the
"primary" truth bearers. This means that the sense of 'true*
3in which things other than propositions are true may be defined
in terms of the sense in which propositions are true, but the
propositional sense cannot be defined in terms of the other
senses. Thus, a belief is true provided it is a belief in a
true proposition; a sentence is true provided it expresses a
true proposition.^
(6) In Chapter 14 of Some Main Problems of Phi losophy
Moore adds another item to this list of characteristics of
proposi tions. It is that we can always form a name of a proposition
by prefixing a sentence expressing that proposition with the
word 'that'. “ Thus, for example, the proposition that lions
exist is named by the expression 'that lions exist 1
. Any
expression consisting of 'that' followed by a sentence may be
called a "that-clause".
Item (2) in this list of characteristics of propositions
is a source of some difficulty. Richard Cartwright has argued
persuasively that a sentence such as 'It is raining' is used
to express different things on different occasions, but its
meaning remains constant.^ 4 Thus, what a sentence means and
what it expresses diverge, at least in some cases. Let us
reserve 'proposition' for what is expressed by a sentence.
We may leave open the question whether what is meant by a
sentence and what is expressed by it ever coincide.
I can see no further inconsistencies in Moore's account
4of propositions, but there is one respect in which it should be
supplemented. It is generally said of propositions that they
are abstract entities whose existence is necessary
J
5 They are,
therefore, not physical objects located at seme particular place
or time.
If Moore was right when he said that there are propositions,
then a number of facts concerning belief and belief sentences
seem subject to simple explanations. I will turn now to a
discussion of how prepositions can aid in these explanations.
The supposition that that-clauses are names of propositions
seems to allow us to give an unproblematic account of the
semantics of belief sentences. In a typical extensionsal
semen rics for a language, we show how the truth value of every
sentence in the language is determined by the extensions of
the expressions making up the sentence. The extension of a
name is an object and the extension of an n-place predicate is
a set of ordered n-tuples of objects. On the supposition that
that-clauses are simple names, belief sentences may easily be
incorporated in a language for which an extensional semantics
may be given.
By saying that that-clauses are simple names, I intend to
contrast them with complex names, which are names having
meaningful parts and whose meaning (or extension) is somehow
determined by the meaning (or extension) of these parts. For
5example, one might say that 'the father of Nixon' is a complex
name, whose extension is determined by the extensions of its
meaningful parts, 'the father of and 'Nixon'.
Suppose F is a function that assigns to each simple
English expression its extension. It will thus assign to each
simple name some object and to each n-place predicate some
ordered n-tuple of objects. F( 'Moore'), then, will be the man,
G. E. Moore, F('that lions exist') will be the proposition
that lions exist, and F( ' bel ieves
' ) will be a set of ordered
pairs of people and propositions such that the first member of
each pair, the person, believes the second member, the
proposition.
We are now in a position to specify the truth conditions
for a typical belief sentence, e.g.,
1. Moore believes that lions exist.
The truth conditions will be stated by this principle:
'Moore believes that lions exist' is true iff <^F('Moore'),
F('that lions exist')/* e F( ' believes ')
.
(2) is simply an instance of a more general formula
covering all belief sentences:
3. For any names a and ^that 03 ra believes that 0^ is true
iff <^F (a)
,
F( r that 0^ )/> e F( ' bel ieves' )
6(3) itself is simply an instance of a still more general
formula that provides the truth conditions for all atomic
sentences. Ignoring a problem about word order in English, we
may state this general formula this way:
4. For any names a ,...,a and any n-place predicate P, rP(cq...a V
is true iff <F(a
1
)...FTan)> e F(P).
V 1 n '
On this account of belief sentences, then, no special rules need
be added to the truth definition to cover them.
Let us call the theory just sketched the "naive
propositional view", or simply "(NPV)". (NPV) has a number of
advantages. First, it seems clear that speakers of diverse
languages may believe the same thing. If, for example, both
Nixon arid Brezhnev believe that detente is good, then they
believe the same thing. Nothing about (NPV) is inconsistent
with this fact. Although the two men would use different
sentences to express their common belief, we may say that there
is one proposition, namely, that detente is good, and that both
Nixon and Brezhnev believe it.
Second, since propositions are abstract entities they are
not dependent for their existence upon languages or language
users. Therefore, even if no one expresses a proposition, it still
may exist and be believed. This accords with the fact that some
beliefs are never expressed. Thus the sentence 'Jones believes
7something that never has been and never will be expressed 1 may be
true. (NPV) accounts for this, since nothing prevents F( 'believes*
)
from including an ordered pair consisting of Jones and some
proposition that never has been and never will be expressed.
A third advantage of (NPV) is that it explains the
invalidity of certain inferences. For example,
5. Plato believed that nine is greater than seven,
may be true despite the falsity of
6. Plato believed that the number of planets is greater than
seven.
The fact that nine is the number of planets does net prevent (5)
and (6) from differing in truth value. (NPV) provides a simple
explanation of this: the that-clauses in (5) and (6) name
different propositions. Plato believed one of them, but not the
other.. Hence, (5) and (6) have different truth values.
Although (NPV) has all these advantages, it is subject to
some important criticisms. By treating that-clauses as simple
names, it seems to ignore some extremely important facts about
language.
Since any sentence can be preceded by 'that', and there
are an infinite number of sentences, it follows that there are
an infinite number of that-clauses. If each that-clause is a
8simple name, there are an infinite number of simple names.
The view that English has an infinite number of simple
names is an implausible one . 15 If it is true, it follows that
no one could ever be capable of understanding all the atomic
sentences of English, since no one could ever learn the entire
primitive vocabulary. It seems clear, however, that the number
of simple expressions is finite, and that it is possible for
someone to master all of them, as well as all the rules for
combining expressions, and thus be in a position to understand
all the atomic sentences.
Independent of these general considerations are some more
specific considerations about that-clauses that suggest that they
are not simple names. It seems clear that anyone who understands
a sentence is thereby able to understand a that-clause constructed
out of it. For example, anyone who understands 'lions' and
'exist' and thus understands 'Lions exist' is thereby able to
understand 'that lions exist'. No additional information is
required to understand the that-clause, except possibly about
the function of 'that'.
If that-clauses were simple names, however, understanding
'lions' and 'exist' would be of no more aid in understanding
'that lions exist' than understanding the words 'nix' and 'on'
is in understanding 'Nixon'. This suggests that that-clauses
are not simple names, but complex ones, whose meaning, or
9denotation, somehow is determined by the meaning or denotation
of its parts.
One additional problem with (NPV) is that it fails to
account for points (2) and (6) in Moore's list of attributes of
propositions. Point (2) was that sentences express propositions
and (6) was that a that-clause names the proposition the sentence
in it ordinarily expresses. But (NPV) says nothing about
sentences expressing propositions. It attributes truth values
to sentences, but in no way relates sentences to propositions.
(Except in the roundabout way that sentences may contain names
of propositions, and thus can be related to them in this way.)
There are, then, two problems with (NPV). One is that
it treats that-clauses as simple names, but this seems
implausible on general theoretical grounds, as well as being
a factually incorrect treatment of that-clauses. The second
problem is that it does not do justice to an intuition about
that-clauses and propositions, namely, that any that-clause
names the proposition ordinarily expressed by the sentence
contained in it.
Gottlob Frege developed the basic ideas for a
propositional theory that is superior to (NPV) with respect to
the points just mentioned. 17 Frege's ideas were further
developed by other philosophers, primarily Alonzo Church.
Frege's central idea is to assign to each meaningful expression
10
two semantic values instead of just one. In addition to its
extensions each name, predicate, and sentence has a sense or
intension as well. (The extension of a sentence is its truth
value.) Tne introduction of senses provides the basis for a better
theory than (NPV).
What follows is a highly simplified account of the Frege-
Church propositional view (PV). Every primitive expression is
ass'gned a sense as well as a reference. The reference of every
primitive expression is exactly the same as its extension on (NPV)J 9
That-clauses
,
however, are not counted among the primitive
expressions. The sense of an expression is its meaning, or
perhaps what it expresses. For a name, the sense is an individual
concept, e.g., the sense of 'Moore' is the individual concept of
Moore. For a predicate the sense is a property, e.g., the sense
of 'is wise' is the property wisdom. For a sentence the sense
turns out. to be the proposition it expresses.
In order to keep this exposition as simple as possible,
let us consider a language having only two names, 'Moore' and
'Russell', two predicates, 'is wise' and 'believes', and the
word 'that'. Consider first the sentence:
7. Moore is wise.
Its truth conditions are exactly as would be expected. What
is novel about (PV) is the introduction of senses. On Church's
11
reconstructions of Frege's theory, the sense of 'is wise', i.e.,
the property wisdom, is a function that maps individual concepts
onto propositions. For example, it maps the concept of Moore
onto the proposition that Moore is wise, the concept of Russell
onto the proposition that Russell is wise. As a result, the
sense of (7) is the proposition that Moore is wise.
In addition to proposing a second semantic value for
expressions, Frege had another important insight. It was that
in certain contexts, called "oblique contexts", words refer to
something other than their usual referent. In particular,
in contexts following the verbs expressing propositional
attitudes, words refer to what they usually express.
Consider the sentence:
8. Russell believes that Moore is wise.
Frege's proposal is that in (8) 'Moore' and 'is wise' refer to
what they usually express, and as a result 'Moore is wise'
refers to, instead of expressing, the proposition that Moore
is wise. We can assume that 'that Moore is wise' refers to
this proposition as well, although this does not make clear
what the import of 'that' is. Perhaps it is just to warn us
that what follows refers to its usual sense. The rest of (8)
is unproblematic. 'Russell' refers to Russell, and 'believes'
refers to a set of ordered pairs. (8) is true if and only if
12
ths set assigned to 'believes' includes the pair consisting of
Russell and the proposition that Moore is wise.
Earlier I cited two problems with (NPV). One was that it
incorrectly treated that-clauses as simple names. (PV) remedies
this by making them complex names whose reference depends upon
the reference of their parts.
The second problem with (NPV) was that it did not make
1 hat-clauses refer to the proposition ordinarily expressed by
the sentences they contain. But (PV) has corrected this defect
as well, making it a much better theory.
It must be admitted, however, that difficult problems
arise in working out the details of the theory. Various
technical problems arise when quantifiers, descriptions, and
other expressions are introduced. Another problem that must be
faced is a determination of the sense of expressions occurring
in oblique contexts. Although these problems have not been
completely resolved, Church has been able to develop some
rather promising formulations of (PV). At the very least,
then, (PV) seems to be a viable and attractive theory.
Many philosophers object to (PV) on more general grounds
than that it has not been worked out in all its detail. Their
objection is that it requires us to suppose that there are
individual concepts, propositions, and other abstract objects,
and these philosophers doubt that there are any such things.
fc
V
.<*
13
Moore himself came tc reject propositions. He rejects a
theory something like (PV) on the grounds that
...if you consider what happens when a man entertains
a false belief, it doesn't seem as if his belief
consisted merely in his having a relation to some
object which certainly is. It seems rather as if the
thing he was believing, the object of his belief, were
just the fact which certainly is not - which certainly
is notTbecause his belief is false. This, of course,
creates a difficulty, because if the object certainly
is not - if there is no such thing, it is impossible
for him or for anything else to have any kind of
relation to it.
2Q
Moore goes on to say that his own view
...may be expressed by saying that there simply are
no such things as propositions . That belief does
no£ consist, as the former theory held, in a relation
between the believer, on the one hand, and another
thing wh ; ch may be called the proposition believed
.
^
Bertrand Russell shared Moore's misgivings about
propositions. He wro te
:
Time was when I thought there were propositions
,
but
it does not seem to me very plausible to say that
in addition to facts there are also these curious
shadowy things going about such as 'That to-day is
Wednesday' when in fact it is Tuesday. I cannot
believe they go about the real world. It is more
than one can manage to believe, and I do think no
person with a vivid sense of reality can imagine it. 22
A number of other writers have shared Russell's and
Moore's skepticism about propositions. Part of Russell's
skepticism seems to be founded on his feeling that propositions
14
are "curious” entities, perhaps ones whose nature he does not
fully understand. But such a feeling need not be a sound basis for
doubting their existence. It would be like doubting the existence
of electrons on the basis of an incomplete understanding of them.
In general, if there is theoretical evidence for the existence of
a certain kind of entity, it seems wrong for one to doubt its
existence simply because he does not fully understand its nature.
Not all the objectors to propositions base their objections
simply on bewilderment over what propositions are or simply on
the feeling that there are no such things. Some have objected that
no clear criterion for individuating propositions has been provided
by their proponents. That is, we seem to lack an effective method
for determining whether a proposition p and a proposition q are
2T
in fact the same proposition.
Nevertheless, proponents of propositions, especially Church,
are willing to defend them on the grounds that there is no
acceptable, or even promising, alternative to theories like (PV ).
24
The situation, as Church sees it, is that we must accept propositions
unless some viable alternative is produced.
Numerous alternatives to (PV) have been proposed and some
have been widely discussed in the literature. I think, however,
that many of these theories have neither been clearly refuted
nor shown to be acceptable, and that there is a need for
further evaluation of them. Should one of them prove acceptable,
it would provide the basis for a fairly powerful objection to
(PV), namely, that (PV) is committed to the existence of more
15
entities than are required for an adequate account of belief.
In the chapters that follow I will discuss several of the more
interesting alternatives to (PV).
There are some methodological difficulties that will be
found in the discussion that follows. In propounding the
theories to be considered, some philosophers seem to be concerned
with showing that beliefs may be expressed in artificial
languages in which no reference is made to propositions. Others
deal directly with English belief sentences. Of those who
oeal directly with English, some try to escape commitment to
propositions by showing that none of the expressions j n belief
sentences are names of propositions. Others attempt to
establish this conclusion by paraphrasing belief sentences into
other sentences that, they claim, contain no references to f
proposi tions.
In all these cases there are some methodological
considerations that bear upon the adequacy of the proposal. For
example, when belief sentences are paraphrased into other
sentences, an evaluation of the proposal requires a decision on
the conditions of adequacy for paraphrases. Some philosophers
require synonymy, some logical equivalence, and seme have even
weaker requirements.
For the most part I will try to avoid arguing against a
proposal on methodological grounds alone. For example, against
16
a philosopher who holds a weak view of paraphrasing, I will not
argue that the stronger view is correct, and that his account of
belief sentences is incorrect, even though it satisfies his own
standards. Instead, I will attempt to evaluate proposals on the
standards cf their proponents.
Sometimes, however, the philosopher's standards are not
made clear, and in such cases I will have to impose my own. But
at all times, I will try to be clear about exactly what
methodological assumptions and standards are in use.
Finally, in some cases the theories to be discussed are
not developed by their proponents in sufficient detail to make
any evaluative judgments about them. In such cases I will try
to develop the theory in a way that accords with the general aims
of the defender of the theory. I will try to make clear what
features of any theory were part of the original theory and what
additions I have made.
17
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PART I
SENTENTIAL THEORIES
For those wishing to avoid commitment to propositions, a
natural alternative to (PV) is to construe the objects of belief
as sentences. Sentences are thought to be more concrete entities
than propositions, and therefore sentential theories are favored
over (PV) on ontological grounds. Rudolf Carnap has proposed two
sentential theories and they will be discussed in the three
chapters that make up Part I.
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CHAPTER II
CARNAP
One of the most interesting and widely discussed accounts
of belief sentences may be found in Rudolf Carnap's Meaning and
Necessity. 1 Carnap's theory is that belief sentences may be
analyzed by metalinguistic sentences expressing a certain relation
between believers and sentences. Although he eventually rejects
this theory, 2 I think a discussion of it will serve as a useful
background for the theories to be discussed in later chapters.
I
A. Carnap's theory. Carnap begins his discussion of belief
sentences in Meaning and Necessity by asking us to consider the
sentence
:
1. John believes that D.
'D' is an abbreviation of some sentence of an object language,
S, that is "not a symbolic system but a part of the English
O
language." 0 (1), apparently, is also an abbreviation of a
sentence of S.
21
Discussion will be easier if we proceed in terms of a
sample belief sentence instead of an abbreviation such as (1).
Therefore, we will recast what Carnap said about (1) so that
it applies to:
2. John believes that the earth is round.
We shall assume that (2) is a sentence of S.
Carnap's view is that (2) can be "interpreted" or
"analyzed" in terms of John's dispositions to make affirmative
responses to sentences. In part (B) of this section I will
examine Carnap's view on the nature of the relation that must
hold between (2) and a sentence that analyzes it. For now let
assume that any sentence that analyzes (2) must be logically
equivalent to it.
Carnap notes that it will not do to analyze (2) by
3. John t s disposed to respond affirmatively to 'The earth is
round'
.
There are at least two objections to the view that (2) may be
analyzed by (3). First, as Carnap points out, since John might
not understand English, it is possible that he is not disposed
to respond affirmatively to 'The earth is round' although he
does believe that the earth is round/
Second, since 'The earth is round' can be a sentence of
many different languages, and it can have many different
23
meanings, John might use the sentence to mean something other than
that the earth is round, and tend to respond affirmatively to it
even though he does not believe that the earth is round. Thus,
(2) and (3) clearly are not logically equivalent, and (2) cannot
be analyzed by (3).
In order to meet these problems Carnap proposes a slightly
more complicated formulation of his theory. It is that (2) is
analyzed by:
4. John is disposed to respond affirmatively to some sentence T
as a sentence of some lanquage S' such that T in S' is
synonymous with 'The earth is round' in S.
Carnap thinks that (4) overcomes the problems encountered
by (3), and it seems to do just that. (4), unlike (3), allows
John's responses to be to a sentence of any language at all. It
does not require his responses to be to an English sentence.
Furthermore, the fact that the sentence to which he does
tend to respond affirmatively may be part of several languages
seems to be no problem. All that is relevant to the truth of
(4) are his responses to the sentence as a part of a certain
language.
Tin's last point may not be as clear as it first appears.
While it is easy enough to tell when a person is responding to a
certain sentence, it is not as easy to tell whether or not he is
responding to it as a part of a particular language. Suppose,
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Tor example, that John is just learning English and tends to
confuse the words 'flat' and 'round’. 6 Assume that he does
not believe that the earth is round, i.e., that (2) is false,
but that he tends to respond affirmatively to 'The earth is
round', because he thinks that it means that the earth is flat.
Snould we say that he is disposed to respond affirmatively to
this sentence as an English sentence?
It is not clear what the correct answer to this question
is. On the one hand, John does speak English and does intend
to be responding to the sentence as an English sentence. On
the other hand, he doesn't understand the English sentence, and
is taking it to mean something other than what it means in
Engl isn. Perhaps, then, we should say that he is responding to
it not as an English sentence, but as a sentence of his own
version of English, English^
In order to avoid a clear counterexample to his theory,
Carnap must take the latter alternative. Otherwise in the
circumstances described, (2) is false although its proposed
analysis, (4), would be true. Thus, Carnap must say that John
is disposed to respond to 'The earth is round' not as a sentence
of English, but as a sentence of English.. In English. 'The
J j
earth is round' means that the earth is flat and therefore is
not synonymous with 'The earth is round' in English. So we
may assume that John is not disposed to respond affirmatively
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to any sentence in Engl ishj (or any ether language) synonymous
with 1 The earth is round 1 in English. Therefore, (4) is false.
This view also has some troubling consequences for Carnap's
theory. It requires him to say that there are an unusually large
number of languages, probably one for each speaker and time.
This shows that the term 'language' in Carnap's theory must be
understood differently from the way in which it is ordinarily
understood. But perhaps this fact, in itself, is not an
objection to the theory. 7
Although Carnap introduces the concept of synonymy into
his analysis of (2) in order to permit John's response to be to
sentences in languages other than S (English), it has an
important consequence concerning the substitution of sentences
of the same language in belief contexts. Suppose that the
sentences The earth is round 1 and 'The world is round 1 are
synonymous in S. If (4) is the analysis of (2), then the analysis
of
5. John believes that the world is round
wi 1 1 be
6. John is disposed to respond affirmatively to some sentence T
as a sentence of some language S' such that T in S' is
synonymous with 'The world is round' in S.
It may easily be shown that (4) and (6) are logically
26
equivalent, and therefore, the sentences they allegedly analyze,
(2) and (5), must be logically equivalent as well. Since 'The
world is round' and 'The earth is round' are synonymous in S,
if John is disposed to respond affirmatively to some sentence
of some language synonymous with one of these sentences in S,
it follows by transitivity of synonymy that he is disposed to
respond affirmatively to some sentence of some language
synonymous with the other sentence in S. So (4) and (6) are
equivalent and, according to Carnap's theory, the English
sentences (2) and (5) are equivalent.
On Carnap's theory, then, we may substitute for 'The earth
is round' in (2) any sentence synonymous with it, and the
resulting sentence will have the same truth value as (2). More
generally, we may say that if
<J) and VF are synonymous English
sentences, then V may be substituted for in sentences of the
form believes that without altering the truth value of the
sentence. We may express this point by saying that on Carnap's
theory synonymy is the criterion for substitution of sentences
in belief contexts.^
Carnap goes on to offer an analysis of synonymy. It is
that sentences are synonymous if and only if they are intensionally
isomorphic. Intensional isomorphism is defined with some
precision, but I think we need not concern ourselves with this
concept here. Many philosophers have criticized Carnap's
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analysis of synonymy, 10 and Carnap seems to have abandoned it
in his later writings. 11 But I think that a precise account of
synonymy is not required for an evaluation of his proposal to
analyze (2) by (4).
More generally, it seems that the question whether belief
sentences may be analyzed in terms of a relation between
believers and sentences is independent of the question of what
the criterion for substitution of sentences in belief contexts
is. Since the former question is the one I wish to explore
here, I will confine my attention to it and will not discuss the
latter question. I will assume, therefore, that we have a
sufficiently clear notion of synonymy to understand sentences
like (4) and (6) and that we understand (4) and (6) well enough
to evaluate the proposal that they analyze (2) and (5)
respectively. Before turning to an evaluation of this proposal,
I will clarify a few points about the nature of Carnap's theory.
The nature of Carnap's theory
. In various places Carnap
describes the general nature of his theory, and some of these
descriptions differ significantly from others. When he first
presents the theory in Meaning and Necessity he says that his
view is that a sentence such as (2) is a sentence of an object
language, S, that may be "interpreted by the. . .semantical
sentence" (4). (4), then, would be a sentence in a
metalanguage, M, for S, and would provide the truth conditions
for (2).
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In other places, however, Carnap describes his theory in
rather different terms. In his "Replies and Systematic
Expositions" he says that on his theory "belief-sentences belong
to the metalanguage M." 13 He adds, "I translate them [belief
sentences] into metalanguage." 1 ^
Elsewhere Carnap says of a modified version of his theory
that it has certain disadvantages, namely, "it abolishes the
customary and convenient device of indirect discourse, it uses
the metalanguage, and it becomes cumbersome in the case of
iteration (e.g., 'James asserts that John believes that...'
would be replaced by a sentence about a sentence about a sentence.)" 15
These later remarks all suggest a second account of
Carnap's theory. This second account is that he favored a formal
reconstruction of English that consists of an object language,
S, and a metalanguage, M, and perhaps additional meta-metalanguages
Belief would be expressed not in S, but only in M (and
possibly higher). Thus, in order to express belief in this
system, one would use metalinguistic sentences such as (4).
Furthermore, in Carnap's system indirect discourse and
that-clauses would be abolished and therefore sentences like
(2) would not occur anywhere in the system. Carnap's reason for
banning indirect discourse is that he thinks it causes enormous
unnecessary complexity.^ 8
The difference between these two interpretations of
Carnap s theory is significant. On the first account belief is
expressed by object language sentences such as (2), which will
be interpreted by metalinguistic sentences such as (4). On the
second account, (2) is simply banned from the object language
and belief is expressed only in the metalanguage by sentences
like (4).
I think that the textual evidence clearly supports the
second account of Carnap's theory. In discussing Carnap's
views Donald Davidson notes that there is an important
difference between Carnap's treatment of modal sentences and hi
treatment of belief sentences. 17 Carnap gives a semantical
account of modal sentences, explaining the rules of
substitution for expressions in such sentences. 18 However,
Davidson explains, Carnap's treatment of belief sentences is
significantly different.
[Carnap]. . .does not provide a semantical analysis
of [belief sentences] in the sense of showing how
out of the meanings of expressions of less than
sentential scope the meanings of the sentences are
constituted. Rather the analysis translates
such sentences as wholes into other sentences
to which, tnen_, Carnap's full semantical analysis
. . .may be applied.-^
In commenting on Davidson's paper Carnap raises no
objection to this description of his method, and adds that a
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direct semantical analysis of belief sentences would require
a theory like (PV). 2° It seems clear, therefore, that « should
understand Carnap's theory in the second of the two ways
described above.
As I understand it, then, Carnap's proposal is that
English belief sentences such as (2) will be expressed in a
formal system in the metalanguage in terms of sentences like (4).
Locutions such as (2) will not be admitted into the system at
P lall. It is this view that will be discussed in the remainder
of this chapter.
This account of Carnap's theory leaves open one important
matter. I have described the theory by saying that sentences
oF English will be expressed formally by certain sentences, but
have not said what relation must hold between the original
English sentence and its formal counterpart. Carnap seems to
have thought that the sentences should be logically equivalent,
but not synonymous. 22 Other philosophers, however, would demand
synonymy. While there may be some serious problems with
Carnap's weaker demands, I will ignore them here, and evaluate
his theory in terms of his own standards. 22
II
Objections to Carna p' s theory . I believe that a few examples will
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Show that (2) and (4) are not logically equivalent and therefore
that (4) is not a proper analysis of (2). The examples all make
use of the fact that a person may not be disposed to respond
affirmatively to sentences in a way that indicates his beliefs.
Suppose that John is a chronic liar who does believe that
the earth is round. 24 Being a liar, John generally denies
every sentence that he cakes to express something he believes
and affirms those sentences he thinks are false. Let us
suppose that John speaks English and no other language, and that
he properly understands the sentence 'The earth is round' in
English. Given all these conditions (2) is true, but John is
not disposed to respond affirmatively to The earth is round’
as an English sentence, nor is he disposed to respond
affirmatively to any sentence synonymous with 'The earth is
round' in English. Hence, (4) is false and therefore does not
properly analyze (2).
Other examples lead to the same conclusion. John might
be unconvinced by Columbus' discoveries and remain a secret
member of the Flat Earth society and advocate of the view that
the earth is flat. Yet, because he is embarrassed to admit his
peculiar views, he is disposed to respond affirmatively to The
earth is round'. In this case, (4) is true but (2) is false.
These examples show that linguistic dispostions are not
conclusive evidence for belief. While it may be that people
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generally do tend to respond affirmatively to the sentences
that they take to express their beliefs, they do not always have
such tendencies. This may happen for a variety of reasons. A
person may be inclined to lie, or may have something wrong with
his ears so that he consistently mishears certain sounds or, more
incredibly, may be afflicted with some rare disease that has as
a symptom yelling 'No' whenever someone utters some particular
sentence even though he believes what that sentence expresses.
A defender of Carnap's analysis might contend that none of
these examples is counter to the proposed analysis. Consider the
case of a liar who believes that the earth is round, but always
denies it. One might argue, in Carnap's behalf, that such a
person has two conflicting dispostions, one to respond
affirmatively to 'The earth is round' and one to deny it. His
belief accounts for the former disposition and his tendency to
lie accounts for the latter. The reason he always responds
negatively to 'The earth is round 1 is that the dispostion to lie
is the stronger of the two and it overrides the disposition to
tell the truth.
This defense of Carnap's analysis is inadequate. Although
it may explain the cases in which (2) is true but (4) seems
false - that is, the cases in which John has the belief but does
not seem to have the disposition - the other cases, those in
which (4) is true but (2) is false, are yet to be explained.
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Postulating some overriding disposition is of no help here. He
simply does have a disposition to respond affirmatively to 'The
earth is round' as an English sentence but does not believe that
the earth is round.
Another way to defend Carnap's theory is to suggest some
minor changes and improvements in his analysis of (2). It is
not clear, however, that any satisfactory modification of (4)
can be constructed that does not make use of the expression
'believes' or some other expression that may only be understood
in terms of belief. Let us consider one possibility, and let us
replace (4) by
7. If John were completely honest then John would be disposed
to respond affirmatively to some sentence T of some
language S' such that T iri S' is synonymous with 'The
earth is round' in S.
There are at least two problems with (7). First, it is
not clear that it overcomes all the objections like those
raised against (4). Suppose John is completely honest,
understands that 'The earth is round' means in English that the
earth is round, but tends to mishear certain sounds and as a
result tends to respond negatively to 'The earth is round' even
though he believes that the earth is round. It seems that in
such a case (2) is false but (7) is true.
Another problem with (7) is that in appealing to the
34
concept of honesty, we seem to make covert use of the concept
of belief. For the antecedent of (7) seems to mean that John
would be disposed to respond affirmatively to a sentence if and
only if he believes that it is true. But if (7) is to be
analyzed, ultimately, with reference to the concept of belief,
the analysis would seem to be circular. 25
Ocher attempts to repair Carnap's analysis lead to
similar difficulties, but since Carnap eventually rejected this
theory, I think we may overlook these other attempts here.
Instead, I will turn in the next chapter co the theory that
Carnap proposed when he abandoned this one.
Ill
It may be useful to conclude this chapter by pointing out
an important difference between Carnap's theory and (PV). It
is that, in a certain respect, Carnap's theory is more ambitious
than (PV). According to (PV), belief sentences express a
relation between believers and propositions, but no attempt was
made in Chapter I to provide any analysis or explanation of that
relation.
Carnap, however, proposes that belief be analyzed in terms
of a relation true of believers, sentences and languages. It is
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in the analysis of the relation that his theory goes wrong.
However, no argument was given here against Carnap's weaker
claim, i.e., that belief can be analyzed in terms of a relation
true of believers, sentences and languages.
The theories to be considered in the next four chapters
are more like (PV) than like Carnap's theory in this respect.
That is, they are all proposals to the effect that belief may
be analyzed in terms of a relation true of believers and certain
other objects, such as sentences or inscriptions, but in no
case is there any attempt to characterize this relation.
Because these theories do not contain any analysis of the
relation in terms Oi which belief may be analyzed, they are more
difficult to criticize than the theory discussed in this chapter.
For we cannot object, as we did here, that analyzing belief in
terms of some particular relation is not correct. Instead, it
must be shown that there is no relation true of the specified
kinds of objects that can be used to analyze belief. Although it
is difficult to prove conclusively that there is no relation
true of believers and sentences, or between sentences and
inscriptions, such that belief may be analyzed in terms of it,
I think that there are some compelling reasons for concluding
that there is none and in the following chapters I will state
these reasons.
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CHAPTER III
CARNAP AND CHURCH
By the time Carnap came to write "On Belief-Sentences" 1
he no longer thought that belief sentences could be analyzed
in terms of sentences about linguistic behavior. Nevertheless,
he still thought that belief could be analyzed in terms of a
triadic relation whose terms are believers, sentences, and
languages. Carnap's theory in "On Belief-Sentences", and some
criticisms Alonzo Church has made of it, 2 will be the topic of
this chapter. Additional criticisms of this theory will be
offered in Chapter 4.
I
A. Carnap's new theory
. Carnap takes the dispute between himself
and advocates of (PV) to be a dispute about the "best form for
belief sentences in a formalized language of science." 3 In (PV)
a belief sentence will be expressed in the formal language in
the same way it is expressed in ordinary language. Thus,
1. John believes that the earth is round,
will be a sentence of the formal language as well as of English.
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On Larnap's view belief sentences will be expressed in a
different way in the formal language. His way "avoids indirect
discourse; here a belief-sentence does not like [(!)] contain
a Partial sentence expressing the content of the bel ief
,
but
instead the name of such a sentence." 4 (1), he says, will be
expressed by:
2
’
of
h
English
he relati °" 8 t0 ' The earth 1s round ' as 3 sentence
Although (2) may be confirmed to some degree by sentences about
John's observable behavior, it is not derivable from such
sentences. Carnap expresses this point by saying that 1 B 1 is
a "theoretical construct".^
Carnap describes (2) as follows:
i he rules For B would be such that [(2)] does not
imply that John knows English or any language
whatsoever. On the other hand, the reference to
an English sentence in [(2)] may be replaced by a
reference to any other synonymous sentence in any
language; e.g., [(2)] is taken to be L-equivalent
wi th
.-g
3. John has the relation B to 'Die Erde ist rund' as a sentence
of German.
In evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of his
theory, in comparison to ( PV ) , Carnap says:
...[The sentential theory] has certain disadvantages; it
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abolishes the customary and convenient device of
it i'JrnLf
1300
^
50
’
it;
.
uses the metalanguage, andbecomes cumbersome in cases of iteration (e.q.James asserts that John believes that..." wouldbe replaced by a sentence about a sentence about
a sentence). The main disadvantage of [(PV)] isthe complexity of the language, whereas the languagefor the [sentential theory] may be extensional andtherefore very simple. The introduction of logical
modalities produces already considerable complications,
ut the use of indirect discourse increases them
still more
.
7
A more general statement of Carnap's theory is that all
English sentences of the form:
4. a^ believes that
<f>,
where <j> is a sentence, may be replaced in the metalanguage, M,
for the formalized language of science, by sentences of the
form:
4. a_ has the relation P> to <j> as a sentence of English.
Carnap asserts that if anyone stands in relation B to a
sentence 4> of a language L, then he stands in the same relation
to any sentence of any language that is synonymous with cf> in L.
This assertion may be expressed in terms of the following rule
of M:
6
.
(x)( 4>)(¥)(L)(L
t )'(If x has the relation B to <j> as a sentence
of L and <f> in L is synonymous with ¥ in L', then x has the
relation B to ¥ as a sentence of L').
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It may be useful to compare this theory with Carnap's
previous theory. On both theories Carnap favors eliminating
typical English belief sentences from his formalized reconstruction
of English, and replacing them with metalinguistic sentences. But
the replacement sentences of these two theories are significantly
different. Whereas the replacement sentences in the old theory
are recognizable English sentences, the new replacements are
not. That is, sentences of the form of (4) in Chapter II are
English sentences that we do understand reasonably well, whereas
sentences of the form of (5) are not English because
'
B
' is not
a predicate in English.
Since B is not a predicate in English, and sentences of
the form of (5) are not English sentences, Carnap's new theory
is difficult to evaluate. Consider, for example, the implication
of Carnap s theory that (1) may be analyzed by (2). Since we
do not know what 1 B 1 means, and therefore do not know what (2)
means, it is difficult to evaluate the claim that (1) may be
analyzed by (2).
In effect, Carnap's new theory makes a more modest
assertion than his old one. The new theory seems to assert no
more than that there is some triadic relation, expressed by ' B
'
,
and holding of people, sentences, and languages, such that
belief may be expressed in terms of it. In order to refute this
theory, one must show that there is no such relation.
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0ne ml
'
9ht °Wect th^ Carnap's theory, even if true, has
little ontological significance.8 For it may be true that there
is some relation, B, holding of a person, sentence, and language
such that belief sentences may be expressed in terms of it. But
it may also be true that this relation obtains only if the person
involved stands in some appropriate relation to a proposition.
Thus, the truth of Carnap's theory need not imply that we can
escape commitment to propositions.
Some may think that it is in fact the case that there is
a relation of the kind required for the truth of Carnap's theory
and that this relation can only obtain if there are propositions.
For it would seem that belief sentences may be expressed in terms
of the following triadic relation: believes the proposition
expressed by in the language
.
Thus, (1) would be
equivalent to:
7. John believes the proposition expressed by 'The earth is
round' in English.
Thus, it seems that we can analyze (1) by a sentence relating
a person to a sentence and a language, and Carnap's theory
appears to be true. But this triadic relation appears to
obtain only if there is some proposition expressed in English
by 'The earth is round' and John believes that proposition.
So despite being true, Carnap's theory may be committed to
exactly the same entities as (PV).^
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What this shows, I believe, is that the truth of Carnap's
theory would not show that there are no propositions or that we
can avoid them in analyzing our language. Perhaps that
conclusion can only be established by proving that the relation
B is not like the one considered in (7). Therefore, even if no
strong arguments against Carnap's theory are forthcoming, we
should not conclude that there are no propositions or that (PV)
is committed to more entities than Carnap's theory.
II
Some of the most interesting discussions of Carnap's
theory of belief, and of sentential theories generally, are
contained in Church's paper, "On Carnap's Analysis of Statements
of Assertion and Belief", and the responses it has elicited from
Hilary Putnam, 10 Donald Davidson, 11 and others. 12
Church's brief paper contains several distinct, but
related arguments against Carnap's proposal. While it may be
that we should accept Church's criticisms only if we make
certain methodological assumptions Carnap would not make, I
think a thorough discussion of his arguments is well worthwhile.
For one thing, it will help us clarify the nature of Carnap's
proposal, as well as some others that will be examined later,
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by bringing out some of the metatheoretical views it relies
upon. Furthermore, a number of commentators have dealt with
Church s objections too hastily, and missed their full force.
The methodological assumptions Church makes that Carnap
does not share concern the nature of analysis. Church seems
to think that an English sentence can only be expressed properly
in a formal language by a sentence that is synonymous with it . 13
Carnap, however, thinks that an English sentence can be expressed
properly in a formal language by a sentence that is logically
equivalent but not synonymous with it . 14 Rather than try to
settle this methodological difference, I will merely try to
indicate all those points at which it becomes important.
Church s arguments are actually directed at an analysis
of statements of assertion that he correctly believes to be
similar to Carnap's analysis of belief sentences that was
discussed in Chapter II. The main point of his arguments,
however, is to show that there is an "insuperable objection" to
all such "analyses that undertake to do away with propositions
in favor of such more concrete things as sentences ." 15 Thus,
even though Church's arguments deal directly with an analysis
other than Carnap's latest one, they are intended to apply to
it. Moreover, they do pose an insuperable objection to this
analysis if and only if they pose an insuperable objection to
Carnap's analysis. Therefore, no harm will be done if we ignore
the analysis of indirect discourse Church actually discusses, and
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apply his arguments directly to Carnap's analysis of belief.
As I will formulate Church's arguments here, they will be
directed at the view that the English sentence (1) may be
analyzed by (2), which is a sentence of M. Church presents at
least four arguments against this view. I will discuss three
of them in this section. His fourth argument concerns iterated
belief sentences, but it is not clear to me exactly what that
argument is. I think that there is a problem in formulating such
sentences on Carnap's theory, and will discuss it in Chapter IV.
A. Lhurcl^fi^^upm. Church's first argument is contained
in this passage:
However, [{2)] is likewise unacceptable as an analysis
or (lj. ror it is not even possible to infer (1) as
a consequence of [(2)], on logical grounds alone - but
only by making use of the item of factual information,
not contained in [(2)], that [ ' i he earth is round 1 ]
means in English that [the earth is round].
^
16
In this argument Church seems to assume only that one sentence,
S a can be an analysis of another. S', only if S implies S'
J
7
He dees not here rely upon his stronger assumption, that the
sentences must be synonymous. With this assumption made explicit,
we may formulate the argument this way:
ARGUMENT 1
(]) (S) (S' ) ( If S is an analysis of S', then S implies S')
(ii) IF (2) is an analysis of (1), then (2) implies (1)
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_
(iii) (?) does not imply ( 1
)
(ivj ( 2 ) is not an "analysis of (f)
The crucial premise in Argument 1 is (iii). Church's
only defense of it is his claim that in order to infer (1) from
(2) we need the additional premise:
8. 'The earth is round 1 means in English that the earth is round.
Church thinks that (8) is contingent and not implied by (2).
Thus, since the contingent premise (8) is required to derive (1)
from (2), (2) by itself does not imply (l). 18
In a recent discussion of Church's paper, R. J. Haack
argues that sentences such as (8) are not contingent. 13 He claims
that the fact that the 'The earth is round' might have meant, for
example, that the earth is flat, does not imply that (8) is
contingent. For, he claims, if 'The earth is round' were to
change its meaning, then (8) would also change its meaning, and
remain true.
Haack' s reasoning is seriously defective. His argument
seems to be that (8) is not contingent because in all
circumstances, the sentence, as used by speakers in those
circumstances, would be true. There are two things wrong with
this argument. First the premise is simply false. People can
use (8) to express anything they like, ar.d some may use it to
express falsehoods. So there are circumstances in which (8),
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as used by speakers, in those circumstances, is false.
Second, the argument is invalid. To say of a sentence
that it is necessarily true is to say that, given the meaning
it actually has, it is true relative to every possible
circumstance. It does not mean that in every possible circumstance
has a meaning such that it is true in those circumstances on
that meaning. How others might use the sentence has nothing to
do with its contingency as used by us. So, even if, for some
inexplicable reason, everyone had to use (8) to express a truth,
it would no: follow that, as used by us, it is a necessary truth.
Of course the failure of Haack's argument for the necessity
of (8) does not show that (8) is contingent. Although it would
be desirable to have some argument for that conclusion. Church
himself never offers one. However, G. E. Moore once proposed an
argument like Argument 1 in certain respects, and he gave two
reasons for thinking that sentences such as (8) are contingent. 20
The sentence Moore discusses is:
9. Tne sentence At least one person is a King of France 1 means
that at least one person is a King of France.
Moore's first reason for thinking that (9) is contingent is that
it means the same as:
10. Les r.:cts 'At least one person is a King of France' veulat
dire qu'une personne au moins est un roi de France.
do), he thinks, is quite obviously contingent, so ( 9 ) must be
contingent as well.
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It seems to me, however, that (10) is no more obviously
contingent than (9) is. Perhaps (9) is more obviously true to
3 SPeak6r °f Engl1sh tha" 00) is, but that doesn't even suggest
that either is contingent. Appeal to (10), then, does not show
that (9) is contingent.
Moore's example may be used to make a similar, but
somewhat stronger argument for the contingency of sentences like
(9). If (9) and (10) are necessary truths, then so is:
n
'
mears
e
tha?
C
at'le
e Personne au m01
'
ns un roi de France'n t least one person is a King of France.
(9) and (11) imply
The sentence 'line
means the same as
personne au moins est un roi de France'
'At least one person is a King of France.'
If (9) and (11) are both necessary, then, since they imply (12),
(12) is also necessary. But (12), it seems to me, is surely
not necessary. It seems that it is a contingent matter of fact
that the two sentences mentioned in (12) mean the same. Therefore,
(9) and (11) are not both necessarily true. But if one of them
is not necessary, then neither of them is.
Moore's second reason for thinking that (9) is contingent
is tnat At least one person is a King of France' might have meant
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something entirely different than it does. This, I think, is true.
But it also leads us to see an important difference between (8) and
(9). For it is true that 'At least one person is a King of
France' might have meant something different from what it does
mean (in English). It might be or have been a sentence in some
other language. But what is less clear is that it could have
meant something other than it does mean in English and still have
been English. For (8) to be contingent and required in the
derivation of (1) from (2), it must be that sentences could have
different meanings in English than they actually have.
Cnurch says that in his argument he "assumes that the word
English' in English
... has a sense
... something like 'the
language which was current in Great Britain and the United States
in A. D. 1949’.
"
21
He observes that one might consider taking
the sense of 'English' in English to be 'the language for which
such and such semantical rules hold'. If 'English' is defined
in this second way, he thinks that the objection that (1) is
not a consequence of (2) "would disappear." 22
Church's point seems to be this. If 'English' is defined
in terms of its semantical rules, then (8) means the same as
something like
13. 'The earth is round' means in the language in which 'The
earth is round' means that the earth is round and ... that
the earth is round
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Uhat is omitted from (13) is a specification of all the other
sentences of English and their meanings. (Since the number of
English sentences is infinite, a more plausible reading of (8)
would replace the specification of the meaning of each sentence
with a specification of the meaning of each primitive symbol
plus the rules for determining the meaning of sentences from the
meanings of the primitive symbols.)
Furthermore, if 'English' is defined in this way, (2)
would mean something like:
14. John has the relation B to 'The earth is round' as a
sentence of the language in which 'The earth is round'
means that the earth is round and...
(What is omitted from (14) is a specification of the meanings
of all the other sentences of English.)
It does seem that (14) implies (1), so if (2) and (14)
mean the same, tnen (2) implies (1). Indeed, we may conclude
that (2) implies (I) even if (2) and (14) are logically
equivalent but not synonymous. (2) and (14) are logically
equivalent provided 'English' necessarily has the same
extension as the description of the language having all the rules
of English. Thus, Argument 1 turns upon whether or not 'English'
is equivalent to such a description. If it is, then premise (iii)
is false and the argument is unsound. If 'English' is not
equivalent to such a description, but rather to something like
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'the language current in the United States and Great Britain in
A.D. 1949', then (iii) is true, and the argument is sound.
I think that it is clear that English could have had
different semantical rules than it has, and therefore that
'English' is not logically equivalent to a description of the
language having all the rules English actually has. As we will
see, Carnap seems to agree with this. Thus, I would say that
(m) is true and that Argument 1 is sound. However, it is
difficult to prove that English could have been different, so
perhaps we should not conclude that Argument 1 presents a
decisive objection to Carnap's theory.
Before moving on to Church's second argument, I would like
to examine a comment that Carnap makes on Argument 1. In "On
Belief-Sentences" he says that the argument "does not apply to my
analysis because.
. .[it] does not refer to historically given
languages, but rather to semantical systems, which are defined
by their rules. 1,22 i t j nd this comment extremely puzzling,
even though a number of commentators on Church's arguments have
accepted it. 24 Apparently, Carnap thinks that Argument 1 poses
a good objection to the claim that an English sentence such as
(I) can be analyzed by (2). His own analysis, however, is not
intended to be applied to English sentences, but to sentences
in artificial semantical systems.
There are a few things that are important to note about
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this comment. First, Carnap's comment may have been at variance
with his previous exposition. He introduces his discussion of
belief sentences in ^in^anOecess^ by saying, "We take here
as our object language S, not a symbolic system, but a part of
the English language.
Second, all the examples he gives to illustrate his
analysis are in terms of sentences in natural languages. 26 So
there is good reason to think that when he wrote all the articles
containing these examples, he did intend the analysis to apply
to natural languages.
To bs. fair, I should note tnat he does make reference to
the rules of the object language S. So it is possible that he
thinks there is a part of English which includes belief sentences,
for which semantical rules can be specified. Perhaps, he regards
this part of English as a formal system.
The problem with this view is that Carnap never develops
a system with sentences like (1). In fact, as I mentioned in
Chapter II, he thinks any system admitting such sentences to
be needlessly complex and prefers his own system in which sentences
like (1) are "replaced by" sentences like (2).
27
Finally, if we do not regard Carnap's theory to be that
English sentences like (1) may be expressed formally by (2), it
is not at all clear what we should take his theory to be. If
it only applies to formal systems, what does it say about them?
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What formal systems does it apply to?
Since Carnap never provides any answers to these
questions, I think it is best to interpret his theory in the
way suggested here, and ignore his comment to the effect that
his analysis does not apply to English.
B
‘ Church's first argument against
Carnap's theory relies on a disputable assumption about the
meaning of the word 'English' and for that reason it may not
constitute a decisive objection. We will turn now to his
second objection, which makes use of the "translation test"
first discussed by Langford. 28
Church's argument is contained in this passage:
Following a suggestion of Langford we may bring
out more sharply the inadequacy of [(2)] in an
analysis of (1) by translating into another
language, say German, and observing that the two
translated statements would obviously convey
different meanings to a German (whom we may
suppose to have no knowledge of English). The
German translation of (1) is [(1
' ) (Johann
glaubt, die Erde is rund)]. In translating
[(2)], of course, 'English" must be translated
as 'Englisch' (not as ’Deutsch') arid ['The
earth is round’] must be translated as ['The
earth is round'] not as ['Die Erde is rund'].
2g
This argument makes reference to sentences (1) and (2)
and their German translations. The translation of (1) is:
1'. Johann glaubt, die Erde ist rund.
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The translation of (2) would seem to be:
2‘. Johann hat das Verhaltnes B zu dem Satz 'The earth is
round' auf Englisch.
In the argument Church assumes that if (2) is an analysis
of (1) then the two sentences "convey the same meaning". I
assume that this means that they mean the same or, in other
words, are synonymous. Since the translations of (1) and (2)
are synonymous with (1) and (2) respectively, all four sentences,
0 ) , 0')> (2), and (2'), should be synonymous. But (1
' ) and
(2 1 ), Church thinks, are not synonymous since they convey
different meanings to a German who does not know English.
We can formulate this argument as follows:
ARGUMENT 2
(i) (S)(S')(If S is an analysis of S', then S and S'
are synonymous)
(ii) If (2) is an analysis of (1), then (2) and (1)
are synonymous
(iii) (1) and (!') are synonymous
(iv) (2) and (2') are synonymous
(v) If (2) is an analysis of (1), then (1‘) and (2‘)
are synonymous
( vi
)
( V ) and (2 1 ) are not synonymous
(vii) (2) is’ not an analysis of (1
)
The two crucial premises of Argument 2 are (i) and (vi).
Church thinks that (vi) turns on the same issue raised in
connection with Argument 1, namely, the contingency of
sentences like;
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8. 'The earth is round'
round.
means in English that the earth is
Apparently, his reason for thinking this is that if (8) is
necessarily true, then (2') and (T) are synonymous. If, on
the other hand, (8) is contingent, then (2') and (V) are
not synonymous.
Church's contention that Argument 2 turns on this point
is surprising. He seems to think that Arguments 1 and 2 are
roughly the same, the main difference being that Argument 2
makes use of translation in an effort to be more compelling.
However, there is, or at least there seems to be, a
significant difference between the two arguments. According to
Argument 1, (2) does not satisfy the conditions for being an
analysis of (1) because it is not logically equivalent to (1).
According to Argument 2, (2) does not satisfy the conditions
for being an analysis of (1) because it is not synonymous with
( 1 ).
Church holds, I believe, that logically equivalent
sentences may have, or convey, different meanings, so it seems
that in Argument 2 he places a stronger requirement on analyses
than he does in Argument 1. It may turn out that (2) and (1)
are logically equivalent, but not synonymous
. In that case,
Argument 1 would be unsound but Argument 2 would be sound. It
seems, then, that it is a mistake for him to think that these
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two arguments are roughly the same.
Clearly, the different methodological assumptions of
Carnap and Church mentioned at the beginning of this section
are of great importance in Argument 2. For Carnap would reject
premise (1) on the grounds that it places too strong a
requirement on analyses. So he would reject this argument no
matter what we say about (vi).
It is important to note that Carnap agrees that (1) and
(2) are not synonymous and therefore that he must appeal to his
own weaker view of analysis in order to respond to Argument 2. 3 °
Anyone favoring a stronger view of analysis cannot consistently
maintain Carnap's theory of belief.
However, since Argument 2 turns on this methodological
point, I will not discuss it further. I think that there are
some questions that may be raised about Church's claims on the
synonymy or non-synonymy of certain sentences, but similar
issues arise in connection with Argument 3, and I will discuss
them in considering that argument.
C * s thlriLl!3Hggj]^ We can turn now to Church's third
argument. He describes one that does not turn on the contingency
of sentences such as (8).
The argument is contained in this passage:
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ofafr'fpn
the P roposa1 ’ for English, to analys
5 WS
r
aVe> f° r ^Srma n . thp nrnnncal +
analyse (1) as. ..[(2") which
Verhal tens B zu dem Satz 'Die
Deutsch'].
, e proposal
is 'Johann hat das
Erde ist rund' auf
e
to
Because of the exact parallelism between them thetwo proposals stand or fall together
in German and [(2)] in English are not
acceptable sense translations of each othc,.,
3
1
Yet [(2")]
in any
;r.
As I understand it, the point of this argument is not
just to show that (1) and (2) are not synonymous, but to
demonstrate a different defect in Carnap's proposal. The idea
is that if Carnap's proposal were correct, then when it is
applied to the German translation of (1), it should result in
a sentence which is the German translation of (2). What we
get, however, is (2") which is not a translation of (2), since
it refers to a different sentence than (2) does.
We can formulate the argument this way:
ARGUMENT 3
( 1 ) ;(A)(A )(If S and S' are synonymous and A
and A are analyses of S and S' respectively,
then A and A' are synonymous)
If (I) and (1‘) are synonymous and (2) and (2")
are analyses of (1) and (l 1 ) respectively, then
are synonymous
are synonymous
are not synonymous
are not the analyses of (1) and (!')
(ii)
( i i i
)
(iv)
(v)
(2) and (2")
( 1 ) and (1
'
)
(2) and (2")
(2) and (2")
res pec ti vely
(vi) If (2) and (2") are not the analyses of (1) and
(r_) respectively, then (2) is not the analysis of fll
(vi l n?7 is not the^na1'^lToT~nT^ — ~
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I will consider two objections to Argument 3. The first
is that premise ( iv) is false because (2) and (2") are
translations of one another, and therefore are synonymous. A
number of philosophers have pointed out that it is not clear
that (2) and (2 !l ) are not acceptable translations of one
another, and if trarislatabil ity is a mark of synonymy, then it
is not clear that they are not synonymous. 32 In many
circumstances the appropriate translation of a quoted sentence
will be the translation of that sentence. For example, in
translating a novel in which there is a great deal of quoted
dialogue, one would translate the words inside the quotes,
rather than leave them in their original language. Similarly,
then, perhaps one should translate the quoted sentences in (2)
and (2") and shift the reference to a language. So, perhaps
(2) and (2") are acceptable translations.
It is surely true that in some cases the correct
translation of a sentence containing quoted expressions would be
one in which the quoted expressions are translated rather than
left in their original language. There are, however, cases in
which the quoted material surely should not be translated, 33
e.g.
,
in
11. 'Grass is green' is an English sentence.
In translating (11) into German, for example, one would not
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translate 'Grass is green' into its German equivalent. I„ orde r
to decide whether or not (2) and (2") are correct translations,
we would have to decide whether these sentences are more
appropriately translated like sentences in a novel, or like (11).
Both sides in this dispute seem to assume that (2) and
(2") are synonymous if and only if they properly translate one
another. Since they have differing views about proper
translation, they come to different conclusions on the synonymy
of (2) and (2"). I think, however, that this shared assumption
may be false and that it may be the source of some confusion. 34
Whether (2) and (2") are cotranslations seems to be a pragmatic
matter depending upon the context and purposes of the translation.
But I would say that (2) and (2") clearly are not synonymous.
One asserts that John stands in a certain relation to an English
sentence and the other asserts that he stands in the same relation
to a different sentence of a different language. Since they are
about different objects, (2) and (2") are not synonymous. I think,
therefore, that this objection to Argument 3 fails.
Donald Davidson has raised another objection to Argument
35
3. He argues that the demand that (2) and (2") be synonymous
is unreasonable since Carnap holds that a sentence need only be
logically equivalent to a sentence that analyzes it. Thus,
Davidson would say that (i) is unreasonable in view of Carnap's
position on analysis.
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1 thlnk that (i ) may wel ' be mistaken, for a reason
sitmlar to, but not identical with the one Davidson suggests.
(i) does not imply that a sentence must be synonymous with its
analysis, (i) should be distinguished from another principle
quite like it:
^
^
^and A'
A
]h
A S and S ' are synonymous andA an t e analyses of S and S' respectivelythen S and A and S' and A' are all synonymous')
’
(i 1 ) is similar to the principle Church appeals to in Argument 2,
and it is one Carnap would reject, (i), however, is somewhat
different. What it requires is, roughly, that sentences which
analyze synonymous sentences be synonymous themselves. This
requirement might hold even if a sentence need not be synonymous
with a sentence that analyzes it.
The following situation might be analogous to the one
under consideration. Suppose we have a valid argument with only
one premise, P, and the conclusion, C. Now, since the argument
is valid P implies C, although they need not be synonymous. If
we were to construct the same argument in another language, we
would want the new premise, P
* ,
to be synonymous with P, and
the new conclusion, C', to be synonymous with C. Again, however,
it is not required that C‘ be synonymous with P 1 .
Similarly, in the case of analysis, we might say that if
A is the analysis of S, and S’ is synonymous with S, then the
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analysis of S', A', should be synonymous with A. This does not
imply that A and S or A' and S' are also synonymous.
Thus, simply pointing out that Carnap holds a weaker view
of analysis than Church holds does not show that it is unreasonable
to appeal to (i). (i ) does not imply that Carnap's view of
analysis is wrong.
However, (i) may well be objectionable. Carnap can
argue that a given sentence may have several non-synonymous
analyses. There is, then, no such thing as the analysis of a
particular sentence. The conclusion of Argument 3 can be accepted
by Carnap: his claim is that (2) is an analysis of (1), not that
it is the only one.
We might try to revise Argument 3 to conclude that (2) is
not even an analysis of (I). In order to do that we might replace
(i) by:
(i ) (S)(S')(A)(A , )(If S and S' are synonymous and A
and A' are analyses of S and S' respectively,
then A and A' are synonymous)
But (i") is clearly false, given the possibility of multiple
non-synonymous analyses of a given sentence. Thus, (i") will
not help to repair Argument 3.
There is only one other way I can see to repair this
argument. Church says that the proposal that (2") is an analysis
of (T ) is "analogous" to the proposal that (2) is an analysis of
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(1). In commenting on the argument, Putnam says that these two
analyses are “constructed along the same lines". 36 Perhaps we
can say that analyses constructed along the same lines from
synonymous sentences should be synonymous. Thus, we would use
as our first premise:
^
^ s and S' are synonymous and Aand A are analyses of S and S' constructed
along the same lines, then A and A' are
synonymous)
We could then construct an argument like Argument 3, but use
Ci ) instead of (i) as the first premise. Some other changes
would have to be made, but we can overlook them here, since (i 1 ")
seems unsatisfactory.
It is, first of all, not at all clear when two analyses
are constructed along the same lines. But even if we do admit
that there is some sense to this concept, it is not clear why
we snould think that ( i ‘ ) is true. If one sentence may have
several non-synonymous analyses, why should not some of them be
constructed along the same lines? Since we have no argument in
favor of (i'"), I think we must reject any argument that makes
use of it.
Church's third argument thus seems less successful than the
previous two. Although neither Argument 1 nor Argument 2 proves
that Carnap's theory is wrong, they do force any defender of the
theory to hold two controversial views. First, that sentences in
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Ensllsh riecessa!''ly mean whatever they do, in fact, mean; and
second, that analysis should be construed in a weak fashion
requiring only that a sentence be logically equivalent to a
sentence that analyzes it. Argument 3, however, has no interesting
consequences like these.
Cnurch offers a fourth argument against Carnap's view,
concerning iterated belief sentences, but it is not clear to me
exactly what his argument is. I think there is a problem in
formulating such sentences on Carnap's theory, although I am not
sure that the problem I see is the same as the one Church sees.
In the next chapter I will discuss three objections to Carnap's
theory, one of which concerns the formulation of iterated belief
sentences
.
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CHAPTER IV
OBJECTIONS TO CARNAP'S THEORY
In this chapter I will discuss three objections to
Carnap's theory of belief sentences. The first is that there is
no way to properly express iterated belief sentences in his
theory. The second is that his analysis of belief sentences fails
unless sentences are taken to be abstract objects such as
properties or universals. The third objection, and the most
serious one, is that his theory fails to deal adequately with
a problem caused by the existence of ambiguous sentences.
I
l^CiL®±heLief^te^_es. In addition to an account of typical
belief sentences such as:
1. Kissinger believes that detente is good
an adequate theory of belief sentences ought to provide some
account of iterated belief sentences, such as:
2. Brezhnev believes that Kissinger believes that detente is good.
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Carnap says that on his theory a sentence like (2) "would be
replaced by a sentence about a sentence about a sentence". 1
Although Carnap never says what sentences would replace
sentences like (2), I think his view can be reconstructed in
the following way. The embedded belief sentence should be analyzed
first, and then his analysis applied to the resulting sentence.
In the case of (2) his analysis should first be applied to the
content sentence, yielding:
3
'
^Detente ifoood- ^ K1s ? 1n9*r haS ths relat1 °" B tos good as a sentence of English.
Next, his analysis is applied to (3), yielding:
4
‘
B
r
to
h
"Dete
h
nt^i-s
re1a
!i
ion B to 'Kissinger has the relation
sentence o? M.
S 9°°d 35 3 Sentence of E"9"sh' « a
(4), I believe, is the sentence about a sentence about a sentence
that would replace (2).
Let us assume for the moment the adequacy of Carnap's
analysis of (3), i.e., that (3) and (4) are equivalent. I think
it can be shown that (4) is not a correct analysis of (2). For
13) and (4) imply that Brezhnev has a belief concerning a certain
English sentence, but (2) has no such implication. (2) is
consistent with Brezhnev's having no knowledge of English, and
his having no beliefs on the relations Kissinger has to any
English sentence. So (3) and (4) attribute to Brezhnev a belief
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(2) does not attribute to him. (3) and (4), then, are not
equivalent co (2), and therefore Carnap’s analysis of (2) is
incorrect.
Davidson notes that Carnap's analysis of sentences like
(2) is subject to this objection, and correctly locates the
sourc_ o. the problem. It is that in transforming (2) to (3)
we replace the occurrence of (1) in (2) by:
5
‘
slnt'enL^in^EngHsi;
61311
'
0" B t0 ' Dete" te is 9°°d ' 35 3
But, on Carnap's view of analysis, (1) and (5) are logically
equivalent but not synonymous. The substitution of logically
equivalent sentences in belief contexts is, as Carnap notes, 3
not always truth preserving. Thus (2) and (3) are not logically
equivalent, and consequently (2) and (4) are not logically
equival ent.
Davidson goes on to argue that a "simple and plausible
convention would save Carnap's analysis of sentences like [(2)]
from... [this] line of attack: in cases of iteration, the analysis
is always applied to the larger context first." 4 In accord with
this suggestion we would analyze (2) not by (3) or (4) but by:
6. Brezhnev has the relation B to 'Kissinger believes that
detente is good' as a sentence of English
Davidson adds, "The words enclosed in quotation marks in
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C < 6) ] Sre n°W ineli9ib,e for furtf'e'" analysis since they merely
help form, with the aid of the quotation marks, the name of a
sentence. [ ( o j j tons constitutes the complete analysis of [( 2 )]
in accord with Carnap's method." 5
Although I have no decisive objections to this proposal,
I think that there are some problems caused by bringing the
embedded belief' sentence in (?) inf/i (c\ ,- r,ce , into (b) unanalyzed and inside
quotation marks. First it ic a /<ni Q n -F r ic, n is a rule or Carnap's system that if
a person has relation B to a sentence S in L, and S in L is
synonymous with S' in then that person has relation B to S'
in L*. In order to apply this rule to (6) Carnap must have an
account of synonymy applicable to the sentence mentioned in it,
1 * e” 0) - But in ord0r t0 havp a " account of synonymy applicable
t0 ^ 1
5
^ seems that he must give a semantical account of (1),
and riot just of the sentence that he uses to analyze (1), i. e .,
(5). However, Carnap thinks that including sentences like (1) in
a language for which a semantical analysis is given leads to
"the greatest complexity". 6
A second problem with Davidson’s suggestion is that it
seems to render invalid some intuitively valid inferences.
For example, from (2) and
7. Mao believes that Kissinger believes that detente i good
I believe that we may infer
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8 . There is something such that both Brezhn
that Kissinger believes it
ev and Mao believe
This inference seems to involve an existential generalization on
the final that-clauses in (2) and (7). Such a generalization
would not be permitted in Carnap's analyses of (2) and (7), since
on his formulations the that-clauses would be inside quotation
marks.
Thus, bringing embedded belief sentences into the
metalanguage inside quotation marks has a second disadvantage:
it prevents all logical operations from being performed on them,
yet some logical operations on embedded belief sentences seem
proper.
It seems, then, that there is some difficulty in
expressing iterated belief sentences in Carnap's system. I think
it would be extravagant to claim that this constitutes a decisive
objection to his theory since, for one thing, it remains possible
that some more satisfactory way to express such sentences in his
theory will be developed. Moreover, iterated belief sentences
may pose problems for (PV) as well and Carnap's theory may be no
less successful in dealing with them than (PV) is. 7
II
The existence of sentences. Few writers on sentential theories
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seem to devote much attention to an account of sentences, and
Carnap seems to say nothing at all on the topic. However, I think
that important problems arise for Carnap's theory, and sentential
theories generally, unless sentences are assumed to be necessarily
existent objects, perhaps properties such as being such and such
a shape. Since sentential theories are often advocated in an
effort to avoid commitment to any entities of this sort, this is
an unwelcome conclusion for sentential theorists.
The problem can best be formulated in terms of Carnap's
analysis of a typical belief sentence, e.g.,
9. John has the relation B to 'The earth is round' as a sentence
of English
which analyzes
10. John believes that the earth is round.
If Carnap's theory were correct, then (9) and (10) would be
logically equivalent. But it seems that they are net, since (9)
implies the existence of the sentence 'The earth is round',
O
whereas (10) does not. Moreover, (9) implies the existence of
the English language, whereas (10) does not, so we have an
additional reason to doubt that (9) and (10) are logically
equivalent. Perhaps we can say that English exists provided the
sentences in it exist, and consider only the question of the
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existence of sentences. If we discover that (10) does imply the
existence of the sentence, then we may assume that it implies
the existence of the language as well.
If (10) does not imply that the sentence 'The earth is
round exists, then there are circumstances in which (10) is
true but 'The earth is round' does not exist. It may seem clear
that there are such circumstances. For example, John might exist
and believe that the earth is round in some world in which English
is not spoken or written at all. The sentence 'The earth is
round' would not seem to exist in such a world, despite the truth
of (10). Hence (10) does not imply the existence of a sentence,
whereas (9) does. Therefore, (9) and (10) are not logically
equivalent., and (9) is not a proper analysis of (10). Let us call
this 'the existence of sentences objection 1 to Carnap's theory.
In order to evaluate this objection, we must come to some
decision on the nature of sentences. For if sentences are
necessarily existent objects, then the objection fails. If on
the other hand, it is true that John can believe that the earth
is round without 'the earth is round' existing, then the objection
succeeds.
In Word & Object^ W. V. 0. Quine discusses three possible
accounts of sentences. He writes,
Prima facie... a sentence is not an event of utterance
but a linguistic form that may be uttered often, once.
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nat leaves their existence uncompromised by failure
or utterance. We can take each linguistic form asthe sequence
... of its successive character as a
class of utterance events, there being here no risk
of non-utterance.
-j 0
look at each of these accounts in some more detail.
(I) The first
the class of all its
account Quine mentions is that a sentence is
utterances. This means, I believe, that a
sentence is a class of all utterances sounding a certain way.
Although Quine does not say this, it is reasonable to assume that
the class also includes all inscriptions of the appropriate shape.
Since utterances and inscriptions are probably best construed as
events, a sentence, on view (I), is a class of utterance-events
and inscription-events. In what follows reference to inscriptions
will be omitted, but can be added in obvious ways.
The details of this view may be developed in various ways,
depending upon how we count utterances. For example, we may say
that an utterance of 'I don't believe that money grows on trees'
contains an utterance of 'Money grows on trees' and an utterance
of 'Money grows', or we may not. It is not clear that one view
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is better than the other.
Another respect in which developments of view (I) may
differ also concerns what is to be counted as an utterance of a
particular sentence. If we assume that similar sounding
utterances may occur in two or more languages, then we may say
that all such utterances belong in one class and that this class
is a single sentence, or we may say that all utterances belonging
to one language constitute one sentence and all those belonging
to another language constitute another sentence.
Our decision on this alternative is slightly more important
than our decision on the previous one. For if a sentence is a
class of all utterances that sound alike of a certain language,
then the same sentence cannot be part of more than one language.
This would make expressions like "The earth is round" ambiguous,
possibly denoting any of several different sentences. Which one
iu denotes can be specified by following it with a reference to a
language. On the other view of sentences, when a sentence is
the class of all appropriate sounding utterances, "The earth is
round" is not ambiguous, but the sentence it denotes is ambiguous,
in that it can have any of several different meanings. Again,
reference to a Inaguage can resolve any problems caused by this
ambiguity. ^ ^
It is somewhat difficult to evaluate the existence of
sentences objection, given view (I) of sentences. This view
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seans to imply that expressions like "The earth is round" are
finite descriptions, naming different objects in different
poss.ble worlds. It will, apparently, name the null class in
worlds in which there are no utterances of the appropriate kind.
Therefore, there are no worlds in which (10) is true and (9) i s
false simply because 'The earth is round' does not exist.
It is clear, however, that view (I) of sentences is
12
unsatisfactory for Carnap. It has the consequence, as Quine
notes, that all sentences that are unuttered in a world are
identical in that world. If $ and ¥ are both English sentences
that have not been uttered, then * and ¥ are identical with the
null class. Hence, if someone stands in relation 0 to <(, as an
English sentence, then he stands in relation B to ¥ as an English
sentence. Carnap's theory would thus analyze f S believes that 4.''
and TS believes that yl in such a way that they are equivalent,
for all unuttered
<j> and ¥. That result, however, is clearly
unsati factory
,
since S might believe only some of the things
that go unuttered. View (I) of sentences, then, must be rejected.
(II) second view of sentences that Quine mentions is
that they are attributes or properties. The most plausible view
along these tines is that a sentence is the property of sounding
such and such a way (or being shaped such and such a way).
Pi operti es
,
like propositions, are said to exist necessarily,
so there would be no worlds in which 'The earth is round' fails
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to exist. Hence, the existence of sentences objection to Carnap's
theory fails, given view (II) of sentences.
Quine rejects this account of sentences because it requires
the existence of properties, which he finds as offensive as
propositions. Carnap may not have regarded the existence of
properties as such an objectionable requirement, and thus may have
accepted view (II). But many philosophers who reject (py) do so
for reasons like Quine's, and thus cannot accept this account of
sentences.
(Ill) The final account of sentences Quine mentions is that
they are ordered sets of characters or phonemes. Characters and
phonemes, on this view, are sets of utterances or inscriptions.
The letter 'a', for example, would be the set of all inscriptions
looking like this: a. A written sentence-type would be the ordered
set of each of its characters. An utterance-type of a sentence
might be the ordered set of the phonemes making up the sentence,
a phoneme being the set of all utterances of a given kind.
Quine contends that on this view there is "no risk of
non-utterance
. His point is that every English character and
phoneme has been inscribed or uttered, so no character or phoneme
is identical with the null set, and they are all properly
individuated. Therefore, each intuitively diverse sentence
will be identified with a diverse ordered set of characters or
phonemes, and sentences will be properly individuated.
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However, when we turn out attention to other possible
worlds, we will find some in which English is not written or
spoken at all, and each character and phoneme is identical with
the null class. Each English sentence, then, will be an ordered
set, each member of which is the null class. So sentences
having the same number of characters or phonemes will be identical
Relative to such worlds, if a person has relation B to * as a
sentence of English and 6 and Y have the same number of characters
or phonemes, then that person has relation B to Y in English.
Thus, ir 4, and Y have the same number of characters or phonemes,
then rS believes that and rS believes that Y*1 are analyzed by
sentences that are equivalent in worlds in which English is not
used. But this seems incorrect, since these two sentences may
have different truth values relative to such worlds.
On Quine's third account of sentences, the existence of
sentences objection fails. In every world every sentence is
identical with some set, possibly an ordered set each member of
whi„h is the null set. Therefore, there are no worlds in which
(10) is true and (9) is false simply because the sentence 'The
earth is round' does not exist. However, as we have just seen,
there is a problem regarding the individuation of sentences
similar to the problem that arose in account (I).
I conclude that although the existence of sentences
objection fails on each of these three accounts of sentences,
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other serious problems arise. Accounts (I) and (III) yield
improper individuations of sentences, while account (II) implies
existence of properties, which is inconsistent with the
nomina! ist leanings of many sentential theorists. However, it
seems to be the only acceptable account of sentences available
to them.
Ill
— On Carnap's theory, belief sentences are
analyzed in terms of a triadic relation true of believers,
sentences and language. The reason Carnap does not analyze
belief in terms of a dyadic relation true of believers and sentences
is that a sentence can occur in more than one language and thus
have more than one meaning. Consequently, if belief were
analyzed in terms of a dyadic relation, we would be unable to
distinguish between a person's having that relation to a sentence
as it occurs in one language and his having it to that sentence in
another language. Ihus, it seems that the dyadic relation view
implies that if a person believes what a sentence expresses in
one language, he believes what it expresses in another language.
The problem with the dyadic relation view may be put in
a slightly different way. Suppose belief were analyzed in terms
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of a dyadic relation, B,
the sentence
true of believers and sentences. Then
11 • Jonss Sieves that the earth is round
would be analyzed by
12. Jones has relation B to 'The earth is round'
There are two reasons why this view is unacceptable. First,
there should be a synonymy rule in the language in which (12)
occurs to the effect that if a person has the relation B to one
sentence, then he has B to every sentence synonymous with that
one. But, since the same sentence may occur in many different
languages and have many different meanings, synonymy only makes
sense as a relation between a sentence in a language and a
sentence in a language (i.e., as a four termed relation or a
dyadic relation true of ordered pairs of sentences and languages).
Therefore, the synonymy rule cannot be applied to (12) as it
stands, but only if a reference to a language is added to it.
There is another difficulty with (12). Suppose that 'The
earth is round' occurs in some language, L, other than English
and in I. it has a different meaning than it has in English.
Suppose further that S does not believe what is expressed by
The earth is round' in I., although he does believe that the
earth is round. There seems to be no more reason to say, in
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these circumstances, that (12) is true than that it is false.
For he believes what 'The earth is round' expresses in English
but not what it expresses in the other language. If We say,
however, that B is a triadic relation true of believers, sentences
and languages, then we may say that it is true that
13
'
of
h
EngHsh
relat1 °n B t0 ' The earth iS r0und ' as a se«ence
and false that
M. S^has the relation 3 to 'The earth is round' as a sentence
I think, however, that there is a problem in treating
belief as a triadic relation true of believers, sentences and
languages that is analogous to the problem in treating it as
a dyadic relation true of believers and sentences. The problem
is caused by the existence of ambiguous sentences.^ 3 Just as
one sentence may have more than one meaning because it may be
part of more than one language, a sentence may have more than
one meaning within one language.
There are many sentences that vary their meaning, or at
least what they express, within a language. For example,
sentences with demonstratives
,
such as 'That is a clock' vary
what they express from context to context. As a result, it is
possible to say truly 'S believes that that is a clock but does
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not bel
i
eve that that is a clock'
,
provided the two demonstratives
are accompanied with gestures indicating different objects.
Other sentences without demonstratives are also ambiguous,
e.g., 'Sam is near a bank', which may mean that Sam is near a
financial institution and may mean that Sam is near a river side.
Simi larly, then, belief sentences may be ambiguous, e.g..
15. John believes that Sam is near a bank
(15) may mean that John believes that Sam is near a financial
institution and it may mean that John believes that Sam is near
a river side.
We have seen that it is wrong to say that (15) may be
analyzed in terms of a relation holding between John and 'Sam
is near a bank' because this sentence may be part of different
languages and have different meanings. Similarly, it is wrong
to say tnat (lb) may be analyzed in terms of a relation true of
John, 'Sam is near a bank 1
,
and English, because the sentence
may have different meanings even in English.
Assume tnat John does believe that Sam is near a financial
institution, but does not bel ieve that Sam is near a river side.
Consider Carnap's analysis of (15):
16. John has the relation B to 'Sam is near a bank' as a sentence
of English
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It seems that (16) should be both true and false, since it
analyzes (15) in both senses of the latter. Obviously (16) must
have only one truth value, and thus cannot properly reflect both
John's belief and his disbelief.
I think that the seriousness of this objection to Carnap's
theory may be brought out by contrasting the way (PV) might be
modified to account for ambiguity with the possibilities open to
Carnap.
Since (15) is ambiguous, it seems best to avoid simple
attributions of truth or falsity to it, but instead to say that
a particular utterance of (15) is true or false, or else to treat
truth as a relation between sentences, speakers and times.
Following the latter course, we will say that (15) is true
relative to a speaker, p, and a time, t, if and only if certain
conditions obtain. Those conditions will vary with p and t.
The truth value of (15) on a given occasion depends upon
how the speaker on that occasion uses the v/ord 'bank'. If he
uses it to mean 'financial institution', then (15) should be
true (given our assumptions about John's beliefs) but (15) should
be false for a speaker at a time if that speaker at that time uses
'bank' to mean 'river side'.
A defender of (PV) may say that the proposition referred
to by 'that Sam is near a bank' by a person at a time depends
upon how he uses 'bank' at that time. Thus, instead of a sense
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and reference simply being assigned to 'bank', one might say
that the expression is assigned a sense and a reference relative
'•o a person and time. Since the assignment to 'bank' can thus
vary, the proposition named by the that-clause in (15) may vary,
and as a result, the truth value of (15) may vary from speaker to
speaker and time to time.
Berore it could justifiably be claimed that a solution to
ambiguity problem can be found within the framework of (PV),
the above suggestion must be developed in more detail. But it
does seem possible that some solution to the problem can be developed
without abandoning (PV) entirely.
Prospects for a solution to the ambiguity problem within
the framework of Carnap's theory seem less promising. For even if
we relativize truth of sentences to people and times, it is hard
to see why the truth value of (16) would vary. For unlike (15),
it contains no ambiguous expressions. The sentential name in (16)
is not ambiguous, even though the sentence it names is ambiguous.
So there seems to be little hope of success in following a course
in this case similar to the one that seems promising in the case
of (PV).
There are two more radical departures from Carnap's theory
that may provide solutions to the ambiguity problem. One is to
taxe the objects of belief to be sentence tokens
- particular
utterances or inscriptions. One might argue that despite the
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ambiguity of sentence types, sentence tokens are unambiguous,
their meaning being determined by the person producing them and
their context.
Another possible solution to the ambiguity problem is to
construe belief as a relation between a person, a sentence, and
a speaker and a time, rather than as a relation between a person,
a sentence, and a language. The idea here is that even if a
sentence is ambiguous in a language, it is not ambiguous for a
speaker at a time.
In the cnapters tnat follow I will examine theories that
adopt the approaches just outlined.
IV
In this chapter I have raised three problems for Carnap's
theory of belief, and I believe that these objections apply to
sentential theories generally.^ The first, and least serious
objection is that there seems to be no way to properly formulate
iterated belief sentences in Carnap's theory. Of the two possible
formulations, one saddles believers with beliefs about sentences
and languages that they need not have. The other formulation may
be preferable, but it seems to invalidate certain valid inferences
and to force Carnap to provide a semantical account of ordinary
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belief sentences, and not just to the sentences that he uses to
analyze them.
The second problem is that an adequate account of sentences
seems to require that they be properties or universal (or perhaps
some other kind of abstract object). To admit the existence of
such entities is to abandon the nominalism that is often the
motivation for adopting a theory like Carnap's in place of (PV).
It should be admitted, however, that Carnap's motivation for
adopting his theory was not nominalism but rather its alleged
logical simplicity.
Finally, the existence of ambiguous sentences poses a
serious problem to Carnap and other defenders of the view that
sentences are the objects of belief. Since a person can believe
one thing expressed by a sentence in a given language but
disbelieve something else expressed by that sentence in that
language, it seems improper to analyze belief simply in terms of
a relation true of believers, sentences and languages.
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PART 2
INSCRIPTION THEORIES
In Part 2 I will discuss two alternatives to (PV) that are
rather different from the sentential theories discussed in Part 1.
Both of these theories take sentence tokens - inscriptions or
utterances - as the objects of belief. The first theory,
proposed by Israel Scheffler, is advanced in an effort to avoid
commitment to all abstract entities, including sentence types.
The second theory, proposed by Donald Davidson, is designed to
overcome the ambiguity problem, discussed in Chapter IV.
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CHAPTER V
SCHEFFLER
in this chapter I will discuss a theory of belief sentences
proposed by Israel Scheffler
,
1
who claims that his theory avoids
commitment to sentence-types, word-types, properties, and
propositions
.
2
The central idea of Scheffler's theory is to
treat that-clauses as predicates true of sentence-inscriptions,
and to take inscriptions as the objects of belief. Such treatment,
he contends, enables his theory to avoid all the undesirable
commitments of other theories.
I
The fullest development of Scheffler's theory is found in
The Anatomy of Inquiry
. There Scheffler develops a theory of
"desi res-that" sentences in some detail, and then proposes that
believes-that sentences be treated similarly. Although there
is some doubt that desi res-that sentences and believes-that
sentences should be treated similarly,^ I will overlook that
issue and consider Scheffler's account of desires-that sentences.
A. Scheffler's account of desires-that sentences . Scheffler begins
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by distinguishing two senses of the word 'desire'. One sense of
the word is found in sentences such as
1. John desires the book.
In sentences such as (1), where the object of desire is some
concrete object, we may say that 'desires' has its "objective
sense".
^
Desires has its second sense in sentences such as
2. John desires that John qualify for entrance to medical school.
Here, what John desires appears to be a state of affairs or,
perhaps, a proposition, although Scheffler argues that this
appearance is deceptive. Let us call this the "propositional
sense" of 'desires'.
Scheffler suggests that in sentences in which 'desires'
occurs in its objective sense, it may be replaced by 'desires to
nave without changing the sense of the sentence. Where 'desires'
has its propositional sense, such replacement radically alters
the meaning of the sentence, indeed, it seems to make it senseless.
Scheffler mentions that the objective sense of 'desires'
may ultimately be defined in terms of the propositional sense.
Thus, (1) might mean:
3.
John desires that John have the book.
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where 'desires' now has its propositional sense.
In order to avoid confusions that might arise out of the
ambiguity of 'desires', Scheffler proposes that we use 'desires-
true to express its propositional sense and reserve 'desires'
For the objective sense. Thus, he suggests that we "replace"
(2) by:
4. John desires-true that John qualify for entrance to medical
school
.
One of the problems that I have in understanding Scheffler's
theory is that I'm not sure what he thinks is gained by replacing
{?.) with (4). As we shall see, understanding this process
becomes crucial when he goes on to replace (4) by other sentences
that look even less like ordinary English than (4) does.
Scheffler next says that we may represent (4) symbolically
by:
5. J Dtr That(QJ).
In (5) 'J' stands for 'John', 'DTr' stands for 'desires-true',
and 'That(QJ)' for 'that John qualify for entrance to medical
school '
.
The essential elements of Scheffler's theory are described
in the following passage:
Now, we take 'That( )' as a predicate forming
operator, so that [(5)7 becomes:
[6.] (Ex) (That(QJ)x . DTrJx)
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read:
'There is some x, such that x is a that-John-
qual ifles-for-entrance-to-medical
-school, and John
desires-true x 1 .
The range of the variable 1 x ' is here restricted
to concrete inscriptions (though a broadening of the
range to include concrete utterances as well is
also conceivabl e)
.
r
5
Scheffler explains the import of his proposal this way:
...we have. ..proceeded to construe [(2)] after the
manner of [(6)]. The import of this construal is to
r?ofn
0r^ inar^ ,(^esi
'
ri
'
n9 that' statements, such as
L(2)J, as tantamount to statements expressing a
certain relation between agents and inscriptions.
The total effect concerns the logical form and
ontological c haracter of ' des i ri ng that' statements
,
rather than their substantive analysis, i.e., the
specification of those conditions under which they
hold true. In fact, [(6)], for example, is presumed
true just under those conditions in which [(2)] is
presumed true. Any further, substantive analysis
of 'desire 1
,
specifying the operative conditions for
the tru :h of [(2)j, and hence of [(6)], is theoretically
welcome, however, as an independent step.
Statement [(5)] thus represents a way of
construing the logical form and ontology of 'desiring
that 1 statements. Nor can [ ( 6 ) J be charged with
obscurity by those favoring an interpretation in
terms of states [propositions]. For [(6)] is
itself explicable in terms of the latter approach:
one can, generally, explain the desiring-true of a
given inscription, to proponents of s tates
,
as the
desiring of that state which is purportedly
represented by the inscription in question. Also,
as noted, the 'desires-true' formulation is to be
taken as true under just those conditions in which
its ordinary 'desires that' counterpart is
considered true. In particular, for an agent to
desire-true some given inscription does not imply
that he produce, possess, wish to possess, be
aware of, or even understand the inscription in
question.
g
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In thase passages Scheffler introduces a novel predicate,
That(QJ)
. More will be said about such predicates later. For
now, it will suffice to say that they are true of any inscription
Of the sentence in their parentheses. 7
B
* i 6f sentences
. Scheffler proposes
a treacment of belief sentences very similar to his treatment of
desi res-that sentences. Corresponding to the objective and
propositional senses of 'desires', there are objective and
propositional senses of 'believes'. 8 The objective sense occurs
in:
7. Jones believes John Dean
and the propositional sense occurs in:
8. Jones believes that John Dean told the truth.
Perhaps these t vvo senses can be distinguished by pointing out
that the objective sense may be defined in terms of the
propositional sense. Taking the propositional sense as basic,
the objective sense might be defined as 'believes what is asserted
by', where 'believes' has its propositional sense. Analogous to
the case of 'desires', Scheffler proposes that we use 'believes-
true' to express the propositional sense of 'believes'.
Sentence (8) goes through the same kinds of transformations
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(1) did, and Scheffler's final replacement for it is:
9. (fcx) (That- (John
-Dean
-to! d-the-truth)x and Jones be! ieves-true x).
(9) can be read:
There is some x, such that x is a that-(John-Dean-told-the-
trucn, inscription, and Jones be! ieves-true x)
Thus, on Scheffler's theory, a typical belief sentence such
as (8) turns out to be replaceable by a sentence that relates a
person to an inscription and avoids all mention of propositions.
Scheffler explains the import of this construal of belief
sentences in mucn the same way he explained the import of his
construal of desires-that sentences:
...the proposal concerns the logical form and
ontological character of 'believes that' statements,
rather than a substantive analysis of the conditions
under which such statements are true. In fact, the
construal
... presented is presumed true just under
those conditions in which ordinary 'believes that'
statements are considered true, no matter what
these conditions may be. It follows that, when
the ' bel ieves-true' relation holds, it need not be
expected that, the agent produce, be aware of, or
even understand the inscription believed-true. Nor
can the proposal well be criticized as more obscure
than one appealing to states (or propositions)
,
for
the bel ieving-true of an inscription can be explained,
in the latter terms, as the believing of that state
(or proposition) associated with it. Qy
In the next two sections of this chapter I will evaluate
Scheffler's proposal.
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II
Scheffler apparently thinks that the fact that (8) may be
rewritten as (9) somehow clarifies the "ontological character"
of (8). I assume that this means that we gain insight into
the ontological implications of (8) by rewriting it as (9). In
particular, what we learn is that (8) does not imply the existence
of a proposition, or is not ontological ly committed to
propositions. What I want to examine in this section are the
reasons for thinking that our ability to rewrite (8) as (9)
has any implications about the ontological character of (8).
In "Propositions and Inscriptions" 10 Herbert Heidelberger addresses
himself to this topic and formulates two arguments that Scheffler
might use to show that rewriting (8) as (9) does give us insight
into the ontology of (8).
A. One account of Scheffler 1 s argument . Hei demerger's first
suggestion is that Scheffler thinks that (9), unlike (8), is a
sentence whose ontological implications are clear and does not
include propositions. Since (8) and (9) are equivalent, (8) must
have the same implications as (9) and, therefore, does not
imply the existence of propositions either. 11
Heidelberger contrasts this proposal with another one along
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the same lines, once made by C. H. Langford. He writes:
Langford considers the sentence
[10.] The present King of France is the present King
of France.
Suppose some metaphysician believes (not implausibly)
that [(10)] is true and holding (perhaps less
plausibly) that [(10)] implies
[11.] The present King of France exists
is led to suppose that the present King of France
exists in some metaphysical realm. How should we
go about showing him that he is in error? Langford
suggests that [(10)] may be interpreted as
[12.] If something has the property of being the
present King of France, then something has
that property.
If we can get our metaphysician to agree that [(10)]
is logically equivalent to [(12)] it might be easier
to persuade him that [(10)] does not imply [(11)].
For it may be obvious that [(12)] does not imply [(H)]
and if, as we have supposed, [(10)] is logically
equivalent to [(12)], [(10)] does not imply [(H)]
either. Again, the merit of the suggested paraphrase
is that the existential implications of [(12)] may
be more apparent than those of [(10)].
^
Heidelberger argues that there is an important disanalogy
between Scheffler's proposal and Langford's. (9) is not an
English sentence, it contains the unfamiliar predicate
1 believes-
true 1
,
which has not been analyzed and consequently is not a
sentence whose ontological implications are especially clear.
Indeed, since all we really know about (9) is that it is supposed
to be true when (8) is, its implications are exactly as clear as
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those of (8), but no clearer. (12), on the other hand, is an
English sentence whose implications are reasonably clear. Hence
we do gain an insight into the implications of (10) by rewriting
it as (12). Rewriting (8) as (9) does not seem to have similar
advantages.
B. Lsecondj^
HeTdelberger points
out that Scheffler may not intend to make a proposal analogous to
Langford's. Instead, he may be making a proposal about the
logical form of (8). 13 His argument might be as follows. Since
no expression in (9) is a name of a proposition, and the quantifier
in (9) does not range over propositions, 14 (9) does not imply the
existence of a proposition. (8), being equivalent to (9), does
not imply the existence of a proposition either. This is the
second argument Heidelberger formulates that Scheffler might use
to show that rewriting (8) as (9) reveals the ontological
implications of (8).
Heidelberger thinks that this argument is invalid, and in
order to show that it is, he likens it to the following argument:
Consider
[13.] Socrates and Plato exist
and
[14.] Socrates exists.
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[15.] There is an inscription which is a that-
Socrates-and-Plato-exist and which is true.
Following Scheffler's lead we shall interpret
th f r/rnT JUSt in case is true. Notetnat LUoJJ does not mention Socrates; in fact
his name is not used in [(15)] at all. Moreover,
the quantifier of [(15)] ranges over inscriptions
and not over persons. Shall we say that since
L(.I5)J does not mention Socrates, and that since
its quantifier does not range over persons, [(15)]does not imply [(14)], and therefore [(13)] does
not imply [(14)]? Surely not. Surelv [(131]
^^)], ancJ ^ is a rephrasal
of [( lj )]> then [(15)] implies [(14)] as well. ]5
The argument that Heidelberger asks us to consider
concerning (13), (14) and (15) seems to be the following:
ARGUMENT 1
16. (13) is equivalent to (15).
17. Socrates i > not named in (15) and the quantifier in (15)
does not range over persons (and therefore does not
include Socrates in its range).
18. (15) does not imply that Socrates exists (i.e., (15) does
not imply (14) ).
19. (13) does riot imply~(7TT
We are to assume that the first premise of Argument 1 is
true, analogous to Scheffler's assumption that (9) is equivalent
to (8). The second premise of Argument 1 would seem to be
obviously true, since (15) contains no names at all, and there
seems to be little doubt that its quantifier ranges only over
inscriptions. (18) is supposed to follow from (17), and the
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validity of this inference will be discussed at length below.
Finally, (19) follows from (13) and (16). Of this last inference
there can be no doubt.
Heidalberger says that this argument is surely unsound,
for (IS) is quite obviously false. He asserts that the mistake
in the argument "comes in passing from [(15)] does not mention
Socrate^ and its quantification does not range over persons, to
[(15)] does not imply that Socrates exists." 16 Thus, Heidelberger's
contention is that the objectionable feature of Argument 1 is the
inference from (17) to (13). He seems to think that this
inference is tne only place at which the argument could go wrong,
and since it is unsound, this inference must be invalid.
It seems to me, however, that there is another place at
which Argument 1 could go wrong, and that we ore not justified
in concluding that the inference from (17) to (18) is invalid
until we show that the argument does not go wrong in this other
place, or else adduce independent grounds for thinking that (17)
ooes not imply (18). The second possible source of difficulty
in the argument is its premises. I think that we must show that
they are consistent before we can justifiably conclude from the
i act tna t Argument 1 is unsound, that the inference frcm (17) to
(18) is invalid.
One might feel that these premises are not controversial
.
(15) has been stipulated to be equivalent to (13), just as
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Scheffler stipulated that (9) is equivalent to (8). Since we can
stipulate that we'll use (15) however we like, the first premise,
(15), seems incontestable. The second premise, (17), seems to
be too obvious to contest, so the two would seem to be
consistent, and Heidelberger justified in placing the error in
Argument 1 where he did.
I think, however, that the truth of (16) cannot simply be
stipulated, given the truth of (17). In (17), sentence (15) is
said to have certain semantical properties, namely, having a
quantifier ranging over inscriptions, and having no name of
Socrates. What is said in (16), whether it be stipulated or
asserted, is that (15) has another semantical property, namely,
being equivalent to (13). And these properties, it seems to me,
may well be incompatible. Perhaps (13) cannot be equivalent to
a sentence having only certain kinds of quantifiers and names.
To see that the compatibility of (15) and (17) is not
something we should jusc. assume, let us consider an analogy.
Suppose someone were to note that in
20. There is some sport such that it is more popular than football
the quantifier ranges over sports and there is no name of a
person. This will be analogous to noting that (17) is true.
Now, suppose this person were to go on to stipulate that as he
will use (20), it is equivalent to:
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21. Mixon exists.
I think we would all want to protest that this stipulation cannot
be made. Since the quantifier in (20) ranges over sports, and
(20) implies the existence of a sport, which (21) does not, (20)
and (21) cannot be equivalent.
Of course one could stipulate that (21) will be used in
such a way that it is equivalent to (20). But then how (20)
is to be interpreted, i.e., the range of its quantifier, is not
something that can be stipulated as well. For the equivalence
of (20) and (21) rules out certain interpretations of (20), e.g.,
its most natural one.
Analogously, then, one might stipulate that (13) and (15)
are equivalent, but then one is not free to interpret the
quantifier in (lb) any way one pleases. In particular, one may
not be free to interpret it as ranging over inscriptions. If one
insists that the quantifier ranges over inscriptions, then one
is not free to stipulate that (13) and (15) are equivalent.
Returning to Argument 1, then, we may say only the
following: since its conclusion, (19), is false, the argument is
unsound. The only possible explanations of this are: (i) that
the two premises, (16) and (17), are incompatible; and (ii) that
the inference from (17) to (18) is invalid. However, we are not
as yet justified in claiming, as Heidelberger does, that the
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inference from (17) to 08) is the source of the difficulty.
I want to argue now that Heidelberger' s assertion that (17)
does riot imply (18), although not yet justified, is nevertheless
true. The argument for this is fairly simple. The inference
from (17) to (18) is based upon a principle such as this:
(P) For any sentence
<f, if the quantifiers in $ do notinclude a certain object in their range, and no
expression in cf names that object, then $ does notimply that that object exists.
That (P) is a false principle, and that inferences such as
the one from (17) to (18) which appeal to it are invalid, may be
shown as follows. Consider the sentence
22. Jack is married to Jill.
(22) quite obviously implies
23. Jill exists.
One is free to view the syntax of (22) in various ways,
although one view might be better than another. One possible
view is that 'Jack' is a name, and 'is married to Jill' is a
one-place predicate. Since 'Jack' names Jack, and there are no
quantifiers or other names in (22), we can conclude, via (P), that
(22) does not imply (23). However, since (22) does imply (23),
(P) is false.
103
it should not be argued that this objection to (P) turns on
taking an unnatural view of (22). For one could imagine a
predicate, say, 'is fortunate,' being constructed as an
abbreviation of 'is married to Jill'. The sentence
24. Jack is fortunate
then, is equivalent to (22) and therefore implies (23). (24),
however, contains only the name 'Jack' and the predicate 'is
fortunate'. Therefore, if (p) is true, we may conclude that
L?A) does not imply (23). Since that conclusion is false, (P)
is also false. So, the above objection does not turn on an
implausible construction of (22).
I think that an explanation of the falsity of (P) can be
achieved by recognizing the existence of predicates that are
"implicitly relational". These are predicates that have the
effect of concealing a reference to an object. For example,
'is married to Jill,' or 'is fortunate 1
,
as it was defined,
conceal references to Jill.
Unfortunately
,
I am unable to provide any precise account
of implicitly relational predicates, but the following account
should be satisfactory in the present circumstances. An n-place
predicate, P
n
,
is implicitly relational provided that for some
constants, ai,'«..,a
n
rP
n
(ai ,. .
. 9a
n
)'1 implies r(Ex) (x / ai ...
x f a )a Ps
m
(x,ai , . . .a P for some Rm , where m is less than or
equal to n + 1
.
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On this account, 'is married to Jill' and 'is fortunate'
are implicitly relational because 'Jack is married to Jill' and
'Jack is fortunate* both imply '(Ex)(x f Jack * Jack is married
to x)', where 'is married to' is a two-place predicate.
Ic is important to realize that many place predicates may
also conceal references and thus be implicitly relational. For
example, 'having a sole intermediary
' is a two-place predicate
true of Kennedy and Mixon. This predicate is implicitly relational
because Kennedy and Mixon have a sole intermediary' implies
'(Ex)(x /• Kennedy a x f Nixon a x is either a successor or a
predecessor of Kennedy)'.
The recognition of the existence of implicitly relational
predicates provides us with an explanation of the falsity of (P).
We may now justifiably assert that the problem (or a problem)
with Argument 1 is the invalidity of the inference from (17) to
(18), since that inference relies upon (P).
Finally, we can return to Scheffler's argument concerning
belief sentences. Scheffler's argument, analogous to Argument 1,
might be formulated as follows:
ARGUMENT 2
25. (9) is equivalent to (8)
26. No proposition is named in (9) and the quantifier in (9)
does not range over propositions
2 7. (9) do es not imply the existence of a proposit ion
23. (8) does not imply* the existence' of a proposition
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Just as the inference from (17) to (18) fails in Argument
because it relies on the
(26) to (27) also fails
princi pie.
false principle, (P), the inference from
because it too relies on this false
I think that this objection to Argument 2 can be
strengthened by pointing out that there is good reason to think
that a predicate in (9) is implicitly relational. That is, I
think some evidence can be accumulated to support the view that
‘bel ieves-true' is implicitly relational. Moreover, the
references it seems to conceal are to propositions.
Scheffler tells us only a few things about ' bel ieves-true
'
.
One is tnat it is true of people and inscriptions. Another is
that it would be desirable to analyze it further. And the
third is that, for those who prefer propositions, "the believing-
true of an inscription can be explained.
. .as the believing of
the state (or proposition) associated with it." 17 Thus,
bel ieves-true' does seem to conceal references to propositions,
and until some reason is adduced for thinking that it does not,
I think we should assume that it does.
In this section I have considered two arguments Scheffler
might give to defend the claim that the equivalence of (8) and (9)
shows that it does not imply the existence of propositions. I
have defended lleidelberger' s claim that the first argument is
unsound. In the case of the second argument, I have offered some
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needed justification for his claim that it is invalid.
Ill
A.
—to
—
Scheffler says of
(9) chat it is "presumed true just under those conditions in
which (8) ,s true, "no matter what those conditions may be." 19
He also claims that the existential quantifier in (9) ranges over
inscriptions, and thus that (9) implies the existence of an
inscription. 19 In this section I will argue that these
additional claims are incompatible with Scheftier's presumption.
(Thus, i think that premises (25) and (26) in Argument 2 are in
fact incompatible, and that there is, therefore, a second
objection to that argument.)
Let us assume that (9) is a part of a language for which
an interpretation has been specified. Assume that the
interpretation assigns to Jones 1 the individual Jones, to
'believes-true' a set of ordered pairs of people and
inscriptions and to 'That-(John-Dean-told-the-truth) ! a
set of inscriptions.
Scheffler says that the inscriptions assigned to a
predicate such as 'That-(John-Dean-told-the-truth)
' should meet
the following conditions. 99 Every inscription in its
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interpretation should be a "rephrasal" of the sentence
inscription in the parentheses in the predicate. A rephrasal
Of an inscription, I, Scheffler says, is a sentence inscription
ordinarily assumed to represent the same sentence" as I. 21
Inscriptions represent the same sentences when (i) they are
spelled alike; ( i i ) they have a "similar language affiliation
( i' e * 5 both French
,
both Italian, etc.)"; 22 and (iii) they
lack indicator terms. The interpretation of every inscription
of
'That-(John-Dean-told-the-truth) 1
,
then, is the set of all
English inscriptions of ‘John Dean told the truth'.
Scheffier never says how the language affiliation of an
inscription is determined, but he seems to think that it is
a feature of its context. 23 Perhaps, then, the intentions of
its inscriber determine the affiliation of any inscription.
At any rate, Scheffler asserts confidently that no inscription
is "part of more than one language" 24 and takes this to be an
important advantage of his theory over theories that take
sentence types as the objects of belief.
There is some doubt that all inscriptions have a unique
language affiliation. Someone might produce an inscription
that is part of more than one language in order to make a joke
or just to point out that there are such inscriptions. I will
overlook this point, however.
Assuming that the method for interpreting (9) is now
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reasonably clear, we can turn to an evaluation of Scheffler's
claim or supposition that it is true in exactly the same
circumstances as (8). I think that there are circumstances in
which these sentences (sentence-inscriptions) would differ in
truth value. I will describe two such cases.
——-
^ • Suppose Jones does believe that John Dean told
the truth, but out of a fear that the president's men have
bugged his house, he never voices his belief and never writes ic
down. Furthermore, suppose everyone else shares Jones' fear,
reacts similarly, and as a result, there are no that-(John-Dean-
tol d- uhe-trutn ) inscriptions. In these circumstances, (8)
would be true, but (9) would not, since it implies the existence
of a that-( John-Dean-tol d-the-truth ) inscription.
^ase 2 . Imagine a world (i.e., a set of circumstances)
much like the real world, with the exception that all people
who speak English in the real world speak Spanish in that world.
Suppose that John Dean makes the same accusations against the
president in that world that he does in this world, and that Jones
believes these accusations and that John Dean told the truth. In
these circumstances, (8) is true but (9) is false, again because
it implies the existence of a that-(John-Dean-told-the-truth)
inscription. Since English is not used in that world, there are
no such inscriptions.
Both of these cases, 1 believe, present circumstances in
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wmch (8) is true and (9) is not. Hence, (3) and (9) are not
true in all the same circumstances; Scheffler's claim or
supposition that they are equivalent is false; and he has not
shown that belief sentences may be reformulated in terms of
sentences expressing a relation between persons and inscriptions.
Scheffler is aware that there is a problem for this theory
concerning the existence of inscriptions and he hints at one
reply that might be made to these objections and claims that
there is no conclusive objection to another reply. I will
consider these replies, taking the hint first.
B
* reply
. Scheffler points out in several
places that any inscription of a predicate of the form 'That- (4)'
contains an inscription of which the predicate is true. At one
point he remarks that the "existence of an inscription denoted
by the predicate is thus guaranteed by the existence of the
predicate-inscription itself." 25
At another point he says, "We need, moreover, not worry
that tnere might perhaps be no appropriate inscription in existence
to warrant an analysis such as [(9)]. For merely to formulate
the question wnether John Dean told the truth "is to produce
an inscription of the right sort." 26 Scheffler notes that
the question might be put orally, but envisages extending his
no
predicates to apply to utterances as well as inscriptions. 27
Sc heftier is surely wrong in claiming that the formation of
the question produces the required inscription or utterance. The
question might be formulated by following an assertion that Nixon
told the truth with the question "How about Dean?" Furthermore,
the question might be formulated mentally, without thereby
producing any inscription or utterance at all.
Setting aside this point, one may wonder why the fact that
the existence of the predicate-inscription guarantees the existence
of the required inscription or the fact that forming the question
produces the required inscription is of importance here. In
-~~-
e
1. there is no predicate-inscription in existence of the
required sort, so it doesn't bring about the existence of the
needed inscription. Moreover, the question of Dean's truth
telling, we have assumed, is only formed mentally in Case 1.
Thus neither of the facts Scheffler mentions implies that there
is an inscription of the needed sort in Case 1 . And in Case 2
there also is no inscription of the required kind, since there
are no English inscriptions at all.
I ca.fi see only one way in which the two facts Scheffler
cites may be of any aid in replying to these two examples.
Scheffler might argue that in both cases I failed to describe
any circumstances in which (8) and (9) differ in truth value.
In order to differ in truth value in a given set of circumstances,
Ill
\ 8 ) and (9) would have to exist in those circumstances. Since
they do not exist in the cases described, they do not differ in
truth value. In any cases in which they do exist, the required
iriscriDtion must exist, and thus they can agree in truth value.
I think that this reply is inadequate, and that it trades
on an ambiguity in the sentence '(8) and (9) are true in all
the same circumstances
. There are, I believe, two clear readings
to the sentence. On one reading to say that (8) and (9) are true
in all the same circumstances is to say that (8) and (9), as used
by inscribers in any set of circumstances, have the same truth
value. We could agree that they have truth values in a set of
circumstances, in this sense, only if they exist in those
circumstances.
There are two things that are clear about the expression
'(8) and (9) are true in all the same circumstances' in this
sense. One thing is that it is false. We can imagine
circumstances in which (8) is the negation of (9) and so they
do not have the same truth value.
The second thing that is clear about this sense of this
sentence is that it has nothing whatever to do with the claim
that (8) and (9) are logically equivalent, or that one may
be used to replace the other. What is of importance to these
claims is that (8) and (9) have truth conditions such that
any circumstances satisfying the truth conditions of one
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satisfy those of the other. When this obtains, (8) and (9) are
true in all the same circumstances, in the second sense of this
Phrase. Perhaps this would be expressed more
that (8) and (9) are true at, or relative to.
clearly by saying
all the same
circumstances. There is no reason to think that (8) and (9)
must exist in a certain circumstance in order to have a truth
value relative to those circumstances. The sentence 'There
might have been no inscriptions' is true and the sentence 'There
are no inscriptions' is (logically) possibly true because there
are circumstances relative to which they are true. Of course,
the latter could not exist jn^ such circumstances, but it is
trua relative to them.
Thus, relative to the circumstances described in Case 1
and Case_2, (8) is true and (9) is false. That they do not
exist in these circumstances is of no consequence.
C
‘ s s^nd^rgDli/, i n a footnote Scheffler offers a
second reply to these examples. Following Goodman and Quine,
he suggests that we might count as an inscription any
appropriately shaped spatio-temporal region even though [it]
be indistinguishable from [its] surroundings in color". 28 In
the examples described above, there surely were some
appropriately shaped regions, so there were some that-(John-
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Dean
-told-the-truth) inscri ptions
.
Thus, (9) is true relative to
those circumstances.
Scheffler admits that accepting this suggestion requires
adopting "a somewhat artificial notion of inscriptions" but
observes that there seems to be "no conclusive argument against
it. There are, however, some considerations that should lead
us to reject this view.
Fir-ot, as Scheffler admits, it is "somewhat artificial".
Il renders false many of cur intuitions about counting
inscriptions. For example, I would have thought that I knew
how to count sentence-inscriptions, and thus, could determine
how many inscriptions of a given sentence there were in a
certain area, say, on a blackboard. But, on this view, there
are countless numbers of inscriptions of every sentence
everywhere. There are some, perhaps an infinite number of
very small ones, in the dot above an ' i '
.
Second, Scheffler cites as an advantage of his view the
fact that inscriptions, unlike sentence-types, are not ambiguous.
The reason for this is that every inscription occurs in a context
and is a part of no more than one language. Thus, a particular
inscription has a specific meaning, detennined by its context,
which apparently includes the intent of its inscribes These
indistinguishable spatio-temporal regions, however, have no
inscribers, are not part of any particular language, and thus
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would not seem to have a particular meaning.
Third, and most importantly, no such inscription is a
tha t-( John
-Dean
-told-the-truth) inscription. It is clear
that the indistinguishable spatio-temporal regions are not
ordinarily assumed to represent any sentence at all, and it
seems unreasonable to attribute any language affiliation to
them. So even if there are such inscriptions, they are not
that-(John-Dean-told-the-truth) inscriptions, given Scheffler's
account of these inscriptions, mentioned at the beginning of
Section III.
I conclude, therefore, that Scheffler has offered no good
reply to my claim that Case 1 and Case 2 provide circumstances
in which (8) and (9) differ in truth value.
IV
In this chapter I have raised two important objections
to Scheffler's theory of belief sentences. Scheffler's view
is that belief sentences like (8) may be paraphrased by
sentences like (9) and he contends that this shows that we
can avoid commitment to propositions. I have argued that
even if we can paraphrase (8) by (9), it would not follow
that, we can avoid commitment to propositions. Furthermore,
I have argued that (8) cannot be properly paraphrased by (9).
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CHAPTER VI
DAVIDSON
Donald Davidson 1 has presented a non-propositi onal theory
of indirect discourse that, he thinks, "opens a lead to the
analysis of psychological sentences generally ."2 His idea is
to treat the objects of the psychological verbs, 'said',
'believes', etc., as utterances. On his view the that-clause
in these sentences is neither a name of the utterance believed
nor a predicate true of it. Instead, 'that' functions as a
demonstrative referring in each case to the utterance of the
words immediately following it.
In this chapter I will present Davidson's theory of
indirect discourse and discuss how it might be extended to cover
belief sentences. I will argue that the theory cannot treat all
belief sentences properly.
I think that Davidson's theory has many virtues, and
some of them are best seen through an examination of a slightly
more formal version of the theory than will be developed in the
body of this chapter. In an appendix to the chapter I will
describe the highlights of a more formal treatment of Davidson's
theory and assess its adequacy.
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A. D^dM^prc^osal. Davidson's goal is to provide truth
conditions for sentences in indirect discourse, and ultimately
for all sentences in natural language. In order to do this, he
must show how the truth value of any sentence is a function of
the extensions of the terms in it.
Davidson develops his theory of indirect discourse through
a consideration of the sentence:
1* Galileo said that the earth moves.
Me begins by rejecting the view that the that-clause in (1) names
the sentence 'The earth moves'. He says that the problem with
this view is that the sentence 'The earth moves' may occur in
many different languages and have many different meanings. 3
Davidson does not explain why he thinks this is a problem, but
perhaps his reasons are similar to those discussed in Chapter IV.
Davidson next considers the possibility that (1) means the
same as:
Galileo spoke a sentence that meant in his language what
earth moves' means in English.
'The
He rejects this view for two reasons. The first is that it fails
the "translation test 11
.
4
I am not at all sure that Davidson is
i
right about this, but will not discuss the issue here. Objections
similar to those raised against Carnap's theory in Chapter IV
apply equally well to this theory.
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Davidson's second
contains a reference to a
reason forrejecti
language and
n 9 this theory is that it
languages (as Quine remarks in a similar context in
express identical propositions. We see then thatquotahonal theories of indirect discourse. ?hose
ove/theoriertha-^M “n "ot c1aim an ^vantage
enmi'el
0
?^ start? lntr°dUCe inte"Sio" al
'
* 5
It is difficult to determine whether Davidson is right on this
point and we need not decide hers. What is important to realize
is that Davidson does oppose reference to and quantification over
languages.
Davidson next considers the view that the that-clause in
(1) names the proposition that the earth moves. The problem with
this view, he thinks, is shown by Quine's arguments concerning the
indeterminacy of translation. 6
Davidson's own proposal can best be brought out by examining
the possioility that (I) means the same as:
3. Galileo uttered a sentence that meant in his mouth what
earth moves means now in mine.
'The
He thinks that (1) and (3) are similar but not identical in
meaning. The difference between them is that "in uttering the
words The earth moves' (in (3)) I do not, according to this
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account, say anything re.otely
,i ke what Galiieo is clai,ned to
hu.e s_id, I do not, in fact, say anything .
"
l
Tte P° int l,ere iS that (3) I
-y that Galileo uttered a
sentence that had the same meaning for him that a particular
expression has now in my mouth. The expression in my mouth when
6r ^ thai" 1S supposed t0 mean the same as Galileo's is the
expression 1 The earth moves 1 Put that
. B that expression was not in my
mouth when I utte^r! T . • .. .ed (3), for I did not use it but merely
mentioned it.
Pe rhdpb tne point will be made clearer if we note that the
expression 'The earth moves' names a sentence in (3), and it can
therefore be replaced, sal^eritate, 5y any othep name ()f thfi
same sentence. Thus, assuming that 'The earth moves' is Davidson':
favorite sentence, (3) has the same truth value as:
Davidson'^^fT'
6
^ ?
sentence that meant in his mouth what
s favorite sentence means now in mine.
Since (4) implies that Davidson's favorite sentence is in my mouth
now, and that sentence is not in my mouth now, (4) is false.
Similarly, then, (3) is also false.
One is tempted to suggest that we amend (3) slightly to
overcome this problem. We might say that (1) means the same as:
5. Galileo uttered a
earth moves’ would
sentence that meant in his mouth what 'The
mean now in mine, if I were to utter it.
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Or perhaps one would say:
6
. Galileo uttered a
earth moves' means
sentence that meant in his mouth what 'Them the language I speak now.
Davidson does not discuss either of these possibilities,
but 1 believe that he would reject both. As we have seen, he finds
references to languages objectionable and so he would find (6)
unsatisfactory.
(5), however, may be slightly better. However, I think the
subjunctive conditional raises all sorts of difficulty. I could
mean many different things by 'The earth moves' now, and in many
cases there may be no telling what it would be.
Nevertheless, we frequently do knew what someone would mean
by a certain sentence, so perhaps we should not be too hasty in
rejecting (5). There are, however, some cases in which it seems
clear that (1) and (5) would differ in truth value. For example,
suppose (1) is true and I utter it at time t. Suppose further
that you and I have a code according to which 'The earth moves'
means
-hau I nave just successfully bribed the mayor into giving
us some lucrative contract for excavating the city. In that
case, if I were to utter 'The earth moves' it would have this
unusual meaning. We can safely assume that Galileo never said
anything having that meaning, so (5) is false despite the truth
of (1).
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lodi 1
Neither (5) nor (6), then, seems to be an acceptable
i call on or (3), and we can turn now to what Davidson proposes.
The idea that underlies our.
.
.
paraphrase is that
eLfh~“~-r: When 1 Say that Gali]eo said that thearth moves, I represent Galileo and myself assamesayers,
. .The form "(Ex)(Galileo's utteranc-xand my utterance y make us sarnesayers)" is thus aM.3W n9 any say1 "9 1^ to Galileo
or nhral^h
1
^ ^
Way ° f re P lac1n 9 V by a word
of mine Anf an aPP™P^te utteranceme. nd surely there is a way I can do this*
P
roduCG tne reciuired utterance and
replace y by a reference to it. Here goes:
The earth moves.
(Ex) (Galileo's utterance x and my last
utterance make us sarnesayers).
Definitional abbreviation is all
bring this little skit down to:
that is needed to
The earth moves.
Galileo said that.
Here the 'that' is a demonstrative singular term
referring to an utterance (not a sentence).
This form has a small drawback in that it leaves
the hearer up in the air about the purpose served
by saying "The earth moves" until the act has been
performed. As if, say, I were first to tell a
story and then add, "That's how it was once upon
a time
. There's some fun to be had this wa/,
and in any case no amount of telling what the
il locutionary force of our utterance is is going
to insure that they have that force. But in
the present case nothing stands in the way of
reversing the order of things, thus:
Galileo said that.
The earth moves.
Perhaps it is now safe to allow a tiny orthographic
change, a change without semantic significance,
but suggesting to the eye the relation of
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introducer and introduced
stop after 'that' and the
we may suppress the
consequent capitalization:
Galileo said that the earth moves.
TU
. !
,
.
,!9 P r°POsal then is this: sentences in indirectdiscourse, as it happens, wear their logical torn/
on their sleeves (except for one small point).
I hey consist of an expression referring to a speakerthe two-place predicate 'said', and a demonstrative
referring to an utterance. Period. What follows
gives the content of the subject's saying, but has
no logical or semantic connection with the original
attribution of a saying. This last point is no
doubt the novel one, and upon it everything depends:
from a semantic point of view the content sentence
in indirect discourse is riot contained in the
sentence whose truth counts. 0O
—
Qrne obj ectjjons__ to Dav i dson 1 s proposal
.. Davidson's proposal
is an unusual one, and his presentation of it has given rise to
a number of objections. The objections rest, I believe, on
misconceptions, but it may be useful to consider these objections
with a view to clarifying the proposal.
Davdson claims that (1) is just an orthographic variant
of:
7. Galileo said that.
The earth moves.
which he says is equivalent to:
8. The earth moves.
Galileo said that.
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And (8)
• niS v,ew
* ls a "definitional abbreviation” of:
i he earth moves.
(tx) (Galilee
same sayers ;
.
v.,,
, lU yC3
.
>r.x
v C-an iso's utterance x and my last utterance make us
William G. l.ycan 9 has raised what appears to be an obvious
objection to this proposal. It seems that Davidson has suggested
that (1), (/), ( 8 ) and (9) are synonymous, or at least logically
equivalent. But (8) implies:
10. (lx)(x - my last utterance).
whereas (1) does not. Therefore, Lycan concludes, Davidson's
analysis saddles (1) with a consequence it does net actually
have.
Lycan is probably right in claiming that (9) and (1) are
not logically equivalent, but Davidson should not have said that
they are. I believe that his theory can be interpreted in a way
that avoids the objection. He should say that (9) is equivalent
to, but not logically equivalent to:
11. The earth neves.
(Ex) (Gal 1 T eo ‘ s utterance x and that make us samesayers).
Sentence (9) tells us to what the demonstrati ve in (11) refers.
Similarly, the sentences 'That is a chair' and 'The thing at which
I am pointing is a chair' are equivalent, and the latter tells
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us to what the demonstrati ve in the former refers.
Instead of saying that (8) is a definitional abbreviation
of (9), Davidson should have said that it is a definitional
abbreviation of (11). since (11) does not imply (10), he need
not hold that (8) implies (10). (Similarly, 'That is a chair'
does not imply 'There is something at which I am pointing'.)
On this interpretation, since Davidson is not committed
cc the view tnac (3) implies (10), he is not committed to the
view that either (7) or (1) implies (10). Thus, we can interpret
Davidson's theory in such a way that it does not saddle (1) with
a consequence that it does not actually have, and we thereby
overcome Lycan's objection.
Another serious problem in understanding Davidson's
proposal arises when we look more closely at (7), (8), and (11).
It is not clear what we are to make of the two sentences in each
o< these and of the claim that (1) is somehow equivalent to these
combinations of two sentences. Moreover, we have to make sense
of Davidson's claim that the content sentence is not contained
in the sentence whose truth "counts".
In orde:-" to attain a clearer understanding of the problem
here, and its solution, let us consider an objection that might be
raised to Davidson's theory. Let us grant to Davidson that (7),
(8), and (11) are all logically equivalent. One might object
that none of these is equivalent to (1). For (7), (8), arid (11)
each implies:
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12. i he earth moves,
which (1) obviously does not imply.
Davidson surely would claim that (7), (8), and (11) do
not imply (12) arid that this objection fails. Before we can
accept this claim, we need a clearer account of sentences (7),
(S), and (11;. Un
;
1 1 we have a better understanding of them,
we do not fully understand Davidson's proposal.
In a critical discussion of Davidson's theory, R. J. Haac!<^°
puzzles over similar matters. He attributes to Davidson the view
than (7) does not imply (12) because in (7) the first sentence.
Galileo said that
,
is "asserted" whereas the second sentence.
The earth moves', is displayed.^ (Similar explanations can be
given for the failure of (8) and (11) to imply (12).) Haack
regards this as a satisfactory rationale for the failure of the
implication, but thinks it leads to a problem in the case of
iterated said-that sentences. We will turn to this problem
shortly.
Haack never explains exactly what he means by 'asserted'
and 'displayed', so it is difficult to determine exactly why he
thinks the fact that 'Galileo said that' is asserted in (7)
while 'The earth moves' is displayed explains the failure of the
inference from (7) to (12). However, his idea might be something
like this: The truth value of (7) depends only upon the truth
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value of 'The earth moves'. We may say, then, the former sentence
is asserted in (7) and that the latter is displayed in (7). Since
'ihe earth moves' is only displayed in (7), its truth value does
not affect the truth value of (7). Thus, (7) may be true despite
the falsity of 'The earth moves'. Thus, (7) may be true and (12)
false. Hence, (7) does not imply (12). Therefore, Davidson need
not say that (7) or (9) or (11) has an implication that (1) does
not have.
Haack believes that this explanation of the failure of (7)
to imply (12) leads to difficulties when we consider iterated
said “that sentences. He contends that a sentence such as:
13 . Davidson said that Galileo said that the earth moves
will, on this theory, be broken up into:
14 . Davidson said that.
Galileo said that.
The earth moves.
According to Haack, (14) is "clearly unacceptable" because the
middle sentence, Galileo said that', is both asserted, relative
to 'The earth moves', and displayed, relative to 'Davidson said
that'. 12 Apparently he thinks that no sentence can be both
asserted and displayed in the same sentence.
I believe that Haack 's objection can be answered, but in
order to state that answer clearly, Davidson's theory must be
stated more complete!*. There seen, to be three assertions central
to Davidson's proposal: first, sentences in indirect discourse are.
in some sense, made up of two sentences; second, in any utterance
of a sentence in indirect discourse the utterance of 'that' refers
to she utterance of the sentence immediately following it; and
thu-d, the truth of the entire sentence depends entirely upon the
truth of the first of the two subsentences and not at all upon the
truth of the second.
I think that we can find a way to interpret our sample
sentence, (1), that reflects these three points. First, we can
rewrite (1) in a slightly more perspicuous way:
lu. Galileo said that: the earth moves.
Syntactical ly, (15) should be viewed as a molecular sentence
containing two subsentences connected by a colon, which here
functions as a sentential connective. This captures the first of
the three points listed above, namely that (1) is made up of two
sentences. Written perspicuously, (1) is a molecular sentence
made up or the sentences 'Galileo said that' and 'The earth
moves'
.
The second and third points will be reflected in the
interpretation given to (15). We can interpret 'that' as a
demonstrative and stipulate that in any utterance of (15) it
refers to the utterance of ' f he earth moves' contained in that
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utterance of ( 15 ).
Finally, we may say that any utterance of (15) is true if
- only if that utterance of ,aHleo sai d thaf is true. ^
last pent nay provide an explanation of Haack's suggestion that
in U5) the first sentence is asserted and the second displayed.
The first sentence is asserted because the truth of (15) depends
upon Us truth. The second sentence is displayed because its
truth is irrelevant to the truth of (15) even though it occurs in
(i5) and is not enclosed in quotation marks.
These points all require some elaboration, but we should
K.ady able to explain why Haack's objection fails, fin
iterated said-that sentence such as (13) should now be written
this way
:
1
3
16. Davidson said that: (Galileo said that: the earth moves).
The parentheses in (16) indicate that the first colon, which is a
binary connective, connects 'Davidson said that' to the entire
molecular sentence enclosed in the parentheses. That sentence
in turn vs composed of two subsentences connected by a colon.
In accord with the account of Davidson's theory just given,
(16) is true if and only if 'Davidson said that', as it occurs
in (loj, is true. The truth of 'Galileo said that' does riot
af.ect the truth of (16). Thus, Haack is correct in saying that
’Galileo said that 1 is displayed in (16).
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WS Can also provide some support for Haack's claim that
'Galileo said that' is asserted in (15). Although the truth value
of
-Galileo said that' is not relevant to the truth value of (16),
it is relevant to the truth value of the second of the two
subsentences of (16), that is, it is relevant to the truth value
or 'Galileo said that: the earth moves'. Since the truth value
of this part of (16) does depend upon the truth value of 'Galileo
said that 1
,
perhaps there is sense in which 'Galileo said that'
is asserted in (16). Thus, we have some support for Haack's claim.
We now have a clearer understanding of why Haack believes
that 'Galileo said that' is both asserted and displayed in (16).
But we have no reason to think that there is anything improper
or unacceptable about this. So far as I can tell, Haack has
presented no argument to show that a sentence cannot be both
asserted and displayed in the way 'Galileo said that' is in (16).
So I conclude that there is no reason to accept Haack's objection.
C. A_ detailed
_acc ount of Davidson's theory . I will turn now to a
more detailed account of Davidson's theory. The central aim of
the theory is to provide an account of the truth conditions of
sentences such as (15). Ir. stating truth conditions for (15)
we encounter a problem due to the presence of the demonstrative.
Since the demonstrative constantly shifts its reference, the
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truth conditions for (15) are constantly changing. In dealing
with this topic, Davidson writes:
I assume that a theory of truth for a language
containing demonstratives must strictly apply to
utterances and not to sentences, or will treat
ruth as a relation between sentences, soeakerc
and times.
^
In TruJi and Meaning"^ Davidson also discusses truth
definitions for languages containing demonstratives, arid there he
seems to favor the second of the two possibilities mentioned in
the passage above. He gives the following example:
(A) 'That book was stolen' is true as (potentially)
spoxen by p at t if and only if the book
demons era ted by p at t is stolen prior to t
The significance of (A) should emerge from a discussion
of a few examples. Suppose Jones utters 'That book was stolen'
at time t and points to a book at that time. If the book
demonstrated by Jones had been stolen, then (A) yields the result
that the sentence is true as spoken by Jones at t. If the book
had not. been stolen, then the sentence is not true as spoken by
Jones at t.
Davidson does not explain why he includes the word
'potentially' in the left side of (A), but there is good reason
for him to do so. Suppose p demonstrates a stolen book at t,
but does not say 'That book was stolen' at t.. The fact that he
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demonstrates a stolen hook together with principle (A) implies
that 'That book was stolen' is true as (potentially) spoken by
P at t. Had 'potentially 1 been omitted from (A), then (A) and our
assumptions would have implied that 'That book was stolen 1 is true
as spoken by p at t. But this implies that 'That book was stolen 1
was spoken by p at t, and this conflicts with our assumption.
Hence, (A), without 'potentially 1 inserted, would have had some
false consequences.
The above considerations may lead one to think that what
(A) actually provides are the conditions under which 'That book
was stolen would be true if it were spoken by p at t. But this
is not the case. We can imagine circumstances in which p does not
bay That book was stolen' and does not demonstrate any book. But,
we may assume, if he were to say 'That book was stolen' he would
also demonstrate a book which was in fact stolen. So, in these
circums unices That book was stolen' would be true if it were
spoken by p at t. However, since p did not demonstrate a stolen
book at t, the right hand side of (A) is false, so (A) yields the
result that 'That book was stolen' is not true as (potentially)
spoken by p at t. Thus, (A) does not provide the conditions
oncer which That book was stolen' would be true if it were spoken
by p at t.
The above examples show that if we accept (A) we should not
take "'That book was stolen' is true as (potentially) spoken by
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P at t" to naan either
“’That book was stolen' is true as spoken
by p at t“ or "'That book was stolen' would be (or would have been}
true if ft were spoken by p at t". Moreover, I can find no
ordinary English equivalent to the expression "'That book was
stolen* is true as (potentially) spoken by p at t" as it is
explicated in (A).
Since it is not clear exactly what is being explicated by
(A), it is difficult to assess its adequacy. The most charitable
way to evaluate it, and the method I will follow here, is to see
if there are any possible circumstances in which 'That book was
stolen' is spoken by a person at a time and (A) yields an
intuitively incorrect truth value for the sentence as spoken by
that person at that time. If there are any such cases, then (A)
must be rejected. If there are none, then (A) may be accepted.
One problem with (A) is that it fails to make any reference
to a language. Suppose p utters 'That book was stolen' at t.,
but is speaking a language in which every sentence has the same
meaning as its negation has in English. Call this language
'Negengl ish' . It would seem that if p demonstrates a stolen book
at t, and utters 'That book was stolen' as a sentence of
Negengl ish, then that sentence is false as spoken by him at
that time. Principle (A), however, implies that it is true as
spoken by him at the time, since its right side is satisfied.
There are several ways to overcome this problem. We could
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amend (A) as follows:
<B)
SvV^?n 4S t,rUe ?* P° tent1aHy spokentM ^ ns ‘1 L> P at t if and only if the bonkdemonstrated by p at t is stolen prior to t.
Alternatively, we might say that "'That book is stolen’ is true
in English as potentially spoken by p at t iff...", but this would
have the consequence that the sentence could be true in English
for a person and time such that the person who uttered it at that
time was speaking a different language. This seems to me to be
an odd result, and since the formulation as in (B) avoids it, I
find (B) slightly preferable. There is, however, no significant
difference between the two formulations, and either may be used.
There is one important objection to adopting (B) as a
modification of Davidson's proposal. As we saw earlier, Davidson
believes that languages are as poorly individuated as propositions,
and therefore is opposed to including any references to languages
in his theory. So he would find the reference to English in (B)
objectionable. Despite his aversion to references to languages,
Davidson seems prepared to make use of predicates such as ' true-
in-English', ! true-in-French 1
,
etcJ'7 For some reason, all these
truth predicates are acceptable even though references to languages
are not. Thus, a principle more in keeping with Davidson's
position than (8) would be:
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(C) 'That book was stolen'
spoken by p at
by p at t is stolen
. ...
_,
1S true-in
-English as potentials
u if and only if the book demonstrated
prior to t.
I must admit that I do not understand why these truth
predicates are acceptable if references to languages are not and
berieve that this is a problem in Davidson's overall position.
Nevertheless, I will overlook this point here.
I assume that Davidson intended to define truth as a
relation between sentences, speakers, and times, for all sentences,
and not just for those with demonstratives. This relati vization
cf the truth predicate will be vacuous in many cases, in that many
sentences will have the same truth value relative to all speakers
and times. Indeed, if we ignore complications caused by tense,
and assume a tenseless language, the only sentences that will vary
in truth value will be those containing demonstratives or
ambiguous expressions.
We can turn now to the truth conditions for sentences in
indirect discourse. It should be recalled that these sentences
are treated as molecular sentences, that the word 'that' is to be
treated as a demonstrative, and that the truth value of the whole
sentence depends entirely upon the truth value of its first
component. A first approximation of their truth conditions might
be:
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[<->/ Gal ileo said that: the earth movs
English as potentially spoken b/ poniy if Galileo said the utterance
by p at t.
s' is true- i n-
at t if and
demon stra tad
It
utte ranee
may seem that there is an obvious objection to (D).
demonstrated by p at t, when he says 'Galileo said
The
that:
the earth moves', is an utterance of his own, not one of Galileo's
ourely Galileo did not say the demonstrated utterance. If anvone
did, it was p.
This objection is mistaken and turns upon a failure to
properly understand how Davidson uses the word 'said'. As
Davidson uses it, this predicate is to be understood iri terms of
his primitive, 'samesaying'
. To say an utterance is to produce
a samesaying with it. Thus, (D) can be rephrased as:
(E) Galileo said that: the earth moves' is true -in-
English as potentially spoken by p at t if and
only if Galileo produced an utterance that is a
samesaying with the utterance demonstrated by p
at t./ K
'Samesaying' is, I believe, an obscure primitive, and it
is at least as obscure as the notion of synonymy. For some
reason Davidson finds 'synonymy' objectionable, but not
'samesaying'. I can see little reason to prefer one to the other.
It is difficult to decide which predicates are acceptable
as primitives and which are not, but one criterion might be the
extent to which we have a preanalytic understanding of the
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predicate and how well this understanding can be supplemented by
informal descriptions of its meaning'. The better this understanding,
the more acceptable the predicate is as a primitive.
In the case of 'samesaying' we may be able to give an
informal description of its meaning by saying that two utterances
are samesayings when the propositions expressed in the utterances
are the same. However, such an appeal seems illegitimate for
Davidson, since he proposes to do without propositions. So any
account or his primitive must proceed along different lines.
There are, then, reasons to have misgivings about the
primitive Davidson appeals to, but I suggest that we overlook
tnem for now, and allow its use in providing truth conditions
for indirect discourse.
There is one simplification that can be made in (E). We
can always tell, in any utterance of ( 15 ), what utterance the
speaker is demonstrating. It is always his own utterance of
the earth moves' at that time. We can make use of this fact
and replace (E) by:
\,F) ‘Galileo said that: the earth moves' is true-in-
English as potentially spoken by p at t if and
only if some utterance of Galileo's is a samesaying
with p's utterance of 'the earth moves' at t.
It is not difficult to extrapolate them from (E) and
stare truth conditions for any sentence in indirect discourse:
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(G) For any constant a and sentence
<J>,
(a said that: <0
is true- in -Engl ish as potentially spoken by p at tif and only if some utterance produced by the referent
of a is a samesaying with p's utterance of <j> at t.
If (G) does state proper truth conditions for English
sentences in indirect discourse, then it has many advantages over
other possible accounts of the truth conditions of these
sentences. The primary advantage, and the one with which we are
most concerned here, is that (G) does not require propositions
to be in the domain of the interpretation. It does, of course,
require that there be sentences, but this requirement seems
acceptable to Davidson, and is often found less objectionable than
the requirement that there be propositions.
In the next section I will discuss how this theory might
be extended to belief sentences.
II
Davidson suggests that his theory of indirect discourse
"opens a lead to the analysis of psychological sentences
generally." 8 If this is true, then we should be able to provide
truth conditions for belief sentences that are somewhat similar
to those provided for indirect discourse.
In addition to Davidson's claim that his proposal opens a
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] '-dd t0 accounts to other psychological sentences, there are a
number of other reasons to think that any adequate account of the
truth conditions of indirect discourse should allow for belief
sentences to be treated similarly. For one thing, there is a
great similarity between the grammatical structure of belief
sentences and sentences in indirect discourse, the most prominent
difference • etwee n them being that one contains ‘believes 1 where
the other contains ‘said 1
. So there is at least a prima facie
reason to suppose they have similar logical forms as well.
Moreover, the objects of belief seem to be the same as the
objects of saying. That is, whatever kind of thing it is that we
say also seems to be the kind of thing we believe. Thus, we
can express a truth by saying "I believe what you said". So we
ought to be able to interpret belief sentences as relations
between people and utterances, just as we did sentences in indirect
discourse.
Let us take as a sample belief sentence:
17. Galileo believed that the earth moves.
If (17) is to be interpreted in a manner similar to (15) (and
(1)) then v/e should first rewrite it as:
18. Galileo believed that: the earth moves.
Sentence (18), like (15), is a molecular sentence containing
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tivo sentences, connected by the connective
'That' is a
demonstrative referring in any utterance of (18) to that
utterance of 'the earth moves'. Sentence (18) will be true, any
time it is uttered, if that utterance of 'Galileo believed that'
is true.
As truuh conditions for (18) we might offer the followinq:
(H) Galileo believed that: the earth moves' is true-in-
English as potentially spoken by p at t if and only
if Galileo believed p's utterance of 'the earth moves'
at t.
(H) has the following peculiar consequences. It implies
that (18) is true as spoken by me now if and only if Galileo
believed an utterance made by me now. Even if utterances are
what we believe, it seems odd to suppose that Galileo believed
one of my utterances. If he believed any utterance, it seems
more reasonable to suppose that he believed one of his own, or
at least one that he had heard.
A similar point was made about Davidson’s account of
'said 1
. According to principle (0), discussed earlier, (15) is
true as spoken by me now if and only if Galileo said some
utterance of mine. But if Galileo said any utterance, it would
seem to be one of his own, and not one of mine.
This oddity of Davidson's theory was explained by the
introduction of 'samesaying’ into the metalanguage. Galileo said
one of my utterances if and only if he produced a sarnesaying
with it. Given this understanding of 'said 1
,
it is reasonable
to say that Galileo said one of my utterances. Of course, this
requires us to understand the notion of samesaying, but that we
have agreed to accept.
In the case of 'believes', however, we cannot make a
similar claim. That is, we cannot explain the oddity of saying
that Galileo believed my utterance by going on to say that what
this means is that he produced some samesaying with my utterance.
It is clear that (17), for example, could be true even if Galileo
never produced any utterance at all.
Moreover, we cannot even explain this unusual interpretation
of 'believes' in terms of tendencies to produce sarnesayings with
my utterance. The following Carnapian type proposal is open to
objections of the kind discussed in Chapter I:
(I) 'Galileo believed that: the earth moves' is true-in-
English as potentially spoken by p at t if and only if
Galileo was disposed to produce some utterance that
would be a samesaying with p's utterance of 'the earth
moves' at t.
(I) resembles the Carnapian analysis discussed previously, and
it is open to the same objections that made repairing Carnap's
proposal seem to be a hopeless endeavor. In particular, liars do
not say what they believe, so (I) seems not to provide the truth
conditions for belief sentences.
It seems, then, that we must leave 'believes' primitive in
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the metalanguage, instead of explaining it in terms of 'samesaying'
.
This makes the treatment of 'believes' rather different from that
of said
,
and it seems fair to say this is not a desirable
result. It is by no means clear what the relation is that holds
between Galileo and some utterance of mine now, if (18) is true
as spoken by me now. So if (18) is to be analyzed in terms of
such a relation, it is desirable that some further analysis of
that relation be given.
However, it is not clear that there is any fatal objection
that can be made along these lines. Indeed, Davidson would be
unmoved by the problem. He distinguishes two tasks: uncovering
the logical form of sentences and giving their truth conditions;
and analyzing the predicates of a language.^ He might say that
in (18) we display perspicuously the logical form of (17) and
in (H) we give its truth conditions. He would readily admit that
we do not as yet have an analysis of 'believes', but that he
would regard as another matter that need not concern him.
It seems, then, chat (H) is the best we can do as a
Davidsonian account of the truth conditions for one belief
sentence. A general account of the truth conditions for all
belief sentences can be given by:
(J) For any name a and sentence 4, ra believes that: (jO
is true in English as potentially spoken by p at t
if and only if the referent of a believes p's
utterance of 4 at t..
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Although the samesaying relation does not appear in this
account of the truth conditions of belief sentences, it does
Play an important part in their semantics. For it should be a
rule of the system that if a person believes some utterance,
then he believes every samesaying of that utterance.
This completes my explanation of Davidson's theory. In
Jie remainder of this chapter I will discuss some of its
advantages and disadvantages.
Ill
In Chapter IV we saw that Scheffier's inscriptional theory
ran into a difficulty over the existence of the entities it
selected as the objects of belief. Specifically, the problem
was that a sentence such as (17), ’Galileo believed that the
earth moves’, could be true relative to situations in which
there were no inscriptions of 'The earth moves'. Since
Scneffl er ' s theory required that there be such an inscription
for (17) to be true, his theory was not quite right.
Since Davidson takes utterances to be the objects of
belief, it might be thought that his theory faces a similar
problem. However, his theory overcomes this problem by
relativizing the truth of sentences to speakers and times. It
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reinains true that Galileo could believe that the earth moves even
if there are no utterances of 'The earth moves'. But the theory
does not conflict with this fact. All that his theory implies is
that (17) (or, more properly, (18)) can only be true relative to
a speaker and time if there is an utterance of 'The earth moves'.
Thus, if I am silent now, (17) is not true as potentially spoken
by me now. but it is not clear that there is anything wrong with
, . 20fms. For if I do utter (17) now, then it will come out true
as spoken by me now. It seems reasonable to be concerned only
with the truth value of sentences relative to speakers and times
such that the speaker does utter the sentence at the time. And
so far we have seen no reason to think that Davidson's theory
yields the wrong result for any such sentences.
Davidson's theory has another marked advantage over the
theories discussed earlier. We saw that the existence of
ambiguous sentences in a language posed serious problems for
SchefTier's theory and for other sentential theories. Davidson's
theory, however, seems to deal with this problem sati sfactori ly.
Consider the ambiguous sentence:
19. Jones said that the bank will collapse.
Since there are at least two different meanings of 'The bank will
collapse', (19) is ambiguous. It might mean that Jones said that
the financial institution will collapse, and it might mean that
he sa id that the river side will collapse. In one of these senses
it might be true even though it is false in the other.
Presumably, however, when someone utters (19) he has one
of these senses in mind. Thus, in uttering (19) he utters
The bank will collapse' and has some specific meaning in mind
i or this ucterance. (19) will be true relative to this speaker
and time ir and only if Jones has produced a samesaying with the
speaxer s utterance of 'The bank will collapse 1 at the time.
Since Jones will have produced such a samesaying if and only if
he said something that meant in his mouth what 'The bank will
collapse’ meant in the speaker's mouth at the time, we seem to
get exactly t.he right results. If I utter (19) now and mean
by 'The bank will collapse' that the financial institution will
collapse, then (19) comes out true as spoken by me now if and
only ir Jones said something that had the same meaning. If, on
the other hand, when I utter (19) now I mean by 'The bank will
collapse' that the river side will cave in, then (19) comes out
true as spoken by me now if and only if Jones said something
that had this meaning. This seems to be exactly right.
Thus, Davidson's theory seems clearly superior to the
theories discussed previously. There are, however, a few
respects in which it may be deficient. In the next, section I
will discuss two of them.
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IV
In this section I will discuss two objections to
Davidson's theory. The first is that an apparently valid
inference seems invalid on the theory. The second is that when
we turn to certain other sentences containing 'believes'
,
the
natural extension of Davidson's theory seems to provide them
with incorrect truth conditions.
The first objection is a variation on a point made by
21Bruce Aune. The following inference is valid in English:
Argument
_I
17. Galileo believed that the earth moves
20. New to n beli eved that the earth moves
21. Gaifleo and Newton believed the same thing
When we give Davidson's interpretations of the sentences in this
argument, however, it seems to be invalid. Roughly, the reason
for this is that 'that' in (17) has a different referent than
'that' in (20), and so (21) seems not to follow.
Aune’s argument raises a number of interesting problems.
First of all, it is not exactly clear how we should even go
about evaluating inferences, now that truth is relativized to
speakers and times. Ordinarily, we would say that the inference
from (17) and (20) to (21) is valid if and only if (21) is true
under every interpretation (17) and (20) are. That is, we would
say that Argument 1 is valid if, given an assignment to ail the
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constants and predicates in (17), (20, and (21), if the
premises are true, then so is the conclusion. But now that the
premises rnay vary in truth value from one speaker and time to
another, even under the same assignments to the constants and
t>.e predicates, it seems clear that another approach is required.
One possibility is to say that the inference is valid if
and only if for any interpretation and any speaker and time,
if the premises are true under that interpretation relative to
that speaker and time, then so is the conclusion.
Let us examine the consequences of adopting this
possibility. Consider any arbitrary speaker and time, p and t.
What we want to know is whether, if (17) and (20) are true
i elative to p and t, then (21) is true as well. In other words,
we want to know whether the following argument is valid:
Argument 1 1
17'. Galileo believed p's utterance of 'The earth moves' at t
20'
. Newton believed p's utterance of 'The earth moves' at t
21'. Newton and Galileo believed the same utterance
This argument does appear to be valid. Perhaps, then, Aune was
mistaken in thinking that Argument I came out invalid on Davidson's
theory.
There is, however, an interesting feature of Argument I'.
By evaluating all the premises and the conclusion of Argument I
relative to the same speaker and time, as we did in Argument I',
U9
in effect we make both occurrences of
re, e) eru. Both seem to refer to p's
' that
' have the same
utterance of 'The earth
moves' at t. Actually, however,
and conclusion of the argument.
if p were to utter the premises
'that' would refer to two
different utterances. That is why Aune thought the argument
would net be treated properly by the theory.
i hi j suggests that it would be more in keeping with
Davidson's proposal to evaluate the validity cf the argument by
seeing if it follows from the fact that (17) is true as spoken
by P at t and (2b) is true as spoken by p immediately thereafter,
say at t + 1
,
then (21) is true as spoken by p at t + 2. On
this approach the argument is valid if and only if the following
argument is valid in the metalanguage:
Argument I "
17". Galileo believed p's utterance of 'The earth moves' at t
20/ jtewton bel ieved p's utterance of 'The earth moves' at t + 1
21". flewton ana Gaiileo believed the" sarne" utterance
Argument I" seems to be invalid. Since the utterance
Galileo is. said to believe in (17") is diverse from the utterance
Newton is said to believe in (20"), (21") does not follow. Even
if we invoke the principle mentioned earlier, that if a person
believes an utterance he believes every samesaying with that
utterance, the inference remains invalid. In order to make it
valid, we would need the additional premise:
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22 . p's utterance of 'The earth moves'
p's utterance of 'The earth moves'
at t is a samesayinq of
at t + 1
(22), it would appear, is contingent. Hence, Argument I" remains
invalid unless the additional contingent premise, (22), is
suppl ied.
Thus, there seem to be two ways to evaluate inference I
in Davidson's theory. One way is to evaluate the premises and the
conclusion relative to the same speaker and time, as in I'. The
argument does come out valid this way, but we seem to change an
essential feature of Davidson's theory, namely, that 'that', in
any utterance of (17), should have a different referent from
'that' in any utterance of (20).
If, on the other hand, we evaluate Argument I by seeing
if (21) must be true as spoken by a person at a time if (17) and
(20) are true as spoken in sequence immediately previously, then
we get Argument I", which is invalid.
This does seem to present a serious problem for Davidson's
theory, although the problem presumes a treatment of inferences
and validity about which I am only speculating. Perhaps some
other way can be developed that will have better results.
A second objection to Davidson's theory is somewhat similar
to an objection raised against Scheff'ler's theory in Chapter V.
We saw that Scheffler's inscriptions! theory failed to provide
the proper truth conditions for belief sentences, since a person
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can have a belief without there being an inscription expressing
the concent of that belief. Although this exact problem does
no ~ a **sct Davidson's theory, a similar one does.
Consider the sentence:
23. Galileo believed something.
Toe truth conditions for (23) are given by the following
principle:
(K) 'Galileo believed something' is true-in-Engl ish as
potential ly spoken by p at t if and only if there
is some utterance such that Gal ileo believed it.
It seems clear that (K) does provide the natural Davidsonian
truth conditions for (23). I think, however, that (K) is
incorrect.
Suppose, for example, that Galileo's only belief is that
the earth moves. In that case, if I were to utter (23), then
it should be true-in-Engl ish as spoken by me now. In fact, since
(23) contains no demonstratives, it should be true relative to
me and now, whether I speak it or not. However, it is possible
that Galileo's only belief never has and never will be verbalized,
arid that there is no utterance such that Galileo believed it.
So (K) would imply that (23) is false in these circumstances,
despite the fact that it would actually be true.
Davidson's theory, then, is subject to an objection very
much like the one to which Scheffler's theory was subject.
In this case, however, the problem arises for sentences
like {c.o) and not for typical belief sentences.
There are many important ramifications of this objection.
If it is correct, then the theory will provide improper truth
conditions for other sentences in which we refer to the objects
of someone’s belief without expressing the content of that
belief. For example, sentences such as:
24. Galileo believed something true,
and
25. Galileo and Newton believed the same thing,
will not be treated properly, for reasons similar to those for
which (23) is not treated properly.
I can see only two possible responses to this objection,
but neither of them seems very plausible. One is to allow the
objects of belief, and the relata of the samesaying relation,
to oe possible as well as actual utterances. Thus, we might say
that there is some possible utterance that Galileo believed, in
the situation described above, even though there were no actual
utterances he believed.
This suggestion poses a number of problems. Admitting
possible objects into the ontology seems every bit as troubling
as admitting propositions in the first place. At any rate, it
seems fairly clear that Davidson would not encourage this
procedure.
Furthermore, there seem to be no grounds for deciding
v/hicn possible utterances are samesayings. In the case of
actual utterances, we can appeal to the intentions of the
utterer to help determine which utterances are samesayings.
But in the case of possible utterances, no such appeal is
possible, and thus the notion of a samesaying becomes even more
obscure than it had been.
The other possible response to the problem is to posit
the existence of mental utterances as well as physical utterances.
Thus, we would say that in the case of (23) in the situation
described above, what Galileo believed was a mental utterance.
It is diiiicult to evaluate this proposal until it is
developed into a more complete theory. For one thing, the
concept of a mental utterance is unclear. Granting that there
are such tilings, it is not clear that it is sentences, and not
propositions, that we utter mentally.
Moreover, it is not clear that there even must be a mental
utterance accompanying every belief. That is, it is not clear
that if Galileo believed that the earth moves, it follows that
at some time he uttered mentally 'The earth moves' (or some
sentence synonymous with it). It seems possible, at least, that
some beliefs are never entertained. In that case, the original
objection would still hold: (K) yields the wrong truth conditions
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for (23) , even if mental utterances are admitted.
Unless one of these alternatives can be made to work out
properly, it appears that Davidson's theory, despite its many
advantages, is open to this one serious objection.
APPENDIX
In this Appendix I will formulate and discuss the highlights
of a more formal version of the theory discussed in the body of
this chapter. I believe that the theory about to be described
is a reasonably accurate formulation of Davidson's theory.
The idea here will be to construct a language, D, as much
like the lower predicate calculus (LPC) as possible, but containing
indirect discourse and belief sentences. These sentences will be
interpreted in the manner proposed by Davidson. It is clear that
a number of important changes muse be made in LPC iri order to
accommodate sentences interpreted in this manner.
Two of the most important changes are: (i ) the additions to
the vocabulary of some demonstratives and a colon as a connective;
(ii) the relativization of truth to speakers and times.
The syntax of D . The syntax of D must differ from that of LPC in
a few ways. In addition to the connectives, logical signs,
constants, predicates, and variables of LPC, we need in D some
demonstratives and the additional connective,
1
The vocabulary
of D, then, is as follows:
(1) Connectives: /s, v , >, e, :
(2) Logical Signs: ( ,) , ,E,
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(3) Variables: x,xi,x 2 ...
(4) Individual Constants: a,b,c,e
y
J
\
Demonstratives: d,d!,d 2 ,...
( 6 ) n-place Predicates: P,Q,...
.z,ai 5b!
It will be useful to isolate a class of two-place
predicates that we may call the "propositional predicates".
These will be used to express 'believes' and 'said'. *B ' and 'S'
will be che predicates used for these purposes. Additional
propositional predicates, expressing 'desires', 'knows', etc.,
could easily be added.
We can turn now to the rules for forming the well
-formed
formulas (wffs) of 0. The idea here will be to include every
wff of LPC as a wff D, but add wffs to express belief sentences
and indirect discourse. The definition of wff in D, then, will
be exactly like that of wff in LPC, with the addition of a clause
for belief sentences and indirect discourse, and a minor change
in the rule for forming quantified wffs. The following recursive
definition should suffice:
(1) If ai,a2 ,...,x^ are constants of D, and P is an n-place
predicate of D, then rP(ai . . .a^)'
1
is an atomic wff of D
(2) If a is a constant and d is a demonstrative and P is a
propositional predicate and $ is a wff, then rP(a,d) :(<{>) 1
is a wff of D. (The context inside the parentheses
immediately following a colon will b? called "the scope
of the colon"
.
)
167
(3) If cp and if are wffs, then
, Afvif 1 , and
are wffs.
(4) If <f> is a viff and a is a constant not occurring in the
scope of a colon in f and x is a variable not in cf, then
'( !<P(x/a)'1 and r ( !: x)(cf(x/oO )'' are wffs.
This definition requires a few comments: (i) Formulas such
as
1
Fd 1 are not wffs in D. They do not satisfy clause (1),
because 'd 1 is not a constant. Clearly, no other clause licenses
their formulation either. A consequence of this is that things
such as ’That is ugly 1 cannot be expressed in D. It is possible
to alter the language to allow such things to be expressed, but
that would only add some complications that are not relevant to
our purpose.
Demonstratives may occur only as the second term of a
propositional predicate in D, and must always be followed by a
colon. These restrictions simplify the language considerably.
(ii) Clause (4) allows all normal quantified wffs to be
formed, but prevents formulas like ' (Ex)(S(g,d) :(Fx)) 1 from being
well -formed. The reason this restriction is desirable is that
such formulas represent an illegitimate kind of quantifying in,
and are best banned from the language.
Later on I will briefly discuss the possibility of allowing
similar formulas to the above to be well -formed, in order to
express de re beliefs. In the initial version of the language,
however, they are not wffs.
153
(iii) This does not prevent quantification over the objects
of the propositional predicates. We want to be able to say things
like 'Galileo believes something' in D, and the formula used to
say it is 1 (F.x)B(g ,x) ' . This is a wff since ' B ( g , a
)
' is an atomic
wff, and clause (4) allows the formulation of the desired
quantified wff.
(iv) We also can express things like 'Everyone believes
that a is F‘. The formula ' (x)B(x,d)
:
(Fa) ' is a wff and will
express this.
A complete account of the syntax of 0 would include a
discussion of the axioms and rules of inference in the language.
For the most part, these will be entirely standard, with the only
differences coming in the existential generalization rule, which
will only allow generalization upon constants not in the scope
of a colon. I will not go into the details of these aspects of
the syntax here.
The semantics of D . There are a number of ways in which the
semantics for D may be developed, but here I will examine only
one of the possibilities.
An interpretation function for D will be exactly like one
for LPC. That is, it will be a function that assigns to each
constant some object in the domain of D and to each n-place
predicate a set of ordered n- tuples from the domain. No
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assignment will be made by an interpretation function to the
demonstratives.
We can turn now to the truth defintion for D. It is here
that the most interesting features of the language are found.
We saw in the main part of this chapter that it is best to define
truth for languages with demonstratives as a relation between
sentences, speakers, and times. That is how we will proceed in
D.
We may call any ordered pair of a person and time an "index"
and thus evluate sentences relative to indices. What the truth
definition will do is provide ways to fill in the blanks in
expressions of the form
"<J> is true in D under interpretation I
at index (p,t) iff ", 0 r, more simply, "4, is truej at <p,t)
iff
Sentences without demonstratives will have the same truth
value at all indices, so the relativization to indices will be
vacuous for such sentences. Although Davidson countenances the
possibility of giving truth defintions for languages with
ambiguous sentences, which might also vary in truth value from
one index to another, D will not include such sentences.
The truth conditions for all sentences without demonstratives
will De the same in D as they are in LPC. The interesting
features of D arise in the truth conditions for sentences
containing demonstratives. Consider the sentence:
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1. B(g,d):(Me)
(1) is intended to represent the English 'Galileo believes that
the earth moves'.
The truth conditions for (1) are supposed to be very much
like the truth conditions for English belief sentences as
discussed in the main part of this chapter. Thus, in any
utterance of (1) '
d
1
is supposed to refer to that utterance of
'Me'. (1) is true, moreover, for any speaker and time, if and
only if 'B(g,d)' is true for that speaker and time.
There is a convenient feature of D that can be explained
at this point. When we evaluate (1) at an index, the index
consists of a speaker and a time. At that index 'd' is supposed
to refer to that speaker's utterance of 'Me' at that time.
Consider any interpretation function, I. (1) is true under I
at any index, <(p,t), provided 1(g), i.e., Galileo, believes p's
utterance of 'Me' at t. In other words, (1) is true^ at <fp,t)
iff the ordered pair consisting of 1(g) and p's utterance of
'Me' at t is in 1(B).
We can, for now, identify p's utterance of 'Me' at t with
the ordered triple 'Me')>. More will be said on this
identification later. Given this identification, 1(B) should be
a set of ordered pairs, each pair being a person and an
utterance, i.e., an ordered triple.
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The truth conditions for (1) can now be stated more
precisely:
'B(g,d):(Me)' is true at <p,t> iff <I(g),<p,t,'Me ,^eI(B)
it is not difficult to go on from here to specify truth conditions
for any belief sentence:
For any wff
<f>, if is rB(a! d):(ip)l then <}> is true iff
\I(a).<P.t,'Me ,
>) e 1(B)
Truth conditions for sentences in indirect discourse would be
similar.
A full statement of the truth definition for D follows.
It makes use of the notion of a "nominal variant", which is
defined this way:
I is a nominal variant of I 1 at a in D (N(I s r,a)) iff
(i) I and I' are interpretation functions for D
(ii) a is a constant in D
(iii) I and I* make assignments into exactly the same domain
(iv) I and I' make exactly the same assignments except
possibly at a
The truth definition is as follows:
(1) If rP(ot! . . .ot ) is an atomic wff in D, then it is true T
at any index <b,t> iff <fl(cn) , . .
.
,I(a )SeI(P) 1
(2) If 'P(a,d)
:
($)' is a wff in D, then it ?s true T at <0,0
iff <I(a).<b,t.*^eI(P) 1 7
(3) If <j) is r~ip ] then <p is true T at (p,t> iff ip is not true T
at <p,t>
^
1
(4) If (p is then <j> is true, at <(p,t') iff \
p
is true,
at <p,'t> arid x is truej at <p,t)>
1
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( 5 )
( 6 )
If
<j> is r (Ex)(^x/a)^ then 4» is true, at <p,t> iff
(El
' ) (N( I ,
I
'
,a) and ip is true, at <J,t>
If $ is ‘(x)(ipx/a)'1 then <j> is 1 true, at /p,t> iff
(I'JtNd.I'.a) =» 4, is true
x
at <p,l>
Finally, we can define validity in D this way:
The inference from <j> to ip is valid in D iff for every
interpretation I and every index i, is true^ at i
The advantages of D. Since D is essentially a formalized version
of the theory discussed inthe main part of this chapter, it has
many of the same advantages as that theory.
First, its ontological commitments are minimal. Although
it does require the existence of sentence types, it avoids
propositions
.
Second, it seems to properly render valid inferences such
as the one from ‘Galileo believes that the earth moves' to 'Galileo
believes something'. This inference will be represented in D
by the inference from (1) to
1. (Ex)(B(g,x))
To see if this inference is valid, we need merely see if,
for any I and any index (p,^, if (1) is true^ at (pjO then (2)
is as well. Suppose (1) is true^ at <(p,t>. Then, given clause
(2) of the truth definition, <J(g), <p,t,'Me'>/ is in 1(B). (2)
is truej at iff there is some nominal variant of I at, say.
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a such that
' B(g ,a ) ' is true under that variant at <p,t>.
Surely there is such a variant; any nominal variant of I at 'a'
that assigns <p,t,'Me'> to 'a' will do. So the inference is
val id.
As we saw in the main part of this chapter (section III),
some of the problems found in earlier theories seem to be
overcome by this theory. For example, no belief sentence such as
(1) will come out false for a person and time, if the person
utters it at that time, simply because there is no utterance of
the appropriate type (cf. pp. 144-145).
Moreover, if D can be made to accommodate ambiguous
sentences at all, no additional problems will be caused by belief
sentences. Sentences of the form rB(a,d)
:
(<f>)l may be interpreted
just as they have been, even if <j> is ambiguous. (Cf. pp. 145-145.)
There are a number of other advantages to this theory that
were not mentioned previously. We could add a truth predicate
to the language, so that things such as 'It is true that the
earth moves' may be expressed in the object language. We might
express this this way;
3. Td: (Me)
We rnay also add a predicate for de re believing and one
for da re saying. Thus, we could express the English:
4. Rodino believes of Nixon that he is guilty
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This will be expressed in terms of a three-place predicate true
of believers, objects and open sentences or predicates. A more
perspicuous English rendition of (4) might be:
5. Rodino believes of Nixon that: he is guilty
In D this might be expressed by:
6. B' (r,n,d)
:
(Gx)
These additions to D would require some changes in the
syntax and semantics, for one thing, we would have to relax the
ban on unbound variables in the scope of a colon. The truth
predicate may bring in some semantic paradoxes, but I suspect
that they can be dealt with in some standard way.
The disadvantages o f D. Along with all these advantages, D
does have a number of disadvantages. For one, it does appeal to
some obscure primitives. As D has been presented here, 'S' and
B; are both primitive predicates that express relations between
individuals and utterances that may occur thousands of years
after they have lived and in languages they do not understand.
Some of the obscurity of 'S' can be removed by the introduction
of samesaying into the language, but it is difficult to imagine
how *3' might be defined in terms of samesaying. Moreover,
'samesaying' itself is a fairly obscure primitive. (Cf. pp. 141-144.)
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Another problem in D concerns inferences such as:
1. B(g ,d)
:
(Me)
7. B(n,d)
: (Me)
8. (Ex)(B(g,x)^B(n,x)
This inference might be used to represent Argument I discussed
earlier. (Cf. pp. 147-150.)
I i we deiine validity the way we have, this inference will
come out valid. Cut this has the effect of treating the two
demonstratives as if they both referred to the same utterance.
This seems to conflict with the basic intent of Davidson's theory.
If, on the other hand, we change the definition of
validity so that the lines in the inference are evaluated at
different indices, it is no longer clear that the inference is
val id
.
Finally, there is some problem iri representing sentences
1 i ke
9. Galileo believes something
2. (Ex)B(g,x)
The problem is similar to the one discussed earlier. (Cf. pp. 150-154.)
(2) will be true under an interpretation at any (and all)
indices provided there is some object (namely, an utterance, or
ordered triple) such that it is the second member of some element
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of 1(B) of which 1(g) is the first member. But, as we saw
earlier, there is no reason to think there must be such an
utterance, even though what (2) is supposed to express is true.
It is clear, however, that there are many ordered triples,
<CP»t,c{)'> such that p did not utter $ at t. This suggests that
there may be something wrong with our identification of utterances
with these order triples - the triples exist even when the
corresponding utterance does not.
We can distinguish triples in which the person did utter
the sentence at the time from those in which he did not. We can
call the former "actualized" ordered triples. No problem arises
from the identification of actualized ordered triples with
utterances.
I have assumed until now that the only ordered triples in
elements of 1(B) are actualized ordered triples. This is the
source of the difficulty. If Galileo believes only that the
earth moves, but no one has ever uttered 'The earth moves', or
any synonymous sentence, then there will be no actualized
ordered triple such that Galileo believed it. So (2) will be
false when it should be true.
The only apparent way to get around this problem is to
allow unactualized ordered triples into elements of 1(B). Thus,
we might say that <I(g) ,(p,t, 'Me')) is in 1(B) even though p
did not utter 'Me' at t. That way, (2) might come out true
after al 1
.
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The problem with this suggestion is that the meaning of
unactual ized ordered triples is indeterminate. There would seem
to be no grounds upon which we could decide which unactualized
ordered triples a person believes, and which he does not.
Furthermore, when the samesaying relation is introduced into the
language, there will be no grounds for making some unactualized
ordered triples samesayings, and some not.
This objection is not as decisive as one might hope. What
it amounts to, essentially, is that if we allow unactualized
ordered triples to be the objects of saying and belief and the
relate of the ssmesaying relation, these relations become
unacceptably obscure. There seems to be no reason for thinking
a person believes one unactualized ordered triple and not
another.
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PART 1 1
1
NON-RELATIONAL THEORIES
According to all the alternatives to (PV) discussed in
Parts I and II, a belief sentence expresses a relation between
a believer and some other object. The differences between the
various theories have been with regard to the nature of these
other entities. In Part III I will turn to some significantly
different alternatives to (PV). These are theories that
construe belief sentences as non-relational and dispense with
objects of belief altogether. I will refer to such theories as
"non-relational theories of belief."
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CHAPTER VII
QUINE AND PRIOR
One of the first philosophers to explicitly defend a
non-relational theory of belief was W. V. 0. Quine J In this
chapter I will discuss Quine's theory and raise two objections
to it. One objection is that Quine gives only a syntactical
theory of belief sentences, and no semantical account of them.
But without a semantics he is not entitled to draw any conclusions
about the ontological commitments of his theory. Thus, he is
not justified in claiming to have provided a way to avoid
commitment to propositions. The second objection is that by
dispensing with the objects of belief Quine fails to deal
adequately with a significant aspect of our discourse about
belief. In connection with the second objection I will discuss
the views of A. N. Prior, who defends a theory similar to
Quine s.“
I
A. Quine's theory. In Word and Obj ect , at the conclusion of a
critical discussion of sentential and inscriptional theories of
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belief, Quine writes:
...there is no need to recognize 'believes' and
similar verbs as relative terms at all; no need
to countenance their predicative use as in 'w
believes x' (as against 'w believes that p'); no
need, therefore, to see 'that p' as a term.
Hence, a final alternative that I find as appealing
as any is simply to dispense with the objects of
the propositional attitudes This means viewing
'Tom believes [Cicero denounced Catiline]' no
longer as of the form : Fab' with a - Tom and b =
[Cicero denounced Catiline], but rather as of the
form 'Fa' with a = Tom and complex ' F ' . The verb
'believes' here ceases to be a term and becomes
part of an operator 'believes that' or 'believes
[...]', which, applied to a sentence, produces a
composite absolute general term whereof the
sentence is counted an immediate constituent
.
3
Quine's view has found several supporters. In addition to Prior,
whose views we will discuss shortly, Arthur Danto defends a
theory similar to Quine's.^'
It is somewhat difficult to give a completely satisfactory
account of Quine's theory without first discussing his methodology.
Although a thorough discussion of that would lead to matters that
cannot profitably be discussed here, I think that the following
brief account of Quine's project is not misleading.
In Chapter 4 of Word and Object Quine points out several
problems that arise in sentences of natural languages.^ One
problem is that a sentence may contain ari ambiguous term, and
therefore be semantically ambiguous.^ For example, the sentence
'Our mothers bore us' may be about our births and it may be about
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our interest in our mother's conversation. On any occasion
the meaning of the sentence depends upon the meaning of 'bore'
on that occasion.
Other problem sentences in natural language are syntactically
ambiguous
.
7
For example, 'Every boy dates some girl’ may mean
that there is some girl such that every boy dates that girl and
it may mean that every boy is not dateless.
Quine observes that ambiguous sentences like these, and
other problem sentences, can often be paraphrased into sentences
lacking these troublesome features. For example, the syntactic
amuiguity mentioned above can be avoided by using predicate logic
quantifiers instead of English quantifiers. Thus, instead of
saying 'Every boy dates some girl' one may use whichever suits
one's pyrpose of ' (Ex)[x is a girl and (y)(if y is a boy then
y dates x)] and '(x)[if x is a boy then (Ey)(y is a girl and
x dates y)] '
.
Quine calls the language which contains only these
trouble-free sentences the "canonical language" and the sentences
in it are said to be in canonical form.^ Quine claims that
translating our language into the ca?ionical language serves two
purposes. First, the canonical language is an aid "to
understanding the referential work of language and clarifying
our conceptual scheme."^ I think that this means that we get a
clearer idea what entities are referred to and thus what entities
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exist, by focusing our attention on the canonical language rather
than ordinary language.
Second, the canonical language allows for a simpler
logical theory than ordinary language .^ 0 That is, the definition
of a sentence, and the rules of inference for the canonical
language may be formulated more easily than the definition of a
sentence and the rules of inference for natural language.
Quine never states clearly what the criteria are for a
successful paraphrase from ordinary language into the canonical
language. He says that the canonical sentence need not be
synonymous with its ordinary language counterpart because synonymy
"is not a notion we can really make adequate sense of."^
Instead, he says that a canonical sentence S' is a proper
paraphrase of an ordinary sentence S on a particular
1 occasion
provided "the particular business that the speaker was on thai.
occasion trying to get on with, with the help of S among other
things, can be managed well enough to suit him by using S
instead of S.'
1^
Since this is not a precise criterion for successful
paraphrasing, Quine's discussion is not entirely satisfactory.
We do not always know whether or not a proposed
paraphrase is
acceptable. Perhaps this point can be set aside here,
and we
can turn to Quine's account of belief sentences.
Quine's view is that reference to and quantification
over propositions can be avoided in the canonical language. It
is important to note that he does not defend this view by
paraphrasing belief sentences into other sentences that lack
reference to propositions. Instead, belief sentences go into
the canonical language in almost the same form they have in
ordinary English. The only difference is that 'that* is
eliminated and replaced by square brackets around the sentence
following 'believes'. Thus, 'Jones believes that Darwin erred'
becomes 'Jones believes [Darwin erred]'.
At one point Quine considers the view that '[Darwin erred]'
is a propositional name,"*^ but he rejects if in favor of an
alternative proposal.^ His alternative is to view 'believes
[...]' as a predicate forming operator on sentences. Thus, it
operates on the sentence 'Darwin erred' to form the predicate
'believes [Darwin erred]'.
Quine says his view is that belief sentences are "of
the fonn 'Fa,., with complex 'F'."^ I take this to mean that
we should view predicates like 'believes [Darwin erred ]
1
as
complex. Let us call such predicates "belief predicates". It
is not clear what Quine's attribution of complexity to belief
predicates amounts to.
One possibility is that Quine is just attributing some
syntactic property to the predicates. Complex predicates might
be contrasted with simple ones in this way: after enumerating
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all the simple predicates of a language, one might specify ways
to form additional predicates. Predicates formed on the basis of
these rules would be complex predicates. For example, 'and' can
serve to form a complex predicate out of two other predicates.
The expression 'believes [...]' can also be considered a predicate
forming operator but it forms complex predicates out of sentences,
not out of other predicates. When Quine says that belief
predicates are complex, he may wish to attribute syntactic
complexity to them.
It is also possible that Ouine's attribution of complexity
to belief predicates is an attribution of some semantical property.
Semantically simple expressions would be those whose interpretation
is assigned directly by the interpretation function. A semantically
complex expression would be one whose interpretation is determined
by the interpretation of its parts. So when Quine says that belief
predicates are complex, he might mean that they are semantically
complex.
Whether Quine intended to say that belief predicates are
syntactical ly complex and semantically simple or that they are
both syntactically and semantically complex, I think some account
of their semantics is required before he is entitled to draw any
ontological conclusions from his theory. Two considerations
support this contention. One is a general consideration about
determining the ontology of a given theory, and the other
concerns non-relational theories of belief specifically.
The general consideration is that one can only tell what
the ontological commitments of a theory are by interpreting it,
i.e., by giving a semantical account of it. Suppose, for exap;ple,
that someone were, to defend an extremely simple theory, which
consisted of the single theorem ' (Ex)(Fx)'. We would not know
what entities this theory is committed to until we understand
at least the meaning of 1 F 1 . If 1 F 1 means 'is a cow', then
his theory is committed to a cow. Similarly, we only know
what entities Quine's theory of belief sentences is committed
to when it is interpreted.
It may seem obvious that Quine's theory can be interpreted
without commitment to propositions, but I will argue that that
is far from obvious. Indeed, the only moderately plausible
interpreted non-relational theory of belief has been proposed
by Jaakko Hintikka ^ and it seems to be committed to entities
every bit as objectionable as propositions, namely, possible
worlds.
! j Some philosophers even identify propositions with sets
of possible worlds, or functions from worlds to truth values.
Thus, there is a specific fact about non-relational theories of
belief that supports my contention that Quine's theory must be
interpreted before any ontological conclusions about it can be
drawn. It is that interpreted non-relational theories
seem lo
have significant ontological commitments; indeed, as I
shall
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argue in Chapter 8, their commitments may he as great as relational
theori es.
In order to support my claim that it is not obvious that
Quine's theory can be interpreted without bringing in any
undesirable entities, I want to turn now to two simple ways in
which his theory might be interpreted. Neither interpretation
is acceptable, and this suggests that some more complex
interpretation is needed, perhaps one requiring propositions, or
possible worlds.
B. Two in terpretation s of Qu ine's theory. On the first
interpretation of Quine's theory, belief predicates are
semantically simple, despite being syntactically complex. That
is, the interpretation function interprets them directly, and
their interpretation does not depend upon the interpretation
of their parts.
This view is similar in some respects to the naive
propositional view, (NPV), discussed in Chapter I. • he similarity
is that where (NPV) posited an infinite number of semantically
simple propositional names - one for each sentence - this theory
posits an infinite number of semantically simple belief predicates
- one for each sentence in the language.
The objections to this version of Quine's theory are
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similar to those directed upon (NPV). General theoretical
considerations suggest that an acceptable theory will not have
an infinite number of semantically simple expressions. Moreover,
it seems clear that the meanings of the parts of belief sentences
do contribute to the meaning of the whole, contrary to the
implications of this theory
.
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It seems, then, that belief predicates must be semantically
complex. Since they are formed by operating on sentences with
the operator 'believes it is natural to suppose that the
interpretation of a belief predicate will depend upon the
interpretation of this operator and the interpretation of the
sentence in it. One way to develop a theory along these lines is
to have the interpretation function specify sets S and S' of
believers such that the extension of any belief predicate
rbelieves is S if $ is true and is S' if <j> is false. This is
the second possible interpretation of Quine's theory.
The problem with this proposal is that it has the
consequence that the members of S' would be unfortunate enough to
believe every falsehood, and the members of S would believe every
truth. Since most people seem to believe some, but not all,
truths, and some, but not all, falsehoods, this theory is clearly
unacceptable.
It is not easy to repair this defect without some radical
changes in the theory. Since on the theory being considered,
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sentences have no other semantic properties than truth and
falsity, it is difficult to see how the interpretation of belief
predicates can differ when the sentences in them have the same
truth value. One move that suggests itself is to assign a
proposition, as well as a truth value, to each sentence, and then
let the interpretation of each belief predicate depend upon the
proposition expressed by the sentence in it. Obviously, this
move is not open to an anti
-propositionalist like Quine.
The preceding discussion was intended to show that there
is no obvious or clearcut semantical theory to supplement Quine's
syntactical theory about belief sentences. The absence of a
semantical theory renders the syntactical theory relatively
unenl ightening. We can only tell what entities Quine's theory
requires when we interpret it. Since ws have no interpretation,
we have no idea whether or not it requires propositions.
It is surely true that there is more than one way to
generate all belief sentences out of some syntactically basic
parts. One way is to allow 'that' to form names out of sentences,
and 'believes' to form sentences out of two names. Another method
is the one Quine advocates. Which one of these methods is
preferable depends largely upon which leads to a more attractive
semantic theory. ^ If Quine's view does lead to a satisfactory
theory, and that theory is ontolcgically more economical than (PV),
then the Quinean view will be an attractive alternative to (PV).
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But without a semantical theory, Quine's view has no ontological
implications, and thus does not show that commitment to propositions
is avoidable.
II
In this section I will examine an objection to non-
relational theories that can be raised even in the absence of a
semantical theory. The objection, if sound, shows that no
matter how the semantics is developed, any non-relational theory
will fail to deal properly with a significant part of our
discourse about belief.
A. The no quantifi cat ion objection. The objection may be put
this way. In addition to belief sentences in which what is
believed is expressed in the sentence, there are belief sentences
in which what is believed is unspecified. Examples of such
sentences are 'Jones believes something', 'Jones believes something
Smith denies', and 'Jones believes everything Smith says'. These
sentences, which appear to contain quantifications over objects of
belief, are meaningful and possibly true. Moreover, there are
valid inferences involving them. Any adequate theory of belief
182
should account for these quantified belief sentences, but in order
to do so, bc;l ieves must oe regarded as a two place predicate,
and belief sentences must be relational. So the non-relational
theory is false. Let us call this the "no quantification
objection"
.
We can make the objection a bit more precise by looking
again at Quine's canonical language. In that language we will riot
find a sentence like:
1. Jones believes something.
The reason that (1) is absent from the canonical language is that
Quine eliminates English quantifiers like 'something' and replaces
them by predicate logic quantifiers.
It may seem, then, that (1) can be replaced by:
2. (Ex) (Jones believes x).
But (2) is not in the canonical language either, since 'believes'
is not a predicate and cannot properly be followed by a name or
a variable.
In order to introduce the kind of quantification we want
in (2), we must reinstate 'believes' as a two place predicate.
But doing that requires abandoning the non-relational theory.
Thus, the non-relational theory cannot properly deal with
sentences like (1).
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liiyee repli e $ to the no quantificatinn nhjprtinn i w-jn
consider three replies to the no quantification objection. The
first reply is Quine's. He admits that quantified belief
sentences cannot be formulated on his theory, but he suggests
that his theory is satisfactory without them. The second reply
I have devised myself. It is that quantified belief sentences
can be admitted into a non-relational theory by recognizing
predicates such as 'believes something'. The third reply is
due to A. N. Prior. He suggests that quantified belief
sentences can be admitted in a non-relational theory by
interpeting quantifiers in a way different from the customary
way.
(I) Quine is well aware of the no-quantification
objection. In both Word and Object and Phi lo sophy of Logic he
points out that his canonical language bans quantification over
objects of belief. However, he does not seem to be terribly
moved by the problem. In Word and Object his comment on it
is that quantification over objects of belief is "expendable"
because "such quantifications tend anyway to be pretty trivial
in what they affirm, and useful only in heralding more tangible
20information.
"
In saying that quantification over the objects of belief
is expendable, Quine seems to be saying that his theory is
satisfactory even if quantified belief sentences cannot be
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formulated in it and inferences involving such sentences not
represented in it. He is, as Israel Scheffler puts it, willing
21
to "give up" these statements and inferences.
In discussing Danto's version of Quine's non-relational
theory, Heidelberger argues that one's willingness to give up
these statements and inferences does not reduce the force of the
objection. He writes, "Defenders of non-relational theories may
advocate that we 'give up' such inferences and 'be indifferent'
toward the corresponding conditionals, but if the inferences are
valid and the conditionals true, the attitudes we take to them
22
are insignificant.
Furthermore, Quine seems to be wrong when he says that
quantified belief sentences are "pretty trivial". The truth
value of sentences like 'Everything the Pope believes (or says)
is true' seems fairly important. And the inferences such as one
from this sentence and 'The Pope believes that abortion is
wrong' to 'It is true that abortion is wrong' are valid and
significant.
Finally, Scheffler has argued, plausibly I think, that
quantification over the objects of the propositional attitudes
is indispensable in any adequate account of the role of reasons
in human behavior.
23
It seems, then, that there are some good
arguments for retaining quantification over the objects of
bel ief
.
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(II) A possible second reply to the no quantification
objection is that sentences like (1) need not be exluded from
the canonical language. For it may be suggested that what (1)
says is:
3. Jones is a believer.
(3) simply attributes a property to Jones, and can easily be
admitted into the canonical language. (1) can also be admitted,
with 'believes something' being counted as a primitive predicate,
or else (1) may simply be excluded and paraphrased by its
equivalent, (3).
This reply does not provide a solution to all the problems
caused by the absence of quantification over the objects of
belief. In addition to a way to express (1), we also need ways
to say things like 'I believe everything John Dean says' and 'I
doubt everything Nixon says'. In order to say these things,
it seems that we will need additional predicates, i.e.,
'believes everything John Dean says' and 'doubts everything Nixon
says'. Since there are an infinite number of sentences like
these that can be formed, we will have to suppose that the
canonical language has an infinite supply of these predicates.
But that seems to be an implausible supposition.
Moreover, there are logical relations between various
belief sentences that will be lost if all these predicates are
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regarded as primitive. For example, 'Nixon believes that
decente is good' and 'I do not believe that detente is good
imply ! I do not believe something Nixon does believe'. With all
the belief predicates left primitive, the only way to validate
this inference is to introduce a special rule licensing the
in.erence. Since there are an infinite number of similar valid
inferences, we would need an infinite supply of these rules.
Bui this would seem to be as objectionable as having an
infinite number of primitive expressions in the language. It is
difficult to see how anyone could learn all the rules for these
inferences. Yet people are able to recognize the validity of
these inferences. So it does not seem as though there are an
infinite number of rules but rather one general rule covering
all the inferences of this kind. Thus, the second reply to the
no quantification objection is inadequate.
(Ill) A third reply to the objection can be found in Prior's
Obj ect s of Thought
. Prior advocates a version of the non-relational
theory, but thinks it can be saved from the no quantification
objection. Before discussing Prior's reply, it may help to
examine some other aspects of his theory.
Prior's major thesis is that propositions are logical
constructions. By this he means that "sentences that are
ostensibly about propositions. . .are not really about propositions,
9/1
but. about something else." T
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Prior finds ostensible reference to propositions in three
kinds of sentences. The first is in ascriptions of truth arid
falsity to propositions, as in 'The proposition that the sun is
hot is true'. He argues that this sentence just means 'The sun
is hot', and the latter is about the sun, not about a proposition,
25
so the former is also about the sun and not a proposition.
Ordinary belief sentences, such as 'Jones believes that
Darwin erred', make up the second class of sentences in which
Prior finds ostensible reference to propositions. Prior's
views on these sentences are similar to Quine's. Like Quine,
he fails to accompany his syntactical observations with any
semantical theory, and therefore he is not justified in
concluding that commitment to propositions by belief sentences
27
is avoidable."
The third context in which Prior thinks there is an
apparent reference to propositions is the kind of context
under discussion in this section, namely, quantifications over
objects of belief. Prior's example of a sentence of this kind
is:
4. I don't believe some of the things that Coheri believes.
Prior credits Ramsey with discovering the method for
28
eliminating this apparent reference to propositons. It
is to
move to a "more stylized language" than ordinary English,
and
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rewrite (4) as:
5. For some p, Cohen believes that p and I do not believe that p.
Prior argues that the quantifier in (5) does not range
over propositions, and because of this contends that (4) can be
paraphrased into a sentence containing no reference to or
quantification over propositions. It is important to note, however,
that this paraphrase differs from the earlier one (from 'The
proposition that the sun is hot is ture' to 'The sun is hot')
in that in the earlier case both sentences were part of ordinary
English, whereas in this case we go from English, (4), to
non-English (5).
Perhaps, if Prior can give us a reasonable account of the
meaning of (5), and show that it means what (4) does, arid that
the quantifier in (5) need not range over propositions, then
we will be in a position to accept his claim that the ostensible
reference to propositions in (4) has been eliminated. What is
needed, then, is a clear account of the meaning of (5), and
some assurance that it means what (4) means.
Chapter 3 of Objects of Thought contains Prior's
explanation and defense of his account of quantification. He
begins with what he calls "name quantifiers . These are
quantifiers binding variables filling the place of a name. He
writes
:
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Consider, for instance, the sentence 'For some x,
x is red-haired'. The colloquial equivalent of
this is 'Something i; red-haired'. I do not think
that any formal definition of 'something' is either
necessary or possible, but certain observations can
usefully be made about the truth-conditions of
statements of this sort. 'Something is red-haired'
is clearly true if any specification of it is true,
meaning by a 'specification' of it any statement
in which the indefinite 'something' is replaced by
a specific name of an object or person, such as
'Peter', or by a demonstrative 'this' accompanied
by an appropriate pointing gesture.
Prior seems to be giving a substitutional interpretation
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of the quantifier, as two reviews of his book suggest. But
a careful reading of the above passage, and the one following
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it, shows that he is not. On a substitutional interpretation,
one would say:
(A) 'For some x, x is red-haired' is true iff some
specification of 'x is red-haired' is true.
Prior is careful to reject (A):
I do not say that 'Something is red-haired' or
'For some x, x is red-haired' is true only if
there is some true sentence which specifies it,
since its truth may be due to the red-hairedness
of some object for which our language has no
name or which no one is in a position to point
to while saying ' This is red-haired'
So Prior is prepared to accept only half the biconditional
in (A). He agrees that the truth of some specification of an
existentially quantified sentence is sufficient for its truth.
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but does not think it is necessary.
Prior does go on to give necessary and sufficient
conditions for the truth of the quantified sentence, but seems
to think that these conditions are not very enlightening. He
writes
:
If we want to bring an 'only if 1 into it the
best we can do, ultimately, is to say that 'For
some x, x is red-haired ' is true if and only if
there is some red-haired object or person, but
this is only to say that it is true if and only
if, for some x, x is red -ha i red.„
Thus, Prior is willing to assert:
(B) 'For some x, x is red-haired' is true if and only if
for some x, x is red-haired.
While (B) is surely true, it in no way supports the claim
that ’For some x, x is red-haired' is a more stylized way to say
'Something is red-haired'. In general , we have no reason to
believe that Prior's stylized sentences are paraphrases of
English quantified sentences. This fact will be of great
importance when we turn to quantifiers binding variables which
stand in place of a sentence, as in (5).
Prior says that a sentence such as (5)
...is clearly true if any specification of it is,
a 'specification' of it being a sentence in wnich
the prefix 'for some p' is dropped, and the
remaining variable p replaced by an expression
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of the sort for which it stands, i.e., a
sentence.
0 ‘+
Again, Prior has offered only a sufficient condition for
the truth of the quantified sentence. Without a necessary
condition, however, we simply do not know whether (5) really
is a more stylized version of (41. Therefore, we do not know
whether Prior has shown us a way to eliminate the ostensible
reference to a proposition in (4). Thus, he has not shown that
quantification over objects of belief can be retained in a
non-relational theory, and he has not successfully replied to
35
the no quantification objection.
In one of the previously quoted passages Prior remarks
that lie does "not think any definition of 'something' is either
necessary or possible". In light of this, it may seem
i nappropria te to criticize him, as I have done, for not defining
'something'
,
i.e., for not giving necessary and sufficient
conditions for the truth of sentences containing 'something'.
I think, however, that Prior's remark may be challenged.
For surely a definition of 'something' is required if we are to
determine the ontological implications of sentences containing
it. Moreover, a definition is possible, namely, the standard
objectual interpretation . The only problem with that definition
is that it brings with it ontological commitments Prior
finds
objectionable. Therefore, since a definition of 'something is
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both necessary and possible, I think it is appropriate to
criticize Prior s theory on the grounds that it does not provide
one.
Ill
In this chapter I have discussed the non-relational
theories of bel ief defended by Quine and Prior. I have argued
that they do not show that (PV) has more ontological commitments
than a theory of belief requires, because the theories, as
propounded by Quine and Prior, are only syntactical theories
about belief sentences, and we do not know their commitments
until a semantics is provided. Thus, we do not know that
non-relational theories can have fewer commitments than (PV).
Moreover, the theories fail to properly account for quantified
belief sentences, and thus are subject to the no quantification
objection. In the next chapter I will turn to a more successful
non-relational theory.
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CHAPTER VIII
HINTIKKA
The two principal defects found in Quine's non-relational
theory of belief were that it did not offer any semantical account
of belief sentences and that it did not properly treat quantified
belief sentences. Jaakko Hintikka has also defended a non-relational
theory of belief^, but his theory does include a semantical account
of belief sentences, and, althouyh Hintikka never discusses
quantified belief sentences, I will argue that his theory may be
expanded to include such sentences. This chapter will be devoted
to a discussion of Hintikka's theory. In section I, I will
present Hintikka's theory in its original form and in section II
expand it to include quantified belief sentences. Sections III
and IV will contain criticism of the theory.
I
'
I
In this section I will describe the language (H) developed
by Hintikka in "Semantics for Propositional Attitudes".
The vocabulary of (H) includes the usual assortment of
constants, predicates, variables, and connectives of the lower
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predicate calculus (LPC). In addition, it contains the symbol
‘S', which will be the counterpart in (H) of the English
' believes that'
.
The rules for forming well -formed formulas (wffs) in (H)
are exactly like the rules in (LPC), with an added rule for
2forming wffs with 1 B'. This rule is:
(W1 ) If a is a constant or variable and <}> is a wff, then
is a wff.
Wffs formed in accord with (W1 ) will be referred to as "the
belief sentences" or "the belief formulas" of (H). (H) could be
expanded to include other expressions of the same category as
1
B
' ,
representing 'knows that', 'doubts that', etc., but it will
be sufficient to deal with just ' B ' here.
The semantics for (H) is a possible v/orlds semantics, and
it may be developed as follows. Let W be a set of all the
possible worlds and D be a set of all the objects talked about
in (H). Some objects in D will exist in some of the worlds in W
but not in the others. Vie may suppose that there is a function,
E, that assigns to each member of W some subset of D. If w is
in W, then E(w) is the set of all those objects existing in w.
An interpretation for (H) is a function that assigns to
each constant some object and to each predicate some set of
n-tuples of objects. But assignments are made relative to worlds,
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so an interpretation is a two argument function from expressions
and worlds onto objects or sets of n ‘tuples of objects.
An interpretation for (H) will also make assignments to
variables, but these assignments will not vary from world to
world. Some way to deal with worlds in which the assigned
object to a variable fails to exist is needed, but this point
3
need not concern us here.
We may now turn to the truth definition for (H). Truth
will be defined relative to a world and under an interpretation
.
Thus, we will say '
cp is true under interpretation I in world w'
,
or simply, 1
<f>
is true- 1 in w
The truth rule for atomic sentences is as follows:
(Tl) If ai On are constants or variables and P
n
is an
n-place predicate, then fp
n (ai-..a is true- 1 in w
iff <I(ai,w),... ,I(a ,w))eI(Pn ,w)
Molecular sentences will be treated in similar fashion.
In order to state the truth rules for quantified
sentences, the concept of a nominal variant must be introduced.
An interpretation I' for (H) is a nominal variant of
interpretation I for (hi) with respect to a variable '
x
1 if and
only if I and I' make exactly the same assignments at every world
to every constant, predicate, and variable, except possibly x .
The expression "I 1 is a nominal variant of I with respect to 'x'"
will be abbreviated 1 N (
1
1
,1 , 'x‘
)
'
.
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With the help of this concept we may state the truth rules
for quantified wffs:
(T2) If $ is a wff of the form r (Ex)(tJj)'' then <j> is true-I in w
iff (El 1 ){[N(
1
1
, 1
,
'x' ) and ^ is true-I' in w] and I'(x,w)e
E(w)>
(T3) If <p is a wff of the form r (x) then <j> is true-I in w
iff (I
'
){[N(I
'
,1
,
'x' ) ^ is true-I' in w] and I'(x,w)e
E(w)
}
All that remains to complete the description of (H) is to
specify the truth rule for belief formulas. Hintikka begins his
discussion of them with the observation that of all the possible
worlds, some are compatible with all the beliefs of a given
individual and some are riot. Let us call all those worlds
compatible with an individual's beliefs his 'belief worlds'.
Since an individual may exist in several worlds, and have
different beliefs in the different worlds, his belief worlds
will vary from world to world.
Hintikka thinks that understanding '
B
‘ amounts to knowing
the function that assigns to each individual and his world, his
belief worlds relative to that world. Suppose Ig is that
function. Ig(a,w) will thus be the set of all a_ s belief worlds
relative to w.
We may now state the truth rule for belief formulas.
Informally the idea is that a wff rBa(<}>)'' is true-I in w
provided
<J>
is true-I in all a/s belief worlds, i.e., 4> is true-I
in every member of Ig(ci^,w) . Formally, this rule may be stated
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(T4) if 9 is a wff of the form rBa(fi)
>
' then 4> is true-I in w
iff ip is true-I in every member of I
f
(Ia,w),w).
I think that there are some serious problems with (T4 ),
but will postpone discussion of them until section III. In section
II, I will develop the language (H 1 ) in which quantified belief
sentences may be expressed.
II
Hintikka never mentions sentences containing quantifications
over objects of belief in his discussion of propositional
attitudes. He neither explains how they may be formulated in
his system, nor the reason for their absence. I think, however,
that they may be formulated in a slightly modified version of
(H), which I will describe in this section and call '(H
1 )'.
No sentence in (H) expresses what is expressed in English
by:
1. Jones believes something.
In (H') the following formula will be a wff and will express
what ( 1 ) expresses:
2. (Ep) (Bj (p)
)
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The letter p will be used as an object language variable. It
Will be called a 'sentential variable' and should not be confused
with the standard variables, e.g., V, already admitted into
(K). In (H‘ ) , (2) will be a wff, but a formula such as
3- ( Ex ) ( 3j ( x )
)
will not. be.
It is not difficult to make (2) a wff in (H* ). The rule
for belief formulas, (Wl), need merely be revised in order to
allow the formation of what we might call 'open belief formulas'.
That is, we replace (Wl) by:
(Wl 1 ) If a is a constant or variable and <f> is a v/ff or sentential
variable, then rBa(4>)'1 is a wff.
Given (W1‘), a formula such as 'Ba(p)' is a wff.
Next, we add a rule for forming sentential ly quantified
wffs, similar to the rule for ordinarily quantified wffs:
(W2) If ^ is a wff and P is a sentential variable, then r (EP)((f>)'1
and r (P)(<M' are wffs.
(W2) allows the formation of wffs with vacuous quantifiers.
For example, since 'Fa' and 'Bb(Fa)' are both wffs, so are '(p)
(Fa)' and ' ( Ep ) ( Bb ( Fa )
)
' . This is an exact analogy with the
rules for ordinary quantifiers, which allow formation of wffs
such as ' (Ex) (Fa) '
.
If desired, we may specify a subclass of ail the wffs of
(H') as the sentences of (M 1 ). These will be wffs having
neither vacuous quantifiers nor unbound variables.^
Given (2), we will have as wffs (and sentences) in (H 1 )
formulas such as (2) and
4. (p) (Ba(p)
)
and
5. (Ep) (Ba(p)^-Bb(p)
)
(5) may be used to express 'There is something a^ believes and
b does not believe'
.
Now that quantified belief sentences may be formulated in
(H'), we must provide an interpretation for them. The best way
to do this is to treat sentential variables like ordinary
variables and have interpretation functions make assignments
to them. The assignment to any sentential variable will be a
set of possible worlds, and the assignment made by an
interpretation to a particular variable will not vary from
world to world
.
Sentential variables must also be given a truth value
at each world. The reason for this is that it enables
sententially quantified sentences to be treated analogously to
ordinary quantified sentences. Just as r (Ex)(cl>)^ is said to be
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true- 1 provided <{> is true-I' for some I* such that N(I',I,'x'),
r (EP)(cf))'1 will be true-I provided
<J>
is true for some I' such that
N(I',I,P).
In order to make use of this rule, every open formula, e.g.,
'Ba(p)', must have a truth value. In order to assign a truth
value to this belief formula, some truth value must be assigned
to ' p ' . Then we may say that 'Ba(p)' is true-I provided 'p ; is
true in all of a' s belief worlds.
The following rule for the truth of sentential variables
will suffice, although numerous other rules would work as well:
(T5) If P is a sentential variable, then P is true-I in w iff
wel (P,w)
.
(T4) may still be used to specify the truth conditions for
unquantified belief formulas, open and closed, but 'ip' must now
be taken to range over wffs and sentential variables.
Finally, we may add clauses to the truth definition for
sentential ly quantified formulas:
(T6) If <j> is ( (EP) (ip)^ then <J> is true-I in w iff (EI
! )N(I
'
,1 ,P)
and ip is true-I' in w.
(T7) If
<f>
is r (P)(ip)"1 then <p is true-I in w iff (
I
'
)N(1 1 ,1 ,P)
4 > i s true-I
1 in w.
It may be helpful to show, informally, that (T5)-(T7) have
the intended results. The best way to do this is to suppose
that there is a function, T, that assigns to each interpretation
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and sentence or sentential variable, the set of worlds in which
that sentence or sentential variable is true under that
interpretation. T( I »4> ) , or Tj(<j>), will thus be the set of all
those worlds in which <j> is true- 1. We may call these worlds O's
'truth set' or its 'truth worlds'. T may be defined recursively,
in a manner similar to that in which truth is defined for (H‘).
The way in which (T5)-(T7) work may be seen more easily
in terms of this new function. We may state an analogue of
(T4) in terms of T. The right hand side of (T4) reads ' ip is
true-I in every member of I
g
(I (a,w) ,w) ' . In terms of T this may
be restated as '
T ^
(xp) includes every member of I g ( I (a,w)
,w)
'
,
or, equivalently, ' I
g
(I(a,w) ,w) is a subset of T
j
(ip)
'
. Thus,
(T4) may be replaced by:
(T4
' ) If 4 is
rBct(ip)^ then 4> is true-I in w iff I g
(I(a,w),w)
is a subset of Tj(i|j)
.
The intuitive idea of (T4‘) is that a belief sentence is
true provided the subject's (the believer's) belief worlds
constitute a subset of the truth worlds of the content
sentence. It might be convenient to say that a truth set for
a sentence is the "proposition"
9
expressed by the sentence,
and that the intuitive idea of (T4 ' ) is that a belief sentence
is true if and only if the believer's belief worlds are
a subset
of the proposition expressed by the content sentence.
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The truth conditions for quantified belief sentences may
now be explained with relative ease. ' (Ep) (Ba(p) ) ' is true
provided there is some propositions that may be assigned to '
p
'
such that a's belief worlds constitute a subset of that
proposition. The assignment to ' p ’ that makes this quantified
sentence true may be identical with the truth set of some
sentence, but it need not be. So the quantified sentence may be
true even though there is no sentence such that
rBa (<!>)' is true.
This seems desirable, since it is possible that a^ believes
something, but nothing expressable in (H
1
).
A more complex example is:
5. (Ep) (Ba) (p)/v~Bb(p)
)
(5) represents the English 'There is something a^
believes and
b does not believe'. (5) is true provided there is some
assignment that may be made to '
p
' such that 'Ba(p)' is true
and 'Bb(p) ' is false. So, if there is some proposition such
that a's belief worlds constitute a subset of it, but
b s do
not, then (5) will be true.
10
If, for example, a believes that
Fc, but o does not, then a's belief worlds will
constitute a
subset of the proposition expressed by 'Fc',
but b's belief
worlds will not be a subset of that proposition.
It is possible,
however, that what a believes and b does not
is not expressed by
any sentence in (H
1
). (5) may still be true in
those circumstances
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if there is some assignment that may be made to 'p', even though
not a truth set of any sentence, that makes ’Ba(p)„~Bb(p) ' true.
(H‘) thus seems to be a superior theory to (H). It is an
interpretated non-relational theory of belief that allows
quantification over the objects of belief. There are, however,
some serious problems with (H‘), and in the next section I will
discuss them.
Before moving on to the objections to (H'), I should point
out that there is one respect in which (H*
)
involves a departure
from (H) that Hintikka might regard as undesirable. He would
contend, I believe, that the introduction of sentential
quantifiers ranging over sets of possible worlds ontologically
commits (H‘) to these entities, whereas (H) did not have those
commi tments
.
Hintikka argues that one's "ontology is what one assumes
to exist in one’s world," and "to exist in an ontologically
relevant sense, to be a part of the furniture of the world,
is
to be a value of a special kind of bound variable,
namely one
whose values all belong to the same possible world
."
1
Since Hintikka's object language quantifiers in (H) always
have values that all belong to the same
possible world, and never
include possible worlds or sets of possible
worlds, Hintikka
claims that his theory is not ontologically
committed to possible
worlds or sets of possible worlds. The
quantifiers in (H ), on
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the other hand, do have sets of possible worlds as values, and these
sets do seem to exist in possible worlds, so (H
1
) is onto logically
committed to such objects.
Hintikka admits that "we must in some sense be committed
to whatever v/e quantify over ."^
2
But since possible worlds are
only quantified over in the metalanguage for (H), and are not
said to exist iji any world, his theory is not ontologically
committed to them. Instead, he says, they are part of the
"ideology" of the theory, and, apparently, the theory is
ideologically committed to them
.”13 (H') s however, is
ontologically committed to sets of possible worlds and thus to
pos hi e worl ds thernsel ves
.
The distinction between ideology and ontology is a
clear
one, but I think it would be a mistake to suppose
that the
ontological commitments of a theory, in Hintikka' s
sense, are
the only "important" or "relevant" ones.
Someone who doubts
that there are possible worlds would object to both
(H) and (H‘)
on the grounds that they are committed to
an objectionable kind
of entity. So (H') is no more objectionable than
(H) because it
moves possible worlds from the ideology
to the ontology. It
would be a mistake to charge (H' ) with
introducing any entities
not required by (H).
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III
In this section I will discuss three fairly familiar
objections to (H‘). These are also objections to (H), but they
are sometimes overlooked in discussions of Hintikka's theory
because his views on d e re belief have been the focus of his
critics' attention. These objections are: (i) the logical
equivalence objection - (H‘) implies that everyone believes
every logical equivalent of anything he believes; (ii) the
closure objection - (H') implies that everyone believes all the
logical consequences of anything he believes; and (iii) the
logical impossibility objection - (H‘) implies that no one
believes any logical impossibility. I will argue that each of
these implications is false.
( i ) The logical equivalence objection. One consequence
of (H‘) is that a person believes everything logically equivalent
to anything he believes. That this is a consequence of (H’) is
easily shown. A belier sentence such as
rBa(4>)'1 is true provided
$ is true in all a/s belief worlds. If <t> and are
logically
equivalent, then they are true in exactly the same worlds, so
one is true in all a's belief worlds if and only if the other
is true in all a's belief worlds. Hence, if 4? and ^ are
logically
equivalent, then rBa(r|>)l -j s true if and only if
r3a(i|^ is true.
The feature of (H') just described seems clearly
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objectionable because it forces us to attribute to believers many
beliefs they need not have. Suppose, for example, that a_ has
never heard of snow and does not have the concept of snow. I assume
that a person cannot have a belief unless he has grasped all the
concepts that make it up. Thus, a^ would have no beliefs
involving the concept of snow, e.g., that snow is white, or that
snow is not white. However, on Hintikka's theory, if a believes
anything, then he does have beliefs about snow. If he believes,
say, that grass is green, it follows that be believes that grass
is green and either snow is white or snow is not white. Ihis is
because 'Grass is green' and 'Grass is green and either snow is
white or snow is not white' are logically equivalent.
(ii) The closure objection. If <f> is true in all of a/s
belief worlds, then everything <j> implies is true in all those
worlds as well. So, if rBa(cf>)^ is true and <J> implies ip then
rBa is true also. But people frequently fail to believe all
the logical consequences of what they believe, so this implication
of ( H
'
)
seems to be false.
A particularly grievous instance of the closure objection
concerns necessary truths. Since necessary truths are true in
all worlds, they are implied by everything. So, if
rBa(cf>)^ is
true, for any $, it follows that for any ip such that ip is a
necessary truth, <> implies ij>, and
rBa(i.b)^ is true. This implies
that every believer believes every mathematical and logical
truth.
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ihuSj ( H
' ) implies that every believer believes that snow is
white or it is not the case that snow is white, whether or not
he has the concept of snow. It seems, however, that some people
do not have this belief. Similarly, it seems that there are
many mathematical truths some of us fail to believe.
(iii) The logical impossibility objection. Since a
logically impossible formula is true in no worlds, it is not
true in all (or any of) the belief worlds of anyone. Therefore,
if <j> is necessarily false, it is provable in (H 1 ) that rBa(c*>)'' is
false.^ This, too, seems inconsistent with the facts about
belief, since people often believe necessary falsehoods, e.g.,
false mathematical statements.
I think that each of these objections constitutes a
serious problem for Hintikka's theory. Moreover, I see no way
to overcome them without significantly changing the theory.
However, I should point out that Hintikka is aware that his theory
is subject to objections of this sort. In response he says that
his theory does not actually apply to the real world, but only
to a world in which people are logically perfect, in the sense
that they are able to draw all the consequences of their belief
and believe all such consequences.
This reply to objections of the sort raised in this
section can only be dealt with briefly here. Hintikka seems to
admit that his theory is not an adequate theory of real belief,
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but is adequate only as a theory of some idealized kind of belief.
Since ic is real belief and its associated ontology chat are of
interest here, I think that we can safely conclude that Hintikka
has not shown that our objections fail. Perhaps, in fairness to
Hintikka, it should be admitted that although his system is not
adequate as a theory of real belief, it is possible that it is
an adequate theory of an idealized belief.
IV
I will conclude this chapter with a few general remarks on
the alleged ontological advantages of non-relational theories.
Prior and Quine suppose that non-relational theories make no
signficiant commitments to suspect entities. I argued in Chapter
VII that no judgment on the commitments of the non-relational
theories of Quine or Prior could be made until semantical accounts
of them were given. Hintikka has given a semantics for a
non-relational theory of belief but his theory does not escape
commitment to all objectionable kinds of entities. In
particular, Hintikka's theory is committed to possible worlds,
and that commitment is likely to be judged extravagant by
philosophers like Quine and Prior. So interpreted non-relational
theories may have commitments Prior and Quine regard as
objectionable, and it has not been shown that any adequate
non-relational theory can be developed that lacks such
cornmi tments
.
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Furthermore, a possible worlds semantics for belief
1
5
sentences can be developed that has no more commitments than
(H‘) and that avoids some of the objections just raised against
(H'). On this theory, call it '(B)', belief sentences are once
again treated as relational, with the objects of belief being
functions from possible worlds to truth values.
In order to develop B, we must suppose that each sentence
is assigned a truth value relative to each world. The function
that maps each world onto the truth value of a given sentence at
that world is the "preposition" expressed by that sentence.
Thus, the proposition expressed by is the function that maps
each world onto the truth value of <j> in that world.
In (B) a that-clause will be treated as a name of the
proposition expressed by the sentence it contains. Thus, ^that-cf^
is a name of the proposition expressed by t|). 'Believes' is a
two-place predicate true of people and propositions.
The theory just outlined seems to make no significant
ontological commitments not made by (H
1
). The only entities
required in addition to the usual assortment of individuals and
properties (sets of individuals) are possible worlds and functions
from possible worlds onto truth values. Thus, the commitments
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of (B) are the same as those of (H'), with the possible addition
01 the t» uth values, which must be as objects of some sort.
There are at least two respects in which (B) is superior
to (H
'
) . First, the logical impossibility objection raised against
(H 1 ) does not hold for this theory. Consider, for example, the
sentence 'Jones believes that seven times seven is forty eight'.
An adequate theory should allow this sentence to be true, and,
unlike (H 1 ), (B) does. Since 'Seven times seven is forty eight'
is false in all worlds, 'that seven times seven is forty eight'
names the function that maps every world onto falsity. The
interpretation of 'believes' may well include the pair consisting
of Jones and this function, so this belief sentence may well be
true. Thus, (B) is immune to the logical impossibility objection.
The closure objection is also avoided by (B). From the
fact that $ implies ij; it does not follow that <j> and ^ are true
in all the same worlds. Therefore, the functions named by
rthat ^ and ^thatif/1 may differ, and rS believes that cp and r S
believes thatij/1 may differ in truth value, even though <{> implies
ip. In escaping the closure objection (B) does open itself to
another objection. There are some cases in which we may wish to
infer from the fact that a person has one belief that he has
another. For example, one might hold that
6 . S believes that P and Q
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impl ies
7. S believes that P.
However, since 'P and Q' and ' P * are not true in all the same
worlds (assuming ' Q
' is contingent and not implied by 'P'), the
thdt-clauses in (6) and (7) name different functions, and thus
there is no guarantee that (7) will be true whenever (6) is.
This objection may be stated in a more general form.
Whereas (H 1 ) had the undesirable consequence that, one believes
ai 1 the implications of anything one believes, (B) does not have
as a consequence that one believes any of the implications of
anything one believes (with the exception of logical equivalents -
see below for more on this). This too seems undesirable, as
the truth of the matter appears to lie somewhere in between:
there are some implications that are so simple that if a person
believes the premise it follows that he believes the conclusion.
Sentences (6) and (7) give us an example iri which this obtains.
Although neither (H‘) nor (B) is entirely adequate to this
point, it seems to me that (B) is superior to (H'). For one
thing, one might argue, with some plausibility, that implications
even so simple as simplification can be overlooked and that the
implication from (6) to (7) is invalid. On the other hand,
if it is granted that (6) does imply (7), one could add axioms
arid rules to (B) to validate the inference. The exact form of
such rules needs to be worked out, but there seems to be no
reason why they cannot be developed.
A more serious problem with (B) is that it is subject to
the logical equivalence objection. If cf> and ip are logically
equivalent, then they are true in all the same worlds, and rthat (jO
and ^thatije name the same functions. As a result, believes
that and rS believes that ^ are equivalent.
I conclude that non-relational theories of belief, at
least those considered here, have little to recommend themselves.
The best non-relational theory, (H
1
), did have a commitment to
possible worlds, and thus does not avoid all suspect entities.
Since (B) is a relational theory that makes no additional
commitments and avoids some of the problems encountered by (H
1
),
it would seem that (B) is a superior theory. As we have seen,
.. .. 16
however, (B) itself is open to at least one serious objection.
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FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VIII
1. Oaakko Hintikka, "Semantics for Propositional Attitudes",
reprinted in Reference and Modality
,
edited by Leonard Linsky,
Oxford University P'ress, London, 1971, pp. 145-167. See also,
Oaakko Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief
,
Cornell University
Press, 1962.
2. It is important to realize that (Wl) allows open formulas,
e.g., 'Bx(Fa)', to be wffs. I assume that the other
formation rules are similar, and that formulas such as ' Fx
'
are also wffs.
3. One possibility is to let interpretations be partial functions.
If I('x',w) is u and u is not E(w- ), then I('x',w.) would be
undefi ned
.
4. See Hintikka, "Semantics for Propositional Attitudes", pp. 150-
151
.
5. See ibid
.
,
p. 152.
6. Since Ig is a function from individuals and worlds onto sets
of worlds, and not a function from names and worlds onto sets
of worlds, it would be a mistake to replace the right hand
side of (T4) by 'if; is true-I in every member of I(a,w)'.
7. A large part of his discussion is devoted to quantifying into
belief contexts, but that is not our concern here.
8. The expressions 'vacuous quantifiers' and 'unbound variable'
can be defined precisely, but I will not attempt to define
them here.
9. I intend every set of worlds to be a proposition, in this
sense, and not just those sets that are truth sets of some
sentence under some interpretation. I do not wish to suggest
that this use of 'proposition' is the same as the one
discussed in Chapter I.
10. Alternatively, we may say that (5) is true if there is something
true in all of a's belief worlds that is not true in all of
b's.
11. Hintikka, "Semantics for Propositional Attitudes", p. 153.
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12. Ibid
.
,
p. 154.
1 3 . Ibid
.
,
pp. 153-154.
14. I assume that Ijj does not assign the null set to any person
and world. If it did, then ( Ba(4>)'' would be true for every <J>,
since every cj> would be true in all (i.e., none) of ads belief
worlds.
15. See Richard Montague, "Pragmatics and Intensional Logic" in
Semantic s of Natural Languages , edited by D. Davidson and G.
Hanman, Dordrecht-Hol land, D. Reidel Publishing Co, 1972, pp.
142-168.
16. Montague argues in "Pragmatics and Intensional Logic" that
this is not a bad feature of his system.
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
In the previous chapters I have examined the views of
several philosophers who claim that an adequate account of belief
sentences does not require all the entities, such as propositions,
required b.y (PV). Carnap and Scheffler attempt to establish
this conclusion by rewriting or paraphrasing belief sentences as
sentences of languages that can be interpreted without including
prepositions in the domain. Davidson attempts to establish this
conclusion by providing an interpretation for the English belief
sentences themselves, while Prior and Quine defend it by
suggesting that belief sentences have a syntactical structure
different from that assumed by defenders of propositional
theories. Hintikka provides an interpretation for belief
sentences that presupposes such a syntax.
In this chapter J will summarize the conclusions reached
in my examination of these theories. I will also discuss what
implications the truth of these theories would have concerning
the existence of propositions or the desirability of a
propositional theory.
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Carnap and Scheffler have proposed rewriting belief
sentences as sentences of languages that can be interpreted
without propositions. Originally, Carnap proposed that a belief
sentence such as
1 . Galileo believed that the earth moves
be rewritten or paraphrased as:
2. Galileo was disposed to respond affirmatively to some
sentence of some language synonymous with 'The earth
moves' in English.
Other belief sentences could be rewritten in a similar manner.
The major problem with this proposal is fairly evident:
one's tendencies to respond affirmatively need not coincide with
one's beliefs. For example, Galileo might have tended to lie or
he might have been afraid to admit his controversial belief. In
either of these cases (2) would be false despite the trutn of (1).
So this proposal is unacceptable.
In the light of objections raised by his critics, Carnap
came to reject this proposal and in its place suggested tnat a
sentence like (1) be replaced by a sentence like.
3.
Galileo had relation B to 'The earth moves' as a sentence of
Engl ish.
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The idea here is that belief sentences be replaced in Carnap's
formal system by sentences that express a relation between a person,
a sentence, and a language. All references to propositions are
thus avoided, and it appears that we have an account of belief
sentences more economical than (PV). It is important to realize
that in this proposal, unlike the first one, the nature of the
relation expressed by the replacement sentences is not specified.
Objections raised by Church, discussed here in Chapter III,
show that this proposal succeeds only if two controversial
assumptions are made. First, it must be assumed that an adequate
paraphrasal of a sentence need only be logically equivalent to that
sentence, and not synonymous with it. Second, it must be assumed
that sentences in English necessarily mean what they do. That is,
it must be assumed that a sentence like
4. 'The earth moves' means in English that the earth moves
is a necessary truth. I believe that each of these
assumptions
is mistaken, although I am not certain that these points
constitute decisive objections to Carnap's proposal.
Additional problems for Carnap's theory were discussed
in
Chapter IV. One problem is that there is some
doubt that
iterated belief sentences can be treated properly
by the theory.
Furthermore, it seems clear that the existence
of ambiguous
sentences poses a serious problem for the
theory. Consider the
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ambiguous English sentence:
5. Jones believes that the bank is wet,
and its paraphrase in Carnap's system:
6. Jones has relation B to 'The bank is wet' in English.
Since (5) is ambiguous, we should not say that it is simply true
or false. Instead, we should say that it is true or false given
one of its meanings, and true or false given another of its
meanings. As a result, we can say that some utterances oi (5)
are true and some are false (or that (5) is true on some occasions
of utterance and false on others). Sentence (6), however, is not
ambiguous and consequently cannot properly paraphrase (5). For if
(5) is true under one of its meanings and false under
the other,
and (6), being unambiguous, has only one truth value,
then (6)
must improperly paraphrase (5) under one of its meanings.
The most promising solution to this problem is contained
in
the proposal made by Davidson. I will turn to it shortly.
Scheffler has proposed a different paraphrase of
belief
sentences. According to his theory, a belief sentence
like (1)
would be rewritten as:
7.
There is some x such that x is a
(that-the-earth-moves)
inscription and Galileo bel ieved-true x.
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An inscription is a (that-the-earth-moves) inscription if and only
if it is an inscription in English that looks just like the
inscription 'Trie earth moves'. Scheffler says little about the
predicate 'bel ieves-true' . What he does say is that a person need
not understand, affirm, or even be aware of an inscription he
bel i eves-true.
I argued that (7) is not a proper paraphrase of (1), since
(7), unlike (1), implies the existence of an inscription.
One interesting and important issue that arises in
connection with these proposals concerns the ontological
implications that can be drawn from them. Scheffler apparently
thinks that the truth of his proposal shows that there are no
propositions, or at least that we can avoid commitment to them.
He argues that since (a), (1) can be rewritten as (7), and (b),
(7) makes no mention of propositions and its quantifier does not
range over propositions, or at least that (d), we can avoid
commitment to them. Since we can avoid commitment to propositions,
and propositions are suspect entities, Scheffler would conclude
that we should adopt a theory that avoids them. A similar
argument could be made by a defender of Carnap's theory, although
Carnap himself does not offer such an argument.
I believe that the inference from (a) and (b) to (c) is
invalid. My argument against this inference is based upon
an
argument offered by Heidelberger. Since the predicate
'believes-
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true' is not one with which we are familiar, and it is not fully
analyzed, we do not know whether or not a person can believe-true
an inscription without standing in some other relation to some
other object. In particular, we do not know whether or not a
person can believe-true an inscription without there being a
proposition expressed by the inscription and believed by the
person. Until we know that this is not the case, we cannot infer
from the (alleged) truth of Scheffler's proposal that there are
no propositions.
Similar considerations apply to the above argument made by
a defender of a Carnapian theory. On Carnap's theory, the
predicate ' B ' is used in the sentences that paraphrase belief
sentences. All that we know about this predicate is that it is
a three-place predicate true of people, sentences, and languages,
and that if '
B
' is true of a person p, a sentence S, and a language
L, and S in L is synonymous with S' in L', then '
B
' is true of p,
S', and L'. One thing we do not know is whether or
not a person
can have relation B to a sentence and a language
without there
being a proposition expressed by the sentence in the
language and
believed by the person. Until we know that this is
not the case,
we cannot infer from the (alleged) truth of Carnap's
proposal
that there are no propositions.
One might draw the weaker conclusion, (d),
from the success
of one of these paraphrasing proposals.
That is, one might argue
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that the paraphrases show that, what is expressed by belief
sentences can be expressed by sentences of languages whose
interpretations do not include propositions in their domain.
Thus, a defender of Carnap's proposal might say that all that is
needed to interpret belief sentences are people, sentences, and
languages. Scheffler claims that all that is need to interpret
his system are people and inscriptions. Since these proposals are
more economical than (FV), they are preferable to (PV).
This argument is more complex than the previous one. Of
course, since we have seen that the paraphrases are not
successful, we can reject the argument. However, it is of some
interest to determine whether the success of the paraphrases
would
have established that we need not, and should not,
suppose that
there are propositions.
I believe that the success of either of these
proposed
paraphrases of belief sentences would have shown
that belier can
be expressed in a language that can be
interpreted without
resorting to propositions. However, the price
paid for this
ontological saving comes in the nature of the
primitive predicates
of the language. On Carnap's theory we
appeal to the predicate
»
B
*
.
One way to account for the way *B’
behaves in the system
is to say that sentences are synonymous
when they express tne
same proposition and that a person has
relation B to a sentence
in a language if and only if he
believes the proposition
224
expressed by the sentence in the language. Of course, if the point
of the proposal is to avoid propositions, such an explanation of
'B' is inappropriate.
It seems desirable, then, that some alternative account of
'
B
' be given. However, it is difficult to imagine v/hat account
other than the one just mentioned could be given. Thus, Carnap's
proposal makes use of an unanalyzed obscure predicate ' B *
,
that
can only be properly understood if appeal is made to propositions.
It is not clear that a theory with such an obscure predicate is
preferable to one that recognizes propositions in the first
place. That is, it is not clear that an interpretation of our
language that renders predicates obscure is preferable to an
interpretation that requires suspect entities.
Similar remarks can be made about Scheffler's proposal.
Like 1 B‘, Scheffier's 'bel ieves-true' is an unanalyzed obscure
predicate. One possible analysis of it would appeal to
propositions! a person bel ieves-true an inscription if and only
if he believes the proposition expressed by the inscription. But
this account of 'bel ieves-true
1 is unacceptable to Scheffler,
who proposes to do without propositions. Again, it is not clear
that Scheffler's theory, with its obscure predicate, is
preferable
to a theory that recognizes propositions in the first
place.
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II
Davidson has proposed another alternative to (PV). He
develops his theory in terms of sentences in indirect discourse,
and suggests that the truth conditions for a sentence such as
8. Galileo said that the earth moves
are given by the following molecular sentence:
9. Galileo produced some utterance that is a samesaying with that
the earth moves.
Here ’that' is a demonstrative referring to the utterance of the
sentence following it. Accordingly, 'samesaying' is a two-place
predicate true of utterances, that holds, according to Davidson,
when the utterances agree in "purport".
When we extend Davidson's theory to belief sentences, a
couple of problems arise. It is difficult to see how 'believes
can be analyzed in terms of samesaying. Since (1) can be true
without Galileo having produced or even been disposed to produce
any samesayi rig with any utterance of 'Ihe earth moves , (1)
cannot be given an analysis similar to that proposed for (8).
The best we can do, I believe, is rewrite (1) as:
10.
Galileo believed that: the earth moves.
As in (9), 'that' is to be interpreted as a
demonstrative.
referring in any utterance of (10) to the utterance of 'The earth
moves' contained in that utterance of (10). Accordingly,
'believes' is a two-place predicate true of people and utterances.
One virtue of this proposal is that it solves the
ambiguity problem described earlier- Consider again the
ambiguous sentence (6). On Davidson's theory, (6) is rewritten as:
11. Jones believes that: the bank is wet.
In any particular utterance of (11) 'that refers to the utterance
of 'The bank is wet' contained in that utterance of (II). Since
such utterances of 'The bank is wet' may vary in meaning, Jones
may believe some of them but need not believe all of them. So
(11), on Davidson's theory, can vary in truth value
from one
utterance to another, and therefore can properly represent (6).
What is peculiar about Davidson's proposal is that it
has
as a consequence that people believe utterances
they have never
heard and utterances they could not understand.
For example, if
(10) is true as uttered by me now, then
Galileo believed an
utterance made by me now in English. Thus,
Galileo would believe
an utterance made hundreds of years after
his death in a language
he need not have understood.
This oddity could be explained by saying
that 'believes',
as it should be understood in (10) may
be analyzed in the following
way: a person believes an utterance,
in Davidson's sense of
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'believes', if an only if he believes, in a more usual sense, the
proposition expressed in that utterance. Since one of the
objectives of Davidson's theory is to avoid propositions, this
account of his use of 'believes' is inappropriate. Without it,
however, we are left with an obscure unanalyzed predicate, and
again, it is not clear that such a theory is preferable to one
that recognizes propositions in the first place.
Davidson's theory also encounters problems in dealing with
sentences in which the objects of one's belief are mentioned
without being expressed. For example, for a sentence such as
12. Galileo believed something Newton disbelieved
to be true on this theory, there must be some utterance such that
Galileo believed it and Newton disbelieved it. However, since
the point of contention between Galileo and Newton might remain
unspoken, this seems to be an improper reading of (12).
Ill
The final group of theories discussed here are theories
that suggested that we do away with objects of belief altogether.
It was thought that so doing would avoid commitment to objectionable
However, the non-relational theories proposed by Quineentities.
and Prior did not include any semantical treatment of belief
sentences, and as a result we have no idea what the ontological
commitments of these theories are. An interpreted non-relational
theory, such as Hintikka's, does have commitments to some entities
that may be objectionable: possible worlds. Furthermore, Hintikka'
theory has a number of problematic features, most notably, that
everyone believes all the logical consequences of anything he
bel ieves
.
I conclude, then, that none of the theories discussed here
is entirely satisfactory. Since we have no acceptable alternative
to (PV), we have no acceptable account of belief sentences that is
committed to fewer entities than (PV). Thus, it has not been
established that (PV) is committed to more entities than are
required for an adequate account of belief sentences.
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